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Chapter 1
Introduction
A great part of humanity participates about half of its lifetime in the labor market. The
reasons are manifold: first, it may be argued from a social and psychological perspective
that individuals achieve one’s full potential through the participation in the labor market
and that the feeling to be needed strengthens the intrinsic motivation, self-satisfaction, and
self-esteem.1 Further, there is a bulk of literature showing that a spell of unemployment
will lead to a systematically lower life satisfaction even after several years (for an overview,
see Clark, 2006; Clark et al., 2008; Clark & Georgellis, 2013; J. M. Bauer et al., 2015;
Neve & Ward, 2017).2 Second, the participation in the labor market and especially the
performance therein constitutes individuals’ wealth, mainly due to wage payments, and
enables a certain degree of freedom. It decides which type of goods and services individuals
can afford to consume, if they can rent a flat or a house, or wether or not they are able to
possess a house on their own, if they are able to go on vacation and where they are able to
1It is meanwhile acknowledged by economists that psychological factors play a role in the incentivisa-
tion of workers. Many workers do not only care about their own wage payment, but also on how much
their peers receive. Further, reciprocity, responding to a perceived positive action with another one to
reward kind actions, shapes individuals’ utility (for an overview, see e.g., Fehr & Falk, 2002; Sobel, 2005;
Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Lastly, altruism, implying that the well being of an individual depends pos-
itively on the well being of others, is used to explain charitable donations and volunteering (see Becker,
1974).
2The paper of J. M. Bauer et al. (2015) evolved out of a seminar paper I wrote together with a
colleague during my studies.
1
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go an vacation, which schools their children attend, and so forth (see Borjas, 2013). Thus,
it becomes evident that the labor market outcomes of individuals, such as the employment
prospect and wage payments, determine their well-being and their life to a great amount.
On top of that, it can be argued that a well-functioning labor market, where as many
people as possible participate in and where a more or less fair income distribution may
be realized, is also of interest for politicians and societies as a whole, since economic
growth and social harmony crucially depend on these things. This makes it clear, why
not only labor economists, but also non-labor economists and the general public should
be interested in the functioning of labor markets. Especially recent years have shown
that the traditional configuration and functioning of labor markets comes under pressure.
While this thesis can certainly not address all of the issues that are playing a role in
shaping labor markets, several important phenomena are studied to analyze how these
affect the labor market outcomes of individuals. These are:3
• How does the coordination of unions at the firm level depend on the degree of
product differentiation and how does it affect the wage rate of workers?
• How does a deregulation of temporary agency employment affect the employment
structure in an economy?
• Will low-skilled workers lose their job due to automation?
• What are the effects of low-skilled immigration?
While the first two questions reveal how a change that is brought up by institutions
affects several labor market outcomes, the third topic deals with an issue of technological
change and the fourth one with an important aspect of globalization.
To be more precise, the impact of institutions and in particular collective bargaining
has been on the agenda of labor economists for decades. However, the feature of multi-
unionism is less considered. Multi-unionism describes the presence of two or more labor
3Next to the examined issues in this thesis, there are a lot of other interesting policy issues labor
economics are dealing with, such as the effects of offshoring, the impact of introducing a minimum wage
on the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers or the optimal design of the unemployment benefit
system in order to reduce the duration of unemployment.
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unions at the firm level. In Germany, June 23, 2010 served as and important day for labor
union policy, since the principle of tariff unity was abolished.4 From this day forward it has
been allowed that various tariff agreements for different occupational groups can coexist
within a firm, even if they only apply to a minority of workers within that firm. As a
consequence, the incentive for occupational groups to form craft unions and to achieve
independent tariff agreements raised rapidly, which resulted in a couple of strikes in the
aviation industry and the rail transport. Subsequently, in 2015 the government passed the
Federal Act on Tariff Unity (Gesetz zur Tarifeinheit, BGBl. I, 1130), which amended § 4a
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Act (Tarifvertragsgesetz ) and regulates that only
one contract is valid within a firm, when unions are representing the same occupational
group, namely the tariff agreement of the union that represents more members of the
particular occupation group. In view of this new law, the rail transport was marked
by a wave of strikes and by the longest strike in the history, as the smaller craft union
continuously tried to defect members from the larger industry union.
A second institutional change was conducted by governments in the last couple of
decades in the European Union due to the deregulation of temporary agency employ-
ment. Temporary agency employment is one form of an atypical employment relationship
and involves three parties: a worker that is employed at a temporary employment agency
that acts as an intermediary and lends the worker to a client firm, where the worker is
used for production. Both sides, employers and employees have an incentive to engage in
temporary agency employment. From the employers’ side it can be argued that the use
of temporary agency employment leads to saving costs and increasing profits, e.g. since
the employment protection of temporary agency workers is rather week (see, e.g., Jahn &
Weber, 2016). Further, the use of temporary agency workers allows firms to adjust their
work force very easily in production peaks or in a period with a lack of orders (see House-
man, 2001; Ono & Sullivan, 2013; Baumgarten & Kvasnicka, 2017). From the perspective
of the worker, it may be argued that especially young workers and students hire at a
temporary employment agency in order to obtain diversified labor market experience in a
short time, and thereby raise their attractiveness for future employers (see Crimmann et
4See, Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), decision from June 23, 2010 – 10 AS 3/10.
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al., 2009).5 A more important argument, however, is that temporary agency employment
serves as a stepping stone to regular employment (see Nunez & Livanos, 2015).6
The third part of this thesis deals with the issue of technological change. More than
80 years ago, John Maynard Keynes anticipated the rapid technological progress that
occurred since then, but he also supposed that “we are being aﬄicted with a new dis-
ease of which some readers may not have heard the name, but of which they will hear a
great deal in the years to come – namely, technological unemployment” (Keynes, 1930).
Wassily Leontief shared a similar opinion and stated that “Labor will become less and
less important (...) More and more workers will be replaced by machines. I do not see
that the new industries can employ everybody who wants a job.”7 Even if the predictions
of these two influential economists haven been proven to be wrong in the past, the con-
cern that the automation of tasks that were previously performed by humans will make
them redundant is rising again due to the enormous progress of automation, robotics and
artificial intelligence in recent years (see Akst, 2013; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Ford,
2016; Davison, 2017).
The last part of this thesis picks up the issue of immigration, which is an important
characteristic in today’s globalized world. Globalization facilitates immigration as in-
ternational trade and outsourcing activities lead to more competition and specialization
and, therefore, also reduced prices for long-distance transport. Further, the freedom of
movement for workers in the European Union and progressing digitalization, which makes
it much easier to collect information about potential destination countries, both increase
the migration flows. Germany, for example, is the second largest destination country in
recent years (OECD, 2014) and has to deal with a net migration of 1.1 million people in
the peak of 2015 (Bru¨cker et al., 2017). These large migration flows may be one reason
5This incentive prevails even if studies reveal that temporary agency workers receive a 25% lower wage
rate than regular workers (see Jahn & Pozzoli, 2013) and that labor turnover is about five times higher
(see Haller & Jahn, 2014).
6There are of course more reasons than those mentioned here for engaging in temporary agency
employment both for workers and firms.
7See the interview by Charlotte Curtis, “Machines vs. Workers”, The New York Times, February 8,
1983.
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for the rise of nationalist parties in many countries, since a lot of Germans and Europeans
are afraid of feeling overwhelmed by immigrants and refugees and actively protest against
open borders.
By taking state-of-the-art models in labor economics and enriching them with the spe-
cific issue at hand, this thesis sheds some light to answer the aforementioned questions
in a novel framework and reveals some potential channels that should not be overlooked
when policy makers address these issues in modern societies. The contribution can be
split in four parts. Chapter 2 picks up a rather special feature of labor union organization
and analyzes how the decision of labor unions to merge or to bargain as separate entities
depends on the degree of product differentiation. Chapters 3 examines how deregulation
efforts of a government, in form of temporary agency employment, affect the employment
structure and the position of labor unions in the economy. Chapter 4 analyzes if progress-
ing automation may lead to skill-specific technological unemployment in the long run.
Finally, Chapter 5 studies how the technological orientation of an economy may change
due to an exogenous inflow of immigrants.
Chapter 2 (single authored) seizes on the issue of multi-unionism and studies diverse
firm-union negotiations. To do so, it uses a partial equilibrium model as in Horn &
Wolinsky (1988a) to examine the effects of multi-unionism on labor market outcomes,
such as the wage rates of workers and the merger incentives of the labor unions. There
are two labor unions that supply labor to a single firm, which produces two final goods.
While the first good is produced with workers of one labor union, the second good requires
labor input from the other union. Using a linear demand function with differentiated
products (see Dixit, 1979; Singh & Vives, 1984) makes it possible to distinguish two
cases: substitutable products in consumption (tariff competition) and complementary
products in consumption (tariff plurality). Three forms of negotiations are examined
and compared to each other: joint, simultaneous and sequential bargaining. Under joint
bargaining, the unions decide ex-ante (before negotiations take place) to merge and to
bargain as a single entity, while they bargain separately and at the same time under
simultaneous bargaining, and lastly separately, but lagged under sequential bargaining.
The scope of bargaining is about wages, while firms set the optimal employment level.
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All of the results are calculated for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. Using this
type of model, it can be shown that labor unions have strict incentives to merge if the
products are substitutable in consumption, while they want to stay separated and bargain
sequentially with the firm for complementary products. As a second result, the model
reveals that the decisions of unions to merge or to bargain as single entities are beneficial
for workers in terms of their wage rate. Only for complementary products, the workers
of the union that bargains in a second stage under sequential bargaining would be better
off in case of simultaneous bargaining.
Chapter 3 (joint work with Philipp Baudy) investigates the deregulation of temporary
agency employment, which has been an important instrument for politicians in the last
few decades to break up the rather rigid labor markets in the European Union, especially
in Germany through the so-called “Agenda 2010”, and to make them more flexible. It uses
a general equilibrium matching model a` la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000) to analyze how a deregulation of temporary agency employment affects the rate
of unemployment and the employment structure in a unionized economy. To be more
specific, it builds up on the work of Delacroix (2006), Ebell & Haefke (2006), C. Bauer &
Lingens (2013), and Krusell & Rudanko (2016), who make first attempts to incorporate
labor unions in the search and matching framework, and Neugart & Storrie (2006) and
Baumann et al. (2011), who are the first that introduce temporary agency employment
in the search and matching model. In doing so, it is the first theoretical model that
combines labor unions and temporary agency employment in the matching framework
and makes it possible to address the question whether or not regularly employed workers
get substituted by temporary agency workers due to continuous deregulation efforts. In
the model, multiple-worker firms produce differentiated goods using regularly employed
workers that are represented by firm-level labor unions or they may use temporary agency
workers for some parts of the production. Temporary agency workers are perfect substi-
tutes for regular workers. To reflect one of the central advantages of temporary agency
employment, which is that temporary agency employment serves as a stepping-stone for
regular employment, temporary agency workers are allowed to search on-the-job for reg-
ular employment. The model predicts that the deregulation of temporary agency work
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reduces overall unemployment and increases the rate of regular employment. Since tem-
porary agency employment is more attractive due to its deregulation, labor unions have
to reduce their wage claims for regular workers leading to lower wages and, therefore, a
higher employment rate. It can be further shown that labor unions come under pressure
due to the deregulation, since the negative wage effect outweighs the positive employment
effect on labor unions’ utility. The last, and probably most interesting result, is that there
exists a hump-shaped relationship between the degree of legal deregulation of temporary
agency employment and its rate of employment. The main driver behind this finding are
voluntary, non-institutional regulations that arise due to agreements between firms and
employee representations. These agreements become more important, the cheaper and
thereby less regulated temporary agency employment is. This negative effect counteracts
the direct effect of reduced costs that arise due to the deregulation and outweighs the
latter effect if legal regulation is sufficiently low. The last finding reveals that the fear
of opponents of temporary agency employment, that a deregulation of temporary agency
employment creates more precarious employment, may not be supported at least in this
type of model. It shows that a steady deregulation of temporary agency employment
does not necessarily lead to an increase in precarious employment. In addition, this find-
ing fits very well to the data, since the rate of temporary agency employment is rather
non-volatile and relatively stable at a level around 2% in most industrialized countries.
While Chapter 3 is more backward looking and focuses on an aspect of deregulation
that changed the flexibility of labor markets in the last couple of decades, Chapter 4 (joint
work with Klaus Prettner) is more forward looking and deals with the issue of automation
that may fundamentally alter the international division of labor and the functioning of
labor markets itself in the not too distant future. While the previous and most influential
contributions of He´mous & Olsen (2016) and Acemoglu & Restrepo (2018) concentrate
on the effects of automation on economic growth and inequality using the R&D-based
growth literature, the model in Chapter 4 takes a different perspective and addresses
the question if automation has the potential to create technological unemployment. To
address this question, and similar to Chapter 3, the model in Chapter 4 uses the search and
matching framework of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). Further, the
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model features two types of workers, high- and low-skilled workers, with an exogenous
skill distribution and two types of one-worker firms that operate in the intermediate
goods sector and require high- or low-skilled workers for production, respectively. Both
intermediate goods are then used for the production of a final good. Next to low- and
high-skilled labor, traditional capital in the form of assembly lines, factory buildings etc.
and automation capital in form of industrial robots, self-driving cars, 3D printers etc.
are used for the production of the final good. The final good is produced according to
a CES production structure, where automation capital serves as a perfect substitute for
low-skilled labor and an imperfect substitute for high-skilled labor. Using this framework,
it can be shown that the accumulation of automation capital decreases the labor market
tightness in the low-skilled labor market and increases the labor-market tightness in the
high-skilled labor market. This in turn decreases the job finding probability of low-
skilled workers and increases that of high-skilled workers, which in turn leads to a higher
unemployment rate of low-skilled workers and a lower unemployment rate of high-skilled
workers. It can be further concluded that the worse outside option of low-skilled workers,
due to a lower job finding probability, is responsible for a drop in low-skilled workers’ wage
rate, while exactly the opposite holds true for high-skilled workers. These findings are also
of interest for politicians, since the current setting suggests that progressing automation
leads to a rise in inequality and, therefore, may even foster the division of societies in
countries that are already shaped by a non-negligible social inequality.
Chapter 5 (single authored) picks up another aspect and phenomena that takes on
an important role in today’s globalized world by taking a closer look at the effects of
immigration. While there already exist contributions that study the effects of immigration
on the wage level of natives and the employment structure of the host country in a
search and matching framework a` la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000)
(see, e.g., Chassamboulli & Palivos, 2013, 2014; Battisti et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017),
no attention has been paid to the question whether or not an increase in immigration
changes the technology choices of firms in the host country. Therefore, Chapter 5 addresses
this issue and answers the question if an increase in low-skilled immigration changes the
technological orientation of the host country. As the previous two chapters, Chapter 5
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uses the search and matching framework of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000) and, in addition, builds on the influential work of Albrecht & Vroman (2002).8
The model incorporates three types of workers: low-skilled immigrants and low- and high-
skilled natives. Further, there are two types of firms: low- and high-tech firms. While low-
skilled workers can only be hired in low-tech firms, the model also allows for educational
mismatch as high-skilled workers can be hired in both type of firms. The skill distribution
of workers is considered to be exogenous, whereas firms may endogenously adjust their
technology by deciding ex ante if they want to use the basic or the advanced technology
for production. Workers randomly match with these vacancies. While firms differ in the
technology they use for production, productivity is higher in high-tech firms, and in the
costs of maintaining a vacancy, workers differ in their flow income of unemployment and
the costs of searching for a job. These costs are higher for immigrants due to existing
language barriers, non-existence of a social network, social stigma against immigrants,
and so forth. The developed model suggests that an influx of low-skilled immigrants
deteriorates the technology level used in the host country and leads to a more intensive
use of the basic technology. High-skilled natives gain in terms of employment, but lose in
terms of their wage rate due to low-skilled immigration. Surprisingly, low-skilled natives
benefit in both terms due to the shift towards the basic technology. This result is also
of interest for politicians, since it shows that there might also be positive aspects of
immigration for substitutable production factors if there are firms in the economy that
adjust there production pattern to the changed skill-mix of labor supply. Lastly, the
model analyzes the effects of policies that improve the access of immigrants to the labor
market. The effects are exactly the opposite: firms shift their production towards the
advanced technology, while low-skilled natives are hurt and high-skilled natives receive a
higher wage rate, but suffer from additional unemployment.
Finally, after the four models have been developed and analyzed in detail, Chapter 6
discusses and concludes the thesis.
8Dolado et al. (2009) extend their model by introducing on-the-job search, while Baudy (2017) incor-
porates temporary agency employment.
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Chapter 2
Multi-unionism at the Firm Level:
The Impact of Asymmetric Nash
Bargaining Solutions on Labor
Unions’ Merger Incentives
2.1 Introduction
Multi-unionism describes a situation where at least two or more labor unions represent
union members at the firm or industry level for collective bargaining purposes. For the
last couple of decades, this trend has been rising and takes on an important role in labor
relations in most European countries. At the national level, multi-unionism prevails due
to the existence of two or more labor union federations. Including Germany, 85% of
the European Union member states have more than one labor union federation, who are
organizing several labor unions and its members. Even in member states, where only one
labor union federation exists (Austria, Ireland, Latvia and United Kingdom), a couple
of labor unions are unionized within this federation. However, the industrial relation
environment in Europe differs from the one in North America. In the United States of
America, multi-unionism disappeared after the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner
Act) was passed in 1935. Therefore, there is only one specific labor union that has the
14
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exclusive right to represent and negotiate for employees in a firm (see Akkerman, 2008).
Considering the high presence of multi-unionism that firms are facing nowadays in
Europe, there has been a growing amount of empirical and theoretical research being done
in labor economics. Reasons for this could be due to not only the high relevance, but also
the political need for politicians and economic policy. This chapter tries to fill a gap in the
theoretical literature on multi-unionism at the firm level and contributes to the literature
in the following ways. First, different bargaining types, such as, joint, simultaneous, and
sequential bargaining between one firm and two labor unions are analyzed in a right-
to-manage model.1 Second, all of the results are calculated for the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution.
The choice of the appropriate bargaining scope is an ongoing discussion in the la-
bor union literature. Regardless of whether establishments or labor unions are asked if
employment is part of the negotiations or not, the answer seems to support the right-to-
manage model (see Oswald, 1993; Booth, 1995). However, it is sometimes argued that
labor unions and firms implicitly bargain over employment due to so called “manning”
levels, which represent capital-to-labor or labor-to-output ratios. Nevertheless, there is no
reason why such contracts determine the employment level, since firms may, for example,
adjust both capital and employment (see Beissinger & Baudy, 2015).
From an empirical perspective, the findings are rather mixed. While some studies find
evidence for equilibria lying on the labor demand curve, other papers find evidence in favor
of equilibria on the Pareto curve or aside of both. Lawson (2011) provides a beneficial and
detailed survey of this literature. Although there are several studies that find evidence
in favor of the efficient bargaining model, it should be considered that empirical tests
that try to differentiate between the right-to-manage model and the efficient bargaining
model have pointed out a number of problems. For example, they have to make joint
assumptions about labor unions’ preferences, the market structure, technologies, etc. (for
an detailed overview of these econometric issues, see Booth, 1995).
1This analysis builds on the right-to-manage model of collective bargaining introduced by Nickell &
Andrews (1983). This framework differs from the efficient bargaining model, where firms and labor unions
bargain over wages and employment levels.
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From a theoretical point of view, it can be argued that the outcome of efficient bar-
gaining may not be realized. The reason is that firms, for any degree of union influence
over employment, will always have an incentive to deviate from the outcome of efficient
bargaining that normally lies on the Pareto curve and to choose its profit maximizing
employment level on the labor demand curve (see Naylor, 2003). Nevertheless, it should
be taken into account that the results may be different if a “game-theoretic approach” is
used in union-oligopoly negotiations (see, e.g., Schroeder & Tremblay, 2014; Fanti, 2015;
Fanti & Buccella, 2017). However, in a recent contribution Buccella & Fanti (2017) point
out that the timing of the bargaining agenda is assumed to be exogenous in most of
the literature. Considering that the timing of the game is endogenous and a decisional
variable of the firm, they show that efficient bargaining does not emerge as a unique equi-
librium. Regarding these reasons and complementing existing literature, such as, Upmann
& Mu¨ller (2014) and Aghadadashli & Wey (2015), a right-to-manage model is assumed.
So far, most studies have used alternative bargaining models or a different method-
ological outline. The theoretical methodology used in this chapter is guided by the model
from Horn & Wolinsky (1988a). Their study contemplates negotiations between a firm
and two labor unions, where each unions’ work force produces a differentiated (either com-
plementary or substitutable) good, over the wage rate, whereas the employment levels are
determined by the employer. In comparison to the right-to-manage model, it is assumed
that the employment levels are exogenously fixed. They cannot be adjusted by the firm
after successful wage negotiations. Horn & Wolinsky (1988b) use the right-to-manage
model to study bargaining between a duopoly of firms that acquire labor inputs through
bilateral monopoly relations with the unions. Thus, they analyze merger incentives of the
unions in the upstream industry if bargaining takes place with two firms. Closely related
to this chapter is Aghadadashli & Wey (2015), who apply a similar theoretical outline.
However, they mainly use an efficient bargaining model and do not consider asymmetric
Nash bargaining solutions.
There are very few empirical studies that analyze the effect of multi-unionism on wages
and the incidence of industrial action. Machin et al. (1993) use data from the 1984
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey in the United Kingdom to study the relationship
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between multi-unionism and a couple of outcome variables. They find that plants with
multi-unionism and separate bargaining agreements pay ceteris paribus higher wages than
those plants that bargain with a joint union under multi-unionism or with a single labor
union.2 Further, the same industrial plants have a lower financial performance and a
higher probability of facing a strike that lasts at least one day. Thus, they conclude that
it is not the presence of multi-unionism that leads to negative bargaining outcomes, but
whether or not the labor unions bargain individually or as a single entity under multi-
unionism. Metcalf et al. (1993) use data of firms in the British manufacturing industry
from the years 1981-1989. They find that the probability of a strike is higher if the
unions bargain separately than if they bargain as a single entity. Further, the strike
probability increases in the number of bargaining groups. Akkerman (2008) uses data of
four industrial sectors for seven European countries from 1990-2006. Her findings indicate
a positive relationship between strike frequency and the number of unions. In addition, her
empirical analysis shows that this positive effect is present in sectors with a heterogenous
work force, but not in those sectors where the work force is rather homogenous. Last
but not least, Jansen (2014) uses data for more than 5,000 firms for 27 European Union
members states in 2009. Similar to the aforementioned authors, his findings confirm the
positive relationship between strike incidence and the number of unions at the workplace.
Further, he shows that the effect of multi-unionism on strike incidence differs substantially
across countries.
Supported by literature, one result is that the already existing merger incentives of
the unions, when joint bargaining is compared to sequential and simultaneous bargaining,
can be confirmed in a right-to-manage model. Unions have strict incentives to merge if
the two products are substitutes in consumption, while they bargain independently and
sequentially if the products are complements in consumption. Further, it is demonstrated
that the decision of unions to merge or to bargain independently favor workers in terms of
their wage rate. Only for complementary products, the workers of the union that bargains
in a second stage under sequential bargaining would prefer to bargain simultaneously.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 surveys the existing
2Naylor (1995) provides a theoretical interpretation for this empirical finding.
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theoretical literature on multi-unionism. Section 2.3 contains the outline of the theoret-
ical framework and explains the components of the model. In Section 2.4, the model is
analyzed for different bargaining regimes in order to identify the merger incentives of the
unions. Finally, Section 2.5 summarizes the results and concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Taking into account that multi-unionism is rather the rule than the exception in Eu-
ropean countries, the question for potential reasons of the development of craft unions
arise. Theoretically, there exist few explanations for the development and the rise of craft
unions. The first theory stems from Olson (1965), which focuses on a politico-economic
perspective. He argues that small and homogenous worker groups have problems to assert
their interests properly in industry wide unions. Thus, these groups have incentives to
represent their interests separately in smaller craft unions. Further, individuals have high
incentives to free-ride in larger groups. The free-rider problem occurs when individuals
benefit from goods or services without bearing any costs (e.g. membership fees). Ac-
cording to the neoclassical theory of labor demand, labor unions that only organize a
small group of workers are more successful in increasing wages (see, e.g. Borjas, 2010,
pp. 114-115). The reason is that it is more likely that the labor costs of a small group
make up only a minor part of total production costs. Thus, the relatively inelastic labor
demand curve makes it possible to increase wages without losing many jobs. The last
theory stems from Horn & Wolinsky (1988a) and is considered to be a part of the domain
of industrial economics. The development of craft unions can be seen as an instrument to
achieve an economic rent for those occupational groups that are complementary in their
labor skills compared to other worker groups used in production. This is due to the fact
that these groups can force a firm to shut down production in the event of a strike, which
then results in a higher bargaining power of the workers. Thus, the workers are better off
to organize themselves separately in a craft union in order to achieve higher wages.
The theoretical literature on multi-unionism dates back to the end of the eighties and
consists of several papers, such as Horn & Wolinsky (1988a, 1988b), Dowrick (1993) and
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Gu¨rtzgen (2003). In Horn & Wolinsky (1988a), a firm and two unions debate over the
wage rate, whereas the employment levels are set by the employer. Wages are determined
in three stages. In the first stage, the firm sets the employment levels. In comparison
to the right-to-manage model, it is assumed that the employment levels are exogenously
fixed. Therefore, they cannot be altered by the firm after the negotiations about wages
were finalized. Thus, it is considered that the firm looks through the next two stages and
considers how the employment decision will affect the outcomes of the following stages. In
the second stage, the unions decide if they want to bargain jointly or simultaneously with
the firm, while the negotiations about wages take place in the third stage. In order to solve
this bargaining problem, the authors use an extended version of the strategic bargaining
model by Rubinstein (1982). Their main findings are the following: if the worker groups
are substitutable, the unions are better off if they form a joint union. The rationale is
that the bargaining power of each union is weaker in the case that the worker groups are
substitutable. If there is a disagreement between the firm and the workers (e.g. a strike),
the firm can easily replace workers of a union with members from the other union and
continue production. In contrast, if the worker groups are complementary then the utility
of the unions is maximized if they bargain separately. The is due to the relatively high
bargaining power of the unions, as it is not possible for the firm to proceed production
with only one worker group. Thus, the decision of the form of unionization depends on
the degree of differentiation of the worker groups.
In Horn & Wolinsky (1988b), a right-to-manage model is used to study the bargaining
problem between a duopoly of firms that receives labor through bilateral monopoly rela-
tions with the labor unions. Hence, the authors analyze merger incentives in the upstream
industry if bargaining takes place with two firms. It is shown that the merger incentives
of the unions are identical to those in Horn & Wolinsky (1988a), where bargaining takes
place with a single firm. Further, the incentives of the firms to merge in a downstream
market are analyzed if negotiations take place with a single labor union. It is highlighted
that the sum of the profits of a duopoly of firms is larger than the profits of a downstream
monopoly if the products are substitutable. Thus, the gains from monopolizing a down-
stream industry are smaller than the losses obtained due to having a worse bargaining
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position. In contrast, the profits of a downstream monopoly are larger than the profits of
the total downstream industry (duopoly of firms) if the goods are complementary.
Similar to Horn & Wolinsky (1988b), Dowrick (1993) takes product market competition
into account. He uses the right-to-manage model to analyze wage negotiations in the
case of a duopoly of firms and labor unions. However, the author extends the model
of Horn & Wolinsky (1988b) in two ways. First, he analyzes eight different bargaining
and organizational structures. Second, strike payoffs are considered and are assumed
to be endogenous. His main finding is that the impact of the level of bargaining on
wage outcomes are not clear. The effects are only conclusive if the level of organization
(specifically the level of the labor unions) is changed in a similar way.
In contrast, Gu¨rtzgen (2003) does not only allow for horizontally mergers, she also
takes into account vertical mergers. These are characterized by cooperation across firms
or industries. In addition, she extends the 2 × 2 duopoly of Dowrick (1993) to the more
general case of multiple labor unions and firms. In comparison to the aforementioned
papers, she assumes a monopoly-union model.3 Her essential finding is that wages cannot
be ranked according to the degree of centralization. The reason being is that wages are
not solely dependent on the cooperation dimension, but also on the specific technical
relationship between different worker groups.
Certainly, the previously discussed papers are not the only ones that cover multi-
unionism. Next to these seminal papers, there are several other papers that deal with
different elements of labor union centralization (see Davidson, 1988; Dowrick, 1989; Hoel,
1989; Jun, 1989; Cheung & Davidson, 1991; Buccella, 2013; Upmann & Mu¨ller, 2014;
Han & Mukherjee, 2017).
The paper closely related to this chapter is Aghadadashli & Wey (2015). In their
main analysis, it is assumed that a single firm uses labor inputs from two unions in
order to produce a single product. Whereas, in an extension it is supposed that a firm
negotiates with two unions, where the workers of each union produce a differentiated
good. According to Aghadadashli & Wey (2015), a prominent example for the latter
3In the monopoly-union model the unions unilaterally determine the wages, while the firm sets the
optimal employment levels.
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setting is the framework of the dominant German railway company (Deutsche Bahn;
DB). The DB offers rail journeys as well as intercity bus services. Most of the train
drivers are represented by the the German Train Drivers Union (Gewerkschaft Deutscher
Lokomotivfu¨hrer), while on the other hand bus drivers of the DB are organized in the
Railway and Transport Union (Eisenbahn- und Verkehrsgewerkschaft). Thus, the two
services can be substitutable or complementary in consumption. In comparison to the
main analysis, it is not necessary for the relationships to be perfect. In both models, an
efficient bargaining model is used to analyze the bargaining problem between a single firm
and two unions. Despite joint and simultaneous bargaining, the authors study sequential
bargaining. Their findings support the existing merger results in related literature: labor
unions have strict incentives to merge if the workers are substitutable, while the unions
stay separated if the worker groups are complementary. Furthermore, the main analysis
shows that under sequential bargaining that labor union, who bargains first with the firm
has a first-mover advantage if the workers are substitutable. For complementary workers, a
second-mover advantage exists. Regarding the analysis of the extension (two differentiated
products), sequential bargaining leads to over-employment (under-employment) if the
products are substitutable (complementary).
2.3 Outline of the Theoretical Framework
2.3.1 Basic Assumptions
A model is considered in which a single firm bargains with two labor unions. The frame-
work of this type of model is borrowed from Horn & Wolinsky (1988a). The downstream
market consists of one firm (employer). The firm negotiates with two unions in the up-
stream market: union X and union Y .
Three different forms of firm-union negotiations are studied: joint, simultaneous, and
sequential bargaining. The firm can only start production if the negotiations with at least
one union are successful. Before the negotiations take place, unions X and Y can decide
whether they want to merge or to stay separated. If the unions decide to merge, the firm
has to negotiate with a joint union Z. If the unions do not merge, there is the possibility to
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study simultaneous and sequential bargaining. Under simultaneous bargaining, the firm
bargains at the same time with unions X and Y . Whereas, under sequential bargaining
it is assumed that the firm bargains first with union X and afterwards with union Y .
The model used in this chapter to describe the scope of bargaining is the right-to-
manage model. In contrast to the efficient bargaining model, the firm only bargains with
the unions over the wage rates, while the optimal employment levels are set unilaterally
by the firm. With that, another difference between the two bargaining models is that for
the right-to-manage model the equilibrium lies on the labor demand curve. However, in
the case of efficient bargaining, the Pareto efficient equilibrium lies on the contract curve.
These two curves are normally different from each other (see Booth, 1995, p. 135). In
order to see if the implications and merger incentives of the labor unions depend on the
model being used, diverse bargaining problems are studied in a right-to-manage model.
2.3.2 Production and Firms
The firm produces two final goods. The production of good 1 requires only labor input
from union X, while the production of good 2 uses labor input from union Y . Variables
q1 and q2 denote the output of good 1 and 2, respectively. For simplification, constant
returns to scale are assumed in production. The production function of good 1 and 2
are the following: q1 = x and q2 = y, where x and y are the corresponding employment
levels of unions X and Y . Concerning the demand for good i, a linear demand function
with differentiated products is assumed (see Dixit, 1979; Singh & Vives, 1984). Thus, the
inverse demand for good i can be written as
pi(qi, qj) = 1− qi − γqj, with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. (2.1)
The variable pi denotes the price of good i, while the parameter γ indicates the degree
of product differentiation and shows how the two products are related to each other. It
is assumed that γ ∈ (−1, 1].4 Thus, it is possible to distinguish between three different
4The two goods are perfect substitutes at the upper bound γ = 1, while they would be perfect
complements at γ = −1. However, the lower bound does not contain γ = −1, since some solutions are
not defined for this case.
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cases. These cases can be illustrated with the help of the following proof: in a first step,
the inverse demand function from eq. (2.1) is solved for qi. Analogously, the respective
inverse demand function of good j is solved for qj. Inserting the latter result in qi gives
qi =
1− pi − γ + γpj
1− γ2 .
Thus, the cross derivative of qi with respect to pj is given by
∂qi
∂pj
=
γ
1− γ2 ,
where the fraction is positive for γ > 0, implying that the products are substitutes in
consumption. When γ < 0, the fraction is negative. Hence, the products are complements
in consumption. For γ = 0, the derivative is also equal to zero. Thus, the last case reflects
independence between the products. A positive γ induces tariff competition between the
two unions, while a negative γ gives rise to tariff plurality.
With the help of the inverse goods demand and the production functions the profit of
the firm, given that it reaches an agreement with both unions, can be stated as
pi(x,w, y, r) = (1− x− γy)x+ (1− y − γx)y − xw − yr, (2.2)
with w and r denoting the wage rate of workers of unions X and Y , respectively. In the
case that the firm does not reach an agreement with union X or union Y , the profits of
the firm are given by
piDX = (1− y)y − yr and piDY = (1− x)x− xw, (2.3)
where piDX (piDY ) is the disagreement point of the firm if it does not reach an agreement
with union X (Y ). Hence, these two terms are the corresponding outside options of the
firm that are used in the bargaining problems. Furthermore, it is assumed that the joint
surplus is
Π := pi + ux + uy, (2.4)
where ux and uy are the corresponding utility levels of unions X and Y .
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2.3.3 Labor Unions
It is assumed that all employed workers of the firm are either a member of union X or Y .
The utility functions of the unions follow the specification suggested by Dunlop (1944):
ux = xw and uy = yr. (2.5)
The two unions want to maximize their corresponding wage bill. Furthermore, it is
assumed that unions X and Y are symmetric. Inspection of eq. (2.5) shows that the
utility the unions obtain if no agreement is achieved with the firm is equal to zero, since
the firm hires no workers from the respective union.
In case that the two unions merge, the utility of the joint union Z is the sum of the
individual wage bills and is given by
uz = xw + yr. (2.6)
2.4 Solution of the Model
The solution depends on the bargaining model that is analyzed. Under joint and simul-
taneous bargaining, the agents’ decision are taken in two stages. In the first stage, the
firm negotiates either simultaneously with unions X and Y , or with a joint union Z over
the corresponding wage levels. In the second stage, the firm unilaterally determines the
employment levels for the two worker groups. It takes into account that the optimal
employment levels depend on the wage rates negotiated in stage 1. Under sequential
bargaining, the agents’ decision are taken in three stages. In the first stage, the firm
bargains with union X over the wage w. In the second stage, the firm negotiates with
union Y over the corresponding wage level r. It is taken into account that the optimal
wage level r depends on the wage rate w negotiated between the firm and union X in
stage 1. In the third stage, the firm determines the corresponding employment levels for
the two worker groups. It is considered by the firm that the optimal employment levels
depend on the wage levels bargained over in stage 1 and 2. In order to obtain a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for the three types of bargaining models, both two-stage games
and the three-stage game must be solved by backward induction.
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Since the profit-maximization problem of the firm is the same across the three bar-
gaining regimes, it is introduced only once. The firm chooses the number of workers of
unions X and Y in stage 2 among joint and simultaneous bargaining and in stage 3 among
sequential bargaining. The maximization problem of the firm is given by
max
x,y
pi = (1− x− γy)x+ (1− y − γx)y − xw − yr. (2.7)
Maximization yields the following labor demand functions
x =
1− w − γ + γr
2(1− γ2) and y =
1− r − γ + γw
2(1− γ2) . (2.8)
2.4.1 Joint Bargaining
If the unions X and Y decide to merge in a first act, the firm bargains with the joint
union Z. Thus, union Z bargains with the firm over both wage rates w and r.
Stage 2
In order to simplify the maximization problem in stage 2 and particularly the bargaining
problem in stage 1, the property of symmetry of the worker groups is used. This symmetry
ensures that the bargaining outcomes will also be symmetric. Thus, it holds that: x = y
and w = r.5 Using this information, eq. (2.8) can be rewritten to obtain
x = y =
1− w
2(1 + γ)
. (2.9)
Stage 1
In stage 1, the firm bargains with union Z over the wage rate w and r. As the workers
are symmetric, eq. (2.6) can be rewritten to obtain uz = 2xw. The generalized Nash-
bargaining problem between the firm and union Z can then be stated as
max
w
[pi(x,w, y, r)]1−β[uz]β
= [2x(1− x− γx− w)]1−β[2xw]β,
(2.10)
5The original bargaining problem that does not use the property of symmetry is provided in Ap-
pendix 2.A.1.
CHAPTER 2. MULTI-UNIONISM 26
where β ∈ [0, 1] denotes the bargaining power of the union. Neither the joint union Z
nor the firm has an outside option available as the union represents all workers. Using
in addition the employment level x obtained in the second stage from eq. (2.9), the
generalized Nash-bargaining problem between the firm and union Z is given by
max
w
[
(1− w)2
2(1 + γ)
]1−β [
w
1− w
1 + γ
]β
. (2.11)
The equilibrium wage rate that solves this bargaining problem is6
wˆ = rˆ =
β
2
. (2.12)
Substitution of the equilibrium wage from eq. (2.12) in the the solution of the employment
level determined by eq. (2.9) gives
xˆ = yˆ =
2− β
4(1 + γ)
. (2.13)
Inserting the equilibrium wage rates and employment levels into the profit function (2.2)
and the utility function of the joint union (2.6) yields
pˆi =
(2− β)2
8(1 + γ)
, (2.14)
while the utility of union Z is
uˆz = β
2− β
4(1 + γ)
. (2.15)
The joint surplus from eq. (2.4) is given by
Πˆ =
(2 + β)(2− β)
8(1 + γ)
. (2.16)
Lemma 1. Consider joint bargaining between the firm and an encompassing union. The
bargaining outcomes depend in the following way on the union’s bargaining power β and
the degree of product differentiation γ:
(i)
∂wˆ
∂β
=
1
2
> 0,
(ii)
∂wˆ
∂γ
= 0,
6Hats indicate equilibrium values in the joint bargaining model.
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(iii)
∂xˆ
∂β
= − 1
4(1 + γ)
< 0,
(iv)
∂xˆ
∂γ
= − 2− β
4(1 + γ)2
< 0,
(v)
∂uˆz
∂β
=
1− β
2(1 + γ)
= 0 if

0 ≤ β < 1 ∧ −1 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 1,
(vi)
∂uˆz
∂γ
= −β 2− β
4(1 + γ)2
5 0 if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 0,
(vii)
∂pˆi/Πˆ
∂β
= − 4
(2 + β)2
< 0,
(viii)
∂pˆi/Πˆ
∂γ
= 0.
Proof. It can be easily seen from the partial derivatives of the respective equations that
parts (i) - (iv), (vii) and (viii) hold for the whole range of parameter values. Further,
parts (vii) and (viii) follow from dividing eq. (2.14) by eq. (2.16), which gives pˆi
Πˆ
= 2−β
2+β
.
The partial derivatives yield the respective result.
2.4.2 Simultaneous Bargaining
If the unionsX and Y decide not to merge in the beginning of the game, the first possibility
to study is simultaneous bargaining. Hence, the firm bargains at the same time with union
X over the wage rate w and with union Y over the wage rate r. Employment is solely
determined by the firm in stage 2. The labor demand functions are given by eq. (2.8).
Stage 1
In stage 1, the firm bargains with union X over the wage rate w, and with union Y over
wage rate r. The generalized Nash-bargaining problem between the firm and union X
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can be stated as7
max
w
[pi(x,w, y, r)− piDX ]1−β[ux]β
= [x(1− x− 2γy − w)]1−β[xw]β.
(2.17)
Taking into account that the employment levels are given by eq. (2.8), maximization
yields8
w˜ = r˜ = β
1− γ
2− γβ . (2.18)
The equilibrium employment levels are determined by inserting the equilibrium wages
from eq. (2.18) in the solution of the employment levels in the second stage given by
eq. (2.8):
x˜ = y˜ =
2− β
2(1 + γ)(2− γβ) . (2.19)
Substitution of the equilibrium values from eqs. (2.18) and (2.19) into the profit func-
tion (2.2) and the utility functions (2.5) yields
p˜i =
(2− β)2
2(1 + γ)(2− γβ)2 , (2.20)
while the wage bills of unions X and Y are
u˜x = u˜y = β(2− β) 1− γ
2(1 + γ)(2− γβ)2 . (2.21)
Thus, if both unions bargain simultaneously with the firm, the wage rates, the employment
levels, and the utility of the unions are identical. The joint surplus is given by
Π˜ = (2− β) 2 + β(1− 2γ)
2(1 + γ)(2− γβ)2 . (2.22)
Lemma 2. Consider separate bargaining between the firm and two unions. Under simul-
taneous bargaining the outcomes depend in the following way on the unions’ bargaining
power β and the degree of product differentiation γ:
(i)
∂w˜
∂β
=
2(1− γ)
(2− γβ)2 = 0 if

0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 1,
γ = 1,
7The generalized Nash-bargaining problem between the firm and union Y can be stated analogously.
The maximization problem is not stated here due to similarity.
8Tildes indicate equilibrium values in the simultaneous bargaining model.
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(ii)
∂w˜
∂γ
= −β 2− β
(2− γβ)2 5 0 if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 0,
(iii)
∂x˜
∂β
= − 1− γ
(1 + γ)(2− γβ)2 5 0 if

0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 1,
γ = 1,
(iv)
∂x˜
∂γ
= −(2− β)[2− β(1− 2γ)]
2(1 + γ)2(2− γβ)2 T 0 if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0, 5 < γ ≤ 1 and 2 < β(1 + 2γ),
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0, 5 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and 2 = β(1 + 2γ),
0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ ≤ 1 and 2 > β(1 + 2γ),
(v)
∂u˜x
∂β
=
(1− γ)[2− β(2− γ)]
(1 + γ)(2− γβ)3 T 0 if

0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 1 and 2 > β(2− γ),
γ = 1 ∨ 0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ ≤ 0 and 2 = β(2− γ),
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 2 < β(2− γ),
(vi)
∂u˜x
∂γ
= −β(2− β)2 + β − γβ(1− γ)
(1 + γ)2(2− γβ)3 5 0 if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 0,
(vii)
∂p˜i/Π˜
∂β
= − 4(1− γ)
[2 + β(1− 2γ)]2 5 0 if

0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 1,
γ = 1,
(viii)
∂p˜i/Π˜
∂γ
= 2β
2− β
[2 + β(1− 2γ)]2 = 0 if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 0.
Proof. Parts (i) - (vi) follow from the partial derivatives of the respective equations. The
partial derivative of part (iv) shows that the employment levels decrease in γ as long as
2 > β(1 + 2γ). This condition is fulfilled for γ ∈ (−1, 0.5). For values of γ that indicate
a higher degree of substitutability among the products, it depends on the size of β if
the partial derivative will be positive, negative or zero. Part (v) follows a similar logic
and shows that the sign of the derivative is ambiguous. Parts (vii) and (viii) follow from
dividing eq. (2.20) by eq. (2.22), which gives p˜i
Π˜
= 2−β
2+β(1−2γ) . The partial derivatives yield
the respective results.
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2.4.3 Sequential Bargaining
If unions X and Y decide not to merge in a first act, the second possibility to study is
sequential bargaining. It is assumed that the firm bargains first with union X over the
wage w and afterwards with union Y over the wage r. Employment is solely determined
by the firm in stage 3. The employment levels are given by eq. (2.8).
Stage 2
In stage 2, the firm negotiates with union Y over the wage rate r. Taking into account that
the employment levels are determined in the third stage, the generalized Nash-bargaining
problem between the firm and union Y can be written as
max
r
[pi(x,w, y, r)− piDY ]1−β[uy]β
=
[
1− r − γ + γw
2(1− γ2)
]2(1−β) [
r
1− r − γ + γw
2(1− γ2)
]β
.
(2.23)
Maximization gives
r = β
1− γ + γw
2
. (2.24)
Eq. (2.24) shows that the wage rate w, which will be negotiated in the first stage, exerts a
positive externality on the wage rate r if the products are substitutable and a negative one
if the workers are complementary. This is quite intuitive, since a larger negotiated wage
rate w improves also the bargaining position of union Y if the products are substitutable.
The reason is that the firm employs only workers from the union with the lower negotiated
wage. Thus, union Y has a certain scope to increase its wage rate.
Stage 1
Considering the employment levels determined in the third stage and the wage rate r
given by eq. (2.24), the generalized Nash-bargaining problem between the firm and union
X can be stated as
max
w
[pi(x,w, y, r)− piDX ]1−β[ux]β
=
[
(1− w)(2− γ2β)− γ(2− β)
4(1− γ2)
]2(1−β) [
w
(1− w)(2− γ2β)− γ(2− β)
4(1− γ2)
]β
.
(2.25)
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Maximization gives9
w∗ = β(1− γ) 2 + γβ
2(2− γ2β) . (2.26)
Inserting w∗ in eq. (2.24) yields the wage rate workers of union Y receive:
r∗ = β(1− γ)4 + γβ(2− 2γ + γβ)
4(2− γ2β) . (2.27)
In order to obtain the equilibrium employment levels, w∗ and r∗ have to be inserted in
the solution of the employment levels determined in the third stage. This gives
x∗ = (2− β) 2 + γβ
8(1 + γ)
, (2.28)
while the employment level of union Y becomes
y∗ = (2− β)4 + γβ(2− 2γ + γβ)
8(1 + γ)(2− γ2β) . (2.29)
Substituting the equilibrium wage rates and employment levels into the profit func-
tion (2.2) and the utility functions (2.5) gives
pi∗ =
(2− β)2
64(1 + γ)(2− γ2β)2
[
32(1 + γβ)− 16γ2β(2− β)
− 4γ3β2(6− β) + 8γ4β2(1− β) + γ4β4(1− γ) + 4γ5β3
]
,
(2.30)
while the wage bill of union X is
u∗x = β(1− γ)(2− β)
(2 + γβ)2
16(1 + γ)(2− γ2β) , (2.31)
and the utility of union Y becomes
u∗y = β(1− γ)(2− β)
[4 + γβ(2− 2γ + γβ)]2
32(1 + γ)(2− γ2β)2 . (2.32)
The joint surplus is given by
Π∗ =
(2− β)
64(1 + γ)(2− γ2β)2
[
32(2 + β) + 16γβ2(1− 3γ)− 16γ2β(4− β2)
− 4γ3β3(8− β) + 16γ4β2(1 + β) + γ4β4(6γ − 10 + β − γβ)
]
.
(2.33)
9Asterisks indicate equilibrium values in the sequential bargaining model.
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Lemma 3. Consider separate bargaining between the firm and two unions. If the firm
bargains first with union X and afterwards with union Y , the following orderings prevail:
(i) w∗ = r∗ if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1) ∨ (0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 ≤ γ < 0),
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0 ∨ γ = 1,
(ii) x∗ 5 y∗ if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1) ∨ (0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0),
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0,
(iii) u∗x T u∗y if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0)∨
(0 < β < 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1 and 8β > 2γβ(2− γ) + γ2(4 + β2) + 8),
(β = 0 ∨ γ = 0 ∨ γ = 1)∨
(0 < β < 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1 and 8β = 2γβ(2− γ) + γ2(4 + β2) + 8),
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1 and 8β < 2γβ(2− γ) + γ2(4 + β2) + 8.
Proof. Part (i) follows by comparing eqs. (2.26) and (2.27) with one another, while
eqs. (2.28) and (2.29) have to be compared to prove part (ii). Part (iii) follows by com-
paring eqs. (2.31) and (2.32) in the text. It is not possible to make a general statement
for substitutable products, since u∗x < u
∗
y only holds if
8
β
< 8 + 2γβ(2 − γ) + γ2(4 + β2).
Even if this is true for a range of parameter values, there exist combinations for which
this condition does not hold.
If the unions bargain sequentially with the firm, the wage rates, the employment levels,
and the utility of the unions will be different. Thus, sequential bargaining between the
firm and both unions creates externalities. The direction of the externalities depend on the
order of bargaining. Part (i) states that workers always inherit a first-mover advantage in
terms of their wage rate. Wages are only identical in cases of perfectly substitutable and
independent products or in the case of a zero bargaining power of the union. For γ = 1 the
wage levels are equal to zero. The reason is that the firm employs workers only from the
union which pays the lower negotiated wage. Thus, the unions undercut each other driving
wages down to zero in equilibrium. Part (ii) is a consequence of part (i) and shows that
the higher wage rate w goes along with a lower employment level x, in comparison to the
employment level y. Part (iii) reveals that the right-to-manage model implies a first-mover
CHAPTER 2. MULTI-UNIONISM 33
advantage for negative values of γ under sequential bargaining. In the case of substitutable
products, no clear statement can be made. This result is different to the findings obtained
in the literature if the efficient bargaining model is used (see Aghadadashli & Wey, 2015).
In their setting, a second-mover advantage exists for complementary products. There are
two motives: first, under efficient bargaining the disagreement point of the firm is better
when bargaining with the first union. Thus, the first union creates a positive externality
on the second union, which raises the second unions’ utility level above the utility level
of the first union. Second, since the firm retains the right to set the optimal employment
level in a right-to-manage model in the third stage, the disagreement point in the second
stage cannot be negative as the firm would not employ workers from the first union and,
as a consequence, shut down production.
2.4.4 Merger Incentives of the Labor Unions
This section compares the results of the three analyzed bargaining regimes in order to
identify the merger incentives of the labor unions. Before doing so, the equilibrium wage
rates, employment rates, and the firms’ profit across the three bargaining models are
compared to one another.
Proposition 2.1. Consider joint, simultaneous and sequential bargaining. A comparison
of the respective wage rates across regimes yields the following orderings:
(i) wˆ T w˜, wˆ T w∗, rˆ T r˜, rˆ T r∗ if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0,
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0,
(ii) w∗ = w˜ if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1) ∨ (0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0),
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0 ∨ γ = 1,
(iii) r∗ T r˜ if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1,
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0 ∨ γ = 1,
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0.
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Proof. Parts (i) - (iii) can be easily proved by comparing the respective wage rates that
have been previously derived.
Part (i) - (iii) show that bargained wages are identical if the products are independent
of each other or if the unions have no bargaining power at all, while the wages under se-
quential and simultaneous bargaining are in addition identical for perfectly substitutable
products. Further, part (i) demonstrates that for substitutable products the equilibrium
wage rates are the highest under joint bargaining, while they are the lowest for comple-
mentary products under joint bargaining. Part (ii) shows that union X negotiates a higher
wage rate under sequential bargaining, while part (iii) states that union Y , which bar-
gains in a second step under sequential bargaining, achieves negotiating a higher wage for
substitutable products. Despite that, its negotiated wage rate is lower for complementary
products compared to simultaneous bargaining.
Proposition 2.2. Consider joint, simultaneous and sequential bargaining. A comparison
of the respective employment rates across regimes yields the following orderings:
(i) xˆ T x˜, xˆ T x∗, yˆ T y˜, yˆ T y∗ if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0,
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0,
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1,
(ii) x∗ 5 x˜ if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1) ∨ (0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0),
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0,
(iii) y∗ T y˜ if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0,
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0.
Proof. Parts (i) - (iii) follow from comparing the respective employment rates that have
been previously derived.
Parts (i) and (ii) directly follow from Proposition 2.1 as the higher bargained wage
rates go in line with lower employment rates. Surprisingly, part (iii) shows that not only
the bargained wage rate under sequential bargaining, but also the employment level of
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union Y is higher for substitutable products and lower for complementary products. The
reason is the strong externality union X exerts due to its first-mover advantage in terms
of its wage rate.
Proposition 2.3. Consider joint, simultaneous and sequential bargaining. A comparison
of the respective profit of the firm across regimes yields the following orderings:
(i) pˆi T p˜i, pˆi T pi∗ if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0,
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0,
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1,
(ii) pi∗ 5 p˜i if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1) ∨ (0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 ≤ γ < 0),
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0 ∨ γ = 1.
Proof. Parts (i) - (iii) can be proved by comparing the respective profit levels of the firm
that have been previously derived.
As expected, part (i) shows that the higher wage rate unions are able to negotiate under
joint bargaining leads to higher wage costs and, therefore, lower profits for substitutable
products, while the profits are higher for complementary products. Part (ii) reveals that
despite completely independent or perfectly substitutable products and a zero bargaining
power of unions, the profit of the firm is always larger under simultaneous bargaining
compared to sequential bargaining.
Next, the equilibrium utility levels of unions X and Y are compared with the respective
utility levels the unions receive under joint bargaining in order to identify the merger
incentives in the initial stage.10 The incentives of a merger are studied separately for each
union, since it cannot be taken as given that a utility transfer between both unions takes
place.11 For simultaneous bargaining, a merger exists if it holds that uˆx > u˜x ∧ uˆy > u˜y,
where uˆx = uˆy =
uˆz
2
.
10It can be shown analytically that the merger results are robust if a rent maximizing utility function
of a union or Stone-Geary type utility function is used.
11Horn & Wolinsky (1988a), Jun (1989), Cheung & Davidson (1991) and Upmann & Mu¨ller (2014)
share a similar opinion.
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Proposition 2.4. Consider joint, simultaneous and sequential bargaining. A comparison
of the respective utility levels of the unions across regimes yields the following orderings:
(i) uˆx T u˜x, uˆy T u˜y if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1)∨
(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 4(1− β) < −γβ2),
(β = 0 ∨ γ = 0)∨
(0 < β < 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 4(1− β) = −γβ2),
0 < β < 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 4(1− β) > −γβ2,
(ii) uˆx T u∗x if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1)∨
(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 4(1− β) < γβ2(1− γ)− 2γβ),
(β = 0 ∨ γ = 0)∨
(0 < β < 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 4(1− β) = γβ2(1− γ)− 2γβ),
(0 < β < 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 4(1− β) > γβ2(1− γ)− 2γβ),
(iii) uˆy T u∗y if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1)∨
0 < β ≤ 1∧−1 < γ < 0 and 2(2−γ2β) > 2√1− γ[4+γβ(2−2γ+γβ)],
(β = 0 ∨ γ = 0)∨
0 < β < 1∧−1 < γ < 0 and 2(2−γ2β) = 2√1− γ[4+γβ(2−2γ+γβ)],
0 < β < 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0 and 2(2− γ2β) < 2√1− γ[4 + γβ(2− 2γ + γβ)],
(iv) u˜x 5 u∗x if

(0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1) ∨ (0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0),
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0 ∨ γ = 1,
(v) u˜y T u∗y if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0,
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0 ∨ γ = 1,
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ < 1.
Proof. Parts (iv) and (v) can be easily proved by comparing the respective utility functions
of the unions that have been previously derived. Part (i) requires more attention. It can be
shown that uˆx < u˜x ∧ uˆy < u˜y for complementary products if 4(1−β) > −γβ2. Assuming
that γ → −1 makes it least likely that the inequality holds, since the right-hand side gets
larger. In this case, β > 0.83 in order for the inequality not to hold. Further, it becomes
obvious that parts (ii) and (iii) deliver no clear results for complementary products.
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Parts (i) - (iii) show that unions X and Y are indifferent between merging and staying
separated if the worker groups are independent of each other or if the union has no
bargaining power at all. Further, parts (i) - (iii) show that the unions are indifferent for
very specific combinations of parameter values. However, the unions have strict incentives
to merge if the products are substitutes in consumption (0 < γ ≤ 1). On the other hand,
parts (i) - (iii) do not reveal clear results for complementary products (−1 < γ < 0). As
already mentioned, it has to hold that β > 0.83 in order that the unions want to merge
for complementary workers if they bargain simultaneously. Under sequential bargaining,
union X only has an incentive to merge for complementary workers if β > 0.92.12 In
a recent study, Hirsch & Schnabel (2014) try to infer the union power in a right-to-
manage model of collective bargaining with the help of annual data for Germany from
1992-2009. Using a utilitarian objective function, their analysis shows that the union
power is in the range of 15-25% in Germany.13 Thus, the empirical evidence predicts
parameter values that support simultaneous bargaining and sequential bargaining for
complementary workers. These findings are used to summarize unions’ merger decisions
and the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 2.5. The following contracts are established in equilibrium when joint bar-
gaining is compared to simultaneous bargaining and sequential bargaining:
(i) if 0 < γ ≤ 1, wages and employment levels are given by wˆ, rˆ, xˆ, yˆ,
(ii) if −1 < γ ≤ 0, wages and employment levels are given by w∗, r∗, x∗, y∗.
Proof. Proposition 2.4 can be used to establish a ranking in unions’ utilities. For 0 < γ ≤ 1
12In comparison to part (i), this cannot be seen directly from the condition of part (ii) as the RHS does
not continuously in- or decrease in γ. Therefore, the condition is plotted in a three-dimensional space.
Appendix 2.A.2 provides the corresponding figure. The three-dimensional plot of the condition of part
(iii) is not provided in the Appendix, since it is enough to show that a merger does not materialize if one
union has an incentive to bargain separately. However, it has to hold that β > 0.59 in order that union
Y has an incentive to merge for complementary products.
13They also conduct several robustness checks with Stone-Geary preferences and different weights on
employment and wages. None of their results yield a higher bargaining power than 83%. Capuano &
Schmerer (2015) confirm this result. They use data from the linked employer-employee data based on the
IAB establishment panel over the years 1996-2008 and estimate a collective bargaining power of 15%.
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it holds that uˆx > u
∗
x > u˜x and uˆy > u
∗
y > u˜y. Thus, unions X and Y have strict incentives
to merge and the equilibrium contract can only be given by joint bargaining. It is further
assumed that the unions do not merge if they are indifferent between merging and staying
separated. This proves part (i). To prove part (ii), it is not possible to establish an
unambiguous ranking for unions’ utility as for substitutable products. However, it is
considered that empirical evidence predicts values for the unions’ bargaining power β
that are only in line with separate bargaining for complementary products. Thus, both
unions will bargaining separately with the firm. However, the question remains open
if the equilibrium contract is given by simultaneous or sequential bargaining. In order
to identify which contract should be implemented in equilibrium, the joint surplus under
simultaneous bargaining, given by eq. (2.22), is compared with the surplus obtained under
sequential bargaining, see eq. (2.33). A comparison yields the following result:
Π˜ T Π∗ if

0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < γ ≤ 1,
β = 0 ∨ γ = 0,
0 < β ≤ 1 ∧ −1 < γ < 0.
Since the joint surplus is always larger under sequential bargaining for −1 < γ < 0, the
equilibrium contract is given by sequential bargaining. It is further assumed that in the
case of indifference the sequential bargaining contract is implemented.
Using the just established equilibrium contracts, it becomes obvious from Proposi-
tion 2.1 that the unions’ decision to merge or to bargain individually benefit workers in
terms of their wage rate. Only for complementary products, workers of union Y , which
bargains in a second stage under sequential bargaining, would receive a higher wage rate
under simultaneous bargaining.
2.5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter develops a theoretical model that analyzes the impact of multi-unionism on
equilibrium outcomes, such as, wage rates and the merger incentives of the labor unions.
Studying the effects of multi-unionism is an important issue, especially since in European
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countries multi-unionism is on the rise for the last couple of decades. A model variant
is considered, where a single firm has to bargain with two labor unions. It is assumed
that the firm produces two final goods, whereas the production of each good requires only
the labor input from the corresponding labor union. In order to model the negotiations
between the firm and the unions, a right-to-manage model is used.
The comparison of joint bargaining with sequential and simultaneous bargaining pre-
dicts that the existing merger results of the unions can be supported in a right-to-manage
model for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution: labor unions have strict incentives to
merge if the products are substitutable in consumption, while they bargain independently
and sequentially if the products are complementary. The model further demonstrates that
workers benefit in terms of their wage rate from the decision of unions to merge or to
stay separated. Only for complementary products, the workers of the union that bargains
in a second stage under sequential bargaining would receive a higher wage rate under
simultaneous bargaining.
There are still some open questions regarding the theoretical literature on multi-
unionism. For example, it would be interesting to see how the equilibrium outcomes
and the merger incentives of the unions are affected in a framework, which takes the
competition between unions for members into account. It is commonly known that craft
unions try to persuade members from the larger industry unions to switch unions in order
to increase their power. Furthermore, the question about the stability of the equilibrium
contracts under sequential bargaining remains open. Due to the first-mover advantage,
workers are strictly better off if they are a member of the union that is bargaining in a
first stage with the firm. Thus, the members of the other union have strict incentives
to switch to the union that bargains first. As a consequence, the contract of the other
union would not be enforceable in equilibrium. All in all, the analyzed model is missing
a mechanism that prevents members to defect to the union that bargains in a first step
with the firm.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Joint Bargaining without the Symmetry Assumption
Stage 2
In stage 2, the firm chooses the number of workers of unions X and Y . The maximization
problem of the firm is given by
max
x,y
pi = (1− x− γy)x+ (1− y − γx)y − xw − yr. (2.34)
The first-order conditions that solve the maximization problem of eq. (2.34) are
x =
1− 2γy − w
2
and y =
1− 2γx− r
2
. (2.35)
Inserting the solutions from eq. (2.35) in each other, the corresponding employment levels
are given by eq. (2.8):
x =
1− w − γ + γr
2(1− γ2) and y =
1− r − γ + γw
2(1− γ2) .
Stage 1
The generalized Nash-bargaining problem between the firm and union Z can be stated as
max
w,r
[pi(x,w, y, r)]1−β[uz]β
= [(1− x− γy)x+ (1− y − γx)y − xw − yr]1−β[xw + yr]β.
(2.36)
Using the employment levels determined in the second stage, the bargaining problem
between the firm and union Z from eq. (2.36) can be written as
max
w,r
[
(1− w)1− w − γ + γr
4(1− γ2) + (1− r)
1− r − γ + γw
4(1− γ2)
]1−β
×
[
w
1− w − γ + γr
2(1− γ2) + r
1− r − γ + γw
2(1− γ2)
]β
.
(2.37)
The wage rates that solve the first-order conditions are given by
wˆ = rˆ =
β
2
. (2.38)
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Substituting the equilibrium wages from eq. (2.38) in the solution of the employment
levels in the second stage, the equilibrium employment levels read
xˆ = yˆ =
2− β
4(1 + γ)
.
The just calculated equilibrium wage rates and employment levels are used to solve the
rest of the model. This proceeds analogously to the simple model that is presented in the
main body of the chapter.
2.A.2 Incentive of Union X to Merge for Complementary Work-
ers under Sequential Bargaining
Figure 2.1 plots the condition of Proposition 2.4 part (ii) in a three-dimensional space. The
condition regulates if union X is indifferent between merging and bargaining sequentially,
prefers a merger or wants to stay separated for complementary products. While the
orange plot represents the LHS, 4(1 − β), the red plot depicts the RHS as given by
γβ2(1− γ)− 2γβ. It can be clearly seen that 4(1− β) < γβ2(1− γ)− 2γβ and, therefore,
uˆx > u
∗
x only holds if β > 0.92.
Figure 2.1: Condition of Proposition 2.4 Part (ii) for Complementary Products
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Chapter 3
Deregulation of Temporary Agency
Employment in a Unionized
Economy: Does This Really Lead to
a Substitution of Regular
Employment?∗
3.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the use of temporary agency work increased tremendously in
almost all OECD countries. In Germany, for example, the number of temporary agency
workers increased sevenfold (Jahn & Weber, 2016). With a share of temporary agency
employment on overall employment of just about 2% in most industrialized countries,
temporary agency employment may seem to be rather small and, therefore, to be a mi-
nor labor market issue at first sight. However, the deregulation of temporary agency
employment is an important, frequently used and highly discussed labor market policy
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Philipp Baudy and has appeared in an earlier version as
Baudy & Cords (2016).
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instrument in Europe. There has been ongoing institutional deregulation of temporary
agency employment aiming at increasing flexibility of the countries’ labor markets. For
instance, in Germany the deregulation of temporary agency employment was part of the
labor market reform “Agenda 2010” of the former social-democratic chancellor Gerhard
Schro¨der in 2003. The aim of increasing the attractiveness of temporary agency em-
ployment was, next to other labor market instruments, to reduce unemployment and to
increase the international competitiveness of the German economy. The political idea be-
hind the deregulation of temporary agency employment is to bring more people to work
that are not able to find a job in the regular labor market, e.g. long-term unemployed.
By using temporary workers in the production, firms may “test” the workers and, after-
wards, convert their employment relationship to regular employment. From the firm’s
perspective, there are various motives for using temporary agency workers in the produc-
tion process (see, e.g., Holst et al., 2010). One of them is that using temporary agency
workers in the production allows to easily adjust the workforce to uncertainty about fu-
ture output levels, workforce fluctuations, worker absence etc., since temporary agency
workers are not covered by employment protection (see Houseman, 2001; Ono & Sullivan,
2013). Another argument for replacing regular by temporary workers is that the use of
the latter may lead to cost savings and increasing profits (see, e.g., Jahn & Weber, 2016).
In most European countries, wages are determined by collective bargaining agreements
between firms and labor unions. The use of temporary agency employment may lead to
a substitution of part of the regular workforce that is represented by the unions. Thus,
labor unions have to take the behavior of the employment agencies into account in the
negotiation process. Otherwise, the increasing attractiveness for firms to use temporary
agency work may induce a substantial replacement of regular employment and, hence,
deteriorate the labor unions’ position in the economy.
Despite the important role of labor unions in almost all European economies, up to now
there has been limited attention on the investigation of temporary agency employment
on labor union’s behavior. Beissinger & Baudy (2015) give a first theoretical contribution
analyzing the firm’s strategic use of potential temporary agency employment in the wage-
setting process to dampen labor union’s wage claims. However, the model neglects the
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general equilibrium effects of increasing temporary agency employment. Therefore, it is
not able to cope with the main argument of opponents of temporary agency work that
the ongoing transition to more flexible labor markets leads to a change in the employment
structure towards more precarious employment and a decrease in union coverage. Thus,
it is left to analyze the effects of temporary agency work on overall employment and the
employment structure in the economy in a dynamic setup.
To close this gap, the present chapter analyzes the general equilibrium effects of tempo-
rary agency employment in a frictional labor market a` la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)
and Pissarides (2000). It is assumed that there are large firms producing differentiated
goods with labor being the only production factor. Workers can either be hired directly
by the firms or, alternatively, the firm may borrow workers from temporary employment
agencies. Both types of work are modeled as perfect substitutes. Regular workers are
organized in firm-level labor unions. Agencies are small (one worker) and bargain in-
dividually with the firm over the fee a firm has to pay for using temporary workers in
its production. This model framework enables to reveal the employment structure in
the economy and its adjustment to shocks like institutional changes in the regulation
of temporary employment agencies. Furthermore, it is possible to analyze how union
coverage evolves in the economy and to examine the flows in the different labor mar-
ket states. Legal (de)regulation is modeled by regulatory costs arising from institutional
barriers like limitations regarding the maximum period of assignment of temporary work-
ers, re-employment bans, synchronization bans or equal pay obligations for regular and
temporary agency workers. Higher legal regulation leads to increasing regulatory costs.
The main result of the model is that there is a hump-shaped relationship between
temporary agency employment used in the production and its degree of legal deregulation.
At first sight, this may be counterintuitive as it means that progressive legal deregulation
does not inevitably lead to an increase in temporary agency employment but it may even
decline. Furthermore, regular employment monotonically increases in the deregulation of
temporary employment. Thus, there is no reduction in the degree of union coverage but,
on the contrary, it even increases. Unions and single workers both suffer from temporary
agency employment due to declining wage rates and labor unions utility. The findings
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reject the main argument of opponents of temporary agency employment and support the
policy makers’ idea that legal deregulation of temporary agency employment increases
the flexibility of the European labor markets and brings people to work who may not find
regular employment. The model supports the deregulation efforts of temporary agency
employment in order to increase the employment level.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 gives a brief discussion of related
literature on labor unions and temporary agency employment. Section 3.3 describes the
outline of the model and its components in more detail before the model is solved in
Section 3.4. Section 3.5 defines the equilibrium. In Section 3.6, the model is calibrated
and its predictions considering the employment structure in the economy are presented.
Section 3.7 examines the key insights of the model, i.e. the changes in the wage setting and
the employment structure triggered by legal deregulation of the temporary employment
sector. Finally, Section 3.8 summarizes the results and concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The behavior of labor unions has already been widely discussed in the literature (for an
overview see Booth, 1995; Boeri et al., 2001; Addison & Schnabel, 2003). However, little
attention was paid on modeling unionized labor markets in the framework of search and
matching for a long time. A first contribution to labor unions in the matching framework
is given by Delacroix (2006). He introduces a multisectorial model with a varying degree
of union coverage and monopolistic competition in the goods market and investigates the
union’s reaction to changes in the unemployment insurance. Based on this framework,
Ebell & Haefke (2006) study the effects of a product market deregulation on the formation
of labor unions by endogenizing the choice of the bargaining institution. Bauer & Lingens
(2013) investigate the efficiency in search models with large firms and collectively bar-
gained wages, while Krusell & Rudanko (2016) analyze the intertemporal effect of unions’
commitment to future wages. In another recent contribution, Ranjan (2013) examines
the general equilibrium effects of decreasing offshoring costs in a unionized economy. He
identifies a non-monotonic relationship of unemployment and offshoring costs in the do-
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mestic, offshoring country. Decreasing costs of offshoring increase unemployment first,
but a further reduction leads to a decrease in unemployment afterwards.
Theoretical work on temporary agency employment is rather limited. The very first
theoretical contributions are given by Autor (2001, 2003). While his first paper investi-
gates the role of employment agencies in the screening for regular jobs, the latter describes
that firms relinquish to substitute the whole workforce by temporary agency employment
due to distinct capital investments related to specific workers. The first contribution to
temporary agency employment in the framework of search and matching is provided by
Neugart & Storrie (2006). The authors analyze the increase of temporary agency em-
ployment based on an improved matching efficiency that is induced by temporary work
agencies acting as intermediaries in the matching process of workers and firms. Baumann
et al. (2011) use the same framework and enrich the model setup by endogenous job de-
struction. However, the majority of research on temporary agency employment is based
on its empirical investigation and focuses on its strategic use in the production (see, e.g.,
Vidal & Tigges, 2009; Holst et al., 2010), its effect on the employment structure (Jahn
& Bentzen, 2012; Haller & Jahn, 2014), the wage differential of temporary agency work
(Garz, 2013), and the question if temporary agency employment may be used as a step-
ping stone to regular employment (see, e.g., Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008; Kvasnicka,
2009; Autor & Houseman, 2005, 2010; Jahn & Rosholm, 2013, 2014).
3.3 Outline of the Model
3.3.1 Labor Market Flows
All workers are assumed to be identical. Following Neugart & Storrie (2006), the workforce
is segmented into four different groups. As in the standard matching literature, work-
ers are either unemployed (U) or directly employed at a firm (regular employment, R).
Furthermore, workers can be employed at temporary employment agencies. Temporary
employment agencies hire workers and have them in their pool (unassigned temporary
work, T ) with the aim to lend the workers to firms that use the workers in their produc-
tion (assigned temporary work, A). Unemployed workers may either find a regular job or
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become unassigned temporary workers. Once in the pool of the temporary employment
agency, the job in state T may either be destroyed to unemployment with an exogenous
rate δ or the temporary agency worker becomes assigned to a firm. Moreover, temporary
agency workers (assigned and unassigned) search on-the-job for regular employment. It
is assumed that the effectiveness of search is higher for temporary workers compared to
that of unemployed workers. This is reflected by parameters γT and γA for unassigned
and assigned temporary workers, respectively. Assigned temporary workers may find reg-
ular jobs or their current position is destroyed with the exogenous rate χ, meaning that
they fall back to state T just being in the pool of the temporary employment agency.
Employment of regular workers is destroyed to unemployment with the exogenous rate δ,
which coincides with the job destruction rate of unassigned temporary jobs. It is assumed
that χ > δ. The reason is that due to its flexibility and a lack of employment protection
instruments, temporary agency employment is more affected by exogenous shocks than
regular jobs.
Workers accept the first suitable job offer they get whatever type it is and matching of
firms and workers/agencies is formally described by the matching function
Mi = M(Vi, Si). (3.1)
The matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, is increasing in both argu-
ments, at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions. Mi denotes the
instantaneous flow of hires for the different employment states i = T,A,R. The number of
vacancies posted in state i is denoted by Vi. The number of job-searchers in the respective
state is given by Si. Firms post vacancies for regular and assigned temporary jobs, while
temporary employment agencies only post vacancies for unassigned temporary workers.
Vacancies posted in state i are filled with the rate M(Vi, Si)/Vi ≡ m(θi), while the work-
ers’ finding rate for a job in state i is M(Vi, Si)/Si ≡ θim(θi). Variable θi ≡ Vi/Si reflects
the labor market tightness in state i. The number of job-searchers differs across the states
and, thus, labor market tightness θi has to be stated for each “submarket” separately. Un-
employed workers search for both, regular and temporary employment, while temporary
workers are allowed to search for regular employment on-the-job. Thus, there is an over-
lap in the groups searching for different types of jobs. The total number of job-searchers
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Figure 3.1: Labor Market Flows
for unassigned temporary agency employment equals the number of unemployed workers,
ST = U . Unassigned temporary workers look for assignments, SA = LT . Li denotes the
amount of employed workers in the respective state. Moreover, all workers in states U ,
T , and A search for regular jobs, i.e. SR = U + γT ·LT + γA ·LA. As temporary workers’
search effectiveness differs from the search effectiveness of unemployed workers, γT · LT
and γA · LA describe the effective number of unassigned and assigned temporary workers
looking for regular employment, respectively.1 Using the information about vacancies and
job-searchers in each submarket, it can be concluded that unemployed workers find jobs in
regular employment with rate θRm(θR), while unassigned and assigned temporary workers
find regular jobs with probabilities γT θRm(θR) and γAθRm(θR), respectively. Unemployed
workers find unassigned temporary jobs with probability θTm(θT ) and, once in the pool
of the agency, become assigned with probability θAm(θA). Figure 3.1 depicts the labor
market flows.
Using the information about the flows into and out of the different labor market states,
the instantaneous flows are represented by
L˙T = m(θT ) · VT + χ · LA − θAm(θA) · LT − γT θRm(θR) · LT − δ · LT (3.2)
L˙A = m(θA) · VA − χ · LA − γAθRm(θR) · LA (3.3)
1Total labor force N is normalized to unity. Hence, U +LT +LA +LR = 1, with U , LT , LA, and LR
denoting the unemployment and employment rates, respectively.
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L˙R = m(θR) · VR − δ · LR. (3.4)
In the steady state, the in- and outflows for the different states coincide, i.e. L˙T = L˙A =
L˙R = 0. Thus, eqs. (3.2) - (3.4) can be rewritten to
2
[δ + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR)] · LT = m(θT ) · VT + χ · LA (3.5)
[χ+ γAθRm(θR)] · LA = m(θA) · VA (3.6)
δ · LR = m(θR) · VR. (3.7)
Similar to the employment flows, the flows into and out of unemployment are
U˙ = δ · LR + δ · LT − θTm(θT ) · U − θRm(θR) · U. (3.8)
As the change in unemployment is zero in steady state, i.e. U˙ = 0, the equilibrium
unemployment rate is formally represented by
U =
δ(LR + LT )
θTm(θT ) + θRm(θR)
. (3.9)
Note that equilibrium unemployment does not directly depend on the labor market tight-
ness in state A. The amount of assigned temporary workers only influences the structure
of employment, but not its rate. There is no direct channel from assigned temporary work
to unemployment or vice versa.
3.3.2 Goods Market
Households act as consumers in the goods market and, at the same time, as workers in
the labor market. Consumers are risk neutral in the aggregate consumption good and
have Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) preferences over a continuum of differentiated goods. The
goods demand function can be derived from the following optimization problem that the
households are facing:
max
cj,k
(∫ n
0
c
η−1
η
j,k dj
) η
η−1
with η > 1, (3.10)
2The flow equations given here represent the firm’s perspective. They can easily be converted to the
respective flow equations from the workers side of view. To do so, the respective job-searchers of each
state and the condition that the total labor force equals the sum of the workers of each state have to be
used. Appendix 3.A.1 provides the respective equations.
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subject to the resource constraint
Ik =
∫ n
0
cj,k ·
(
Pj
P
)
· dj, (3.11)
where j denotes the differentiated good, k the household and n the number of firms.
Further, cj,k denotes household k’s consumption of good j, while Ik is the real income
of household k. Parameter η gives the elasticity of substitution across the differentiated
goods, while pj = Pj/P is the firm’s price relative to the aggregate price level. The
solution to the aforementioned maximization problem and, thus, aggregate demand for
good j is given by
Yj ≡
∫ m
0
cj,k · dk = p−ηj · I, (3.12)
with m being the number of households, I ≡ ∫ m
0
Ik · dk being aggregate real income and
P ≡ (∫ n
0
P 1−ηj dj)
1
1−η denoting the price index.
3.3.3 Firms
In contrast to the basic matching model of Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
(2000), the model in this chapter is dealing with large firms that employ multiple workers.
Each firm j produces a single, differentiated final good. There are two reasons for using
large firms instead of one-worker firms. First, in models of monopolistic competition the
optimal firm size and its output level are determined endogenously. Hence, restricting the
firm size to one worker conflicts with monopolistic goods market competition (for more
details, see Ebell & Haefke, 2006). Second, assuming firm-level labor unions representing
more than one worker, it is natural to assume bargaining with large firms. Considering
the production technology of the firm, final goods are produced by using labor as the
only input factor. Workers can either be employed directly at the respective firm (reg-
ular workers), or they are borrowed from temporary work agencies (assigned temporary
workers). The amount of regular workers employed at firm j is denoted by Lj,R, while
Lj,A gives the amount of temporary agency workers used in the production. The firm’s
production technology is described by
Yj = τ · [Lj,R + Lj,A]ρ, (3.13)
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where τ denotes an efficiency parameter and ρ ∈ (0, 1) captures decreasing returns to
scale in the production. Using this type of production technology reflects the idea that
regular workers and temporary agency workers are perfect substitutes. This is a reasonable
assumption because temporary agency employment is used in almost all branches and in
particular in blue-collar, low-skilled jobs, to replace regular workers doing simple tasks.
The reason to replace regular workers doing simple tasks is all about lowering costs.
The instantaneous profit of a firm is given by3
pij = pj(Yj)Yj − wR Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R), (3.14)
with pj(Yj) representing the firm’s inverse goods demand function that can be derived
from eq. (3.12). Variable wR denotes the wage rate of regular workers. The fee the firm
has to pay to the temporary work agency is depicted by x, while h denotes the costs of
posting a vacancy in state A and R. Parameter ε describes regulatory costs or rather in-
stitutional barriers associated with firm’s use of temporary employment, e.g. employment
protection, the maximum period of assignment, synchronization ban and re-employment
ban. Next to institutional regulations, there are often voluntary firm-level agreements
between employers and employee representations regulating the use of temporary agency
employment. For instance, such agreements limit the share of temporary agency workers
on all employees within a firm or specify a maximum duration of assignment undercutting
the legal time limit. Furthermore, they may include commitments for transferring tempo-
rary workers to regular contracts after a specific assignment period or expand the rights
of the employees representative committee with increasing temporary agency employment
used within the firm.4 Such non-institutional firm-level costs of temporary agency work
are convexly increasing in the number of employed temporary workers, as many of these
regulations apply only if the amount of temporary agency workers in the firm exceeds
specific levels. In principle, it holds that the stronger the employee representation in a
3Appendix 3.A.2 shows that this profit function is strictly concave and, hence, a profit maximum
exists.
4An overview of such voluntary firm-level agreements used in Germany are provided by R. Krause
(2012).
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firm, the more agreements apply with an increasing amount of temporary agency work-
ers. The convexity of the costs is reflected by parameter σ > 1.5 Vj,R and Vj,A denote the
number of vacancies firm j posts for regular and temporary workers, respectively.
3.3.4 Workers
The expected value of regular employment is given by
rΨR = wR + δ · (ΨU −ΨR). (3.15)
Wage rate wR reflects the instantaneous utility of being regularly employed, while the
second term depicts the loss from becoming unemployed weighted by its probability of
occurrence δ. The expected value of being unemployed is given by
rΨU = z + θTm(θT ) · (ΨT −ΨU) + θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨU). (3.16)
Parameter z denotes the net income of being unemployed. The last two terms at the right-
hand-side (RHS) describe the expected gains from possible changes in the labor market
state. Similarly, the present discounted value of being in the pool of the temporary work
agency is
rΨT = wT + δ · (ΨU −ΨT ) + θAm(θA) · (ΨA −ΨT ) + γT · θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨT ). (3.17)
Variable wT denotes the payment that temporary agency workers receive for being in the
pool of the temporary work agency.6 By searching on-the-job they may improve their
position in the labor market and find regular employment with probability γT θRm(θR).
The worker’s expected value of assigned temporary agency employment is
rΨA = wA + χ · (ΨT −ΨA) + γA · θRm(θR) · (ΨR −ΨA), (3.18)
5This type of convex costs are also used by Koskela & Scho¨b (2010) and Ranjan (2013). They argue
that the costs of offshoring are convex. Such costs are similar to the costs of temporary agency employment
as offshoring is also used as a potential cost-saving production alternative for firms.
6This labor market setup fits well to Central European countries such as France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, and Sweden (Arrowsmith, 2006). In those countries temporary workers even receive a wage when
they are just on the books of the temporary work agency.
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with wA denoting the wage that temporary workers receive being assigned to a firm. For
simplicity reasons it is assumed that the agency sets wT and wA in a way that makes
the worker at the margin indifferent between being unemployed, being in the pool of
temporary employment agencies, or being assigned to a client firm, such that
ΨU = ΨT = ΨA. (3.19)
Even if this assumption seems quite strong at first sight, it is reasonable. It reflects
the fact that temporary agency workers usually have a rather weak bargaining position
as they are not organized in labor unions (see, e.g., Storrie, 2002; Dolado et al., 2000;
Neugart & Storrie, 2006). Furthermore, workers may accept a rather low utility out
of being employed at a temporary employment agency. They use temporary agency
employment as a stepping stone to regular employment. The probability of finding a
regular job while being employed at a temporary employment agency is higher compared
to finding a regular job out of being unemployed. Moreover, eq. (3.19) simplifies the model
significantly. Applying this assumption, the value functions (3.15) - (3.18) simplify to
rΨR = wR + δ · (ΨU −ΨR), (3.20)
rΨT = wT + γT θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨT ), (3.21)
rΨA = wA + γA θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨA), (3.22)
rΨU = z + θRm(θR) (ΨR −ΨU). (3.23)
3.3.5 Labor Unions
It is assumed that all regularly employed workers are members of a labor union. Firm
specific, symmetric labor unions determine the wage rate for regular workers by maximiz-
ing the rent of its members. The rent of a union member equals the difference between
the expected value of regular employment and the outside option, which is the value of
being unemployed. Thus, the rent of a union member is given by ΨR−ΨU . As the union
bargains for all regular workers that are employed at firm j, the utility of the respective
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labor union is formally represented by
Λj = [ΨR −ΨU ] · Lj,R. (3.24)
3.3.6 Temporary Employment Agencies
Temporary employment agencies pay a wage rate wA to temporary agency workers that
are assigned to a client firm and a wage rate wT to unassigned temporary agency workers
that are only in the pool of the agency. For each assigned temporary agency worker, the
agency receives a fee x from the firm the worker is lend to.
In contrast to firms, it is considered to have one-worker agencies. Each agency offers
a single vacancy that can be filled by an unemployed worker. In case of a successful
match, the unemployed worker switches to the worker pool of the agency and waits for
assignment at a client firm. The agency’s expected profit of posting a vacancy is
rΩV = −h˜+m(θT )[ΩT − ΩV ], (3.25)
where h˜ denotes the cost of a vacancy.7 The expected profit of having a worker on hold,
ΩT , is
rΩT = −wT + θAm(θA)[ΩA − ΩT ] + γT θRm(θR)[ΩV − ΩT ] + δ[ΩV − ΩT ]. (3.26)
Even in case of a filled vacancy, eq. (3.26), there is no positive flow income but, on the
contrary, the agency has to pay wT . Having a vacancy filled is only worthwhile for the
agency due to the potential assignment of the worker to a client firm. This is reflected
by the second term at the right-hand-side. In general, the last three terms denote the
expected gains/losses due to changes in the different labor market states. Finally, the
agency’s expected profit of assigning a worker to a client firm is given by
rΩA = x− wA + γAθRm(θR)[ΩV − ΩA] + χ[ΩT − ΩA], (3.27)
7Agency’s vacancy costs h˜ differ from the firm’s vacancy costs h with h > h˜. This reflects the fact
that the firms’ screening process of potential employees is more intensive, since they are more interested
in long-term employment relationships and stronger rules of employment protection apply, while agencies
are able to quit the employment relationship easier.
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where x−wA denotes the flow profit in this state. Using eqs. (3.25) - (3.27), the agency’s
job creation can formally be described as
h˜
m(θT )
=
θAm(θA)(x− wA)− wT [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
[r + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR) + δ] · [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]− χθAm(θA) . (3.28)
3.4 Solution of the Model
Recalling the assumption that the values of being unemployed, being in the pool of the
temporary employment agency, and being assigned to a client firm coincide, the wage rates
of assigned and unassigned temporary workers can be derived using the workers’ asset
functions. The bargaining problems between firms and unions and firms and agencies are
interrelated due to the substitutability of regular and temporary agency employment in
the firms’ production technology. Hence, the whole bargaining game consists of two stages
involving three bargaining parties: Firms, unions, and temporary employment agencies.
(i) In the first stage, there are two simultaneous bargaining games. On the one hand,
the firm bargains with the agency over the fee the firm has to pay to the agency to
use temporary agency workers in the production process. As we are dealing with
one-worker agencies, the bargaining problem is of the type individual bargaining.
On the other hand, the labor union determines the wage rate of regular workers.
As the union is responsible for all regular workers in a firm, the bargaining problem
is a collective one. For both bargaining games the model uses the so-called right-
to-manage model. The negotiation games are further specified in the respective
subsections.
(ii) In the second stage, the firm uses its “right to manage” to set the respective em-
ployment levels for regular and temporary agency workers.
In order to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the whole bargaining game,
the two stages have to be solved by backward induction.
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3.4.1 Firm’s Labor Demand
The firm’s intertemporal profit maximization problem is given by
max
Vj,R(s)
Vj,A(s)
Lj,R(s)
Lj,A(s)
∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)
{
p[Yj(s)]Yj(s)−wR(s)Lj,R(s)− εx(s)Lσj,A(s)−h [Vj,A(s) +Vj,R(s)]
}
ds,
(3.29)
subject to the laws of motion for assigned temporary and regular workers, eqs. (3.3)
and (3.4), and the goods demand and production function, given by eqs. (3.12) and
(3.13), respectively. Thus, the current-value Hamiltonian that solves this intertemporal
maximization problem can formally be stated as
H = τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκI1−κ − wR Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R)
+ λ1[m(θR)Vj,R − δLj,R] + λ2[m(θA)Vj,A − χLj,A − γAθRm(θR)Lj,A],
(3.30)
with eqs. (3.3) and (3.4) denoting the equations of motion for the state variables Lj,R and
Lj,A, and λ1 ≡ µ1e−r(s−t) and λ2 ≡ µ2e−r(s−t) being the current-value Lagrange multipli-
ers. Variables Vj,A and Vj,R are the control variables of the intertemporal maximization
problem. Parameter κ ≡ (η − 1)/η, with κ ∈ (0, 1), reflects the firm’s monopoly power
in the goods market. The lower κ, the higher the firm’s monopoly power. The relevant
first-order conditions of the intertemporal maximization problem are
∂H
∂Vj,R
= −h+ λ1m(θR) = 0, (3.31)
∂H
∂Vj,A
= −h+ λ2m(θA) = 0, (3.32)
∂H
∂Lj,R
= ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − wR − δλ1 = rλ1 − λ˙1, (3.33)
∂H
∂Lj,A
= ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − σεxLσ−1j,A − λ2[χ+ γAθRm(θR)] = rλ2 − λ˙2. (3.34)
In the steady state it has to hold that λ˙1 = λ˙2 = 0 and ˙Lj,R = ˙Lj,A = 0. By substituting
eqs. (3.31) and (3.32) in eqs. (3.33) and (3.34), respectively, the first-order conditions
turn out to be
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − wR = (r + δ) h
m(θR)
, (3.35)
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ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ − σεxLσ−1j,A = [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
. (3.36)
Eqs. (3.35) and (3.36) determine the firm’s labor demand for regular and assigned tempo-
rary workers. Theoretically, it may be possible that firms only produce with one type of
labor. Appendix 3.A.3 discusses the conditions for such corner solutions to appear. How-
ever, in the following it is assumed that parameters are such that regular and temporary
employment are both positive, i.e. there is an interior solution.8
It can be easily shown that9
dLj,R
dwR
< 0,
dLj,R
dx
> 0,
dLj,A
dx
< 0, and
dLj,A
dwR
> 0.
3.4.2 Wage Determination for Regular Workers
The wage rate for regular workers is determined by collective bargaining. Since the union
represents all regular employed workers in a firm, it has a very strong bargaining position.
Thus, it is assumed that wages are determined by a special variant of the right-to-manage
model, namely the monopoly union model. This simplifies the formal analysis of the
model. Having monopoly power, the union has the exclusive right to set the wage rate of
regular workers. In response, the firm sets the corresponding employment level. Thus, the
union has to take account of the firm’s labor demand for regular workers that decreases in
the wage of regular workers as well as the labor demand for assigned temporary workers
that increases in the wage of regular workers.
The monopoly union maximizes its objective function, eq. (3.24), subject to the total
labor demand of the firm, given by eqs. (3.35) and (3.36). Using eqs. (3.20) and (3.23),
the rent of a single worker is given by
ΨR −ΨU = wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
. (3.37)
8This rather restrictive assumption is based on Ranjan (2013, p. 176), who uses a similar assumption
concerning the two production factors domestic labor and a foreign produced input, which are perfect
substitutes in production.
9Appendix 3.A.4 provides the detailed calculations.
CHAPTER 3. DEREGULATION OF TEMPORARY AGENCY EMPLOYMENT 61
The union’s maximization problem can formally be stated by the following Lagrangian
function:
L =
wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
· Lj,R + ξ1
[
r + δ
m(θR)
h− ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−1I1−κ + wR
]
+ ξ2
[
r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)
m(θA)
h− wR − r + δ
m(θR)
h+ σεxLσ−1j,A
]
.
(3.38)
The first-order conditions are
∂L
∂Lj,R
=
wR − z
r + δ + θRm(θR)
− ξ1 · ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ = 0, (3.39)
∂L
∂Lj,A
= −ξ1 · ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ + ξ2 · (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A = 0, (3.40)
∂L
∂wR
=
Lj,R
r + δ + θRm(θR)
+ ξ1 − ξ2 = 0. (3.41)
Combining eqs. (3.39) - (3.41), the wage rate for regular workers is given by
wR = z + Lj,R
[
(ρκ− 1)ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A
(ρκ− 1)ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − (σ − 1)σεxLσ−2j,A
]
. (3.42)
Evaluation of the RHS of eqs. (3.42) reveals that the term in brackets is positive. Thus,
the union sets the wage rate for regular workers as a mark-up over the net income of being
unemployed.
3.4.3 Determination of the Fee for Firm’s Use of Temporary
Employment
The fee for using a temporary agency worker in the production is determined by bargaining
between firms and temporary work agencies. As each agency employs only one worker, the
bargaining problem is similar to individual bargaining. In contrast to the monopoly union
model, which is used for the determination of the union’s wage claims, firms and agencies
bargain directly over the fee. This reflects the fact that a single agency is less powerful in
the negotiation process than a labor union. Furthermore, firms that hire more than one
agency worker have to bargain with several temporary employment agencies separately.
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The firm treats each additional assigned temporary worker as a marginal worker. Thus,
the rent of the firm in the Nash product equals the contribution of an additional assigned
temporary worker, which is formally represented by the partial derivative of the firms
profit with respect to Lj,A. As it has to be taken into account that the labor demand of
regular and assigned temporary workers are mutually best responses, the firm’s profit is
evaluated at the optimal labor demand for regular workers, L∗j,R. Thus, the generalized
Nash-bargaining problem between the firm and the agency can be stated as
max
x
[
ΩA − ΩT
]β
·
[∂pi(L∗j,R)
∂Lj,A
]1−β
, (3.43)
where β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the agency’s bargaining power. The agency’s rent, ΩA−ΩT , can
be computed using eqs. (3.25) - (3.27) and the free entry condition, ΩV = 0. It is formally
given by
ΩA − ΩT =
x− wA + wT + h˜m(θT ) · [γT θRm(θR) + δ − γAθRm(θR)]
r + χ+ θAm(θA) + γAθRm(θR)
. (3.44)
Taking into account that the number of regular workers is chosen to maximize the firm’s
profit, the marginal contribution of an additional assigned temporary agency worker for
the firm is given by
∂pi(L∗j,R)
∂Lj,A
= wR − σεxLσ−1j,A . (3.45)
Thus, the first-order condition of the bargaining problem in eq. (3.43) is
β ·(wR−σεxLσ−1j,A ) = (1−β)·[x−wA+wT+ h˜m(θT ) ·[γT θRm(θR)+δ−γAθRm(θR)]
]
·σεLσ−1j,A .
(3.46)
After some rearrangement, the optimal fee for temporary workers can be obtained as
x = β
wR
σεLσ−1j,A
+ (1− β)
[(
wA +
h˜
m(θT )
γAθRm(θR)
)
−
(
wT +
h˜
m(θT )
[γT θRm(θR) + δ]
)]
.
(3.47)
In the hypothetical case that the whole bargaining power is on the side of the agency
(i.e. β = 1), the fee would equal the first term on the RHS. Thus, the agency would set
the fee in order to equate the unit costs of regular and assigned temporary employment.
In the other hypothetical case that the whole bargaining power is on the firm’s side (i.e.
β = 0), the fee would equal the term in brackets. It would therefore hold, that the firm’s
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fee is exactly the difference between the agency’s total costs of an assigned temporary
job and the agency’s total costs of an unassigned temporary worker. As the bargaining
power is shared between the firm and the agency, the optimal fee is the weighted sum of
the aforementioned described terms.
3.4.4 Wage Determination for Agency Workers
Workers are indifferent between being unemployed or in either state of temporary agency
employment, see eq. (3.19). Thus, the wage rates that temporary agency workers receive
can easily be computed by combining the respective asset functions. Using eqs. (3.20),
(3.21), and (3.23), the wage for unassigned temporary workers turns out to be
wT = z + (wR − z) · ΓT (θR), where ΓT (θR) =
[
(1− γT )θRm(θR)
r + δ + θRm(θR)
]
. (3.48)
Similarly, using eqs. (3.20), (3.22), and (3.23), the wage for assigned temporary workers
can be computed as
wA = z + (wR − z) · ΓA(θR), where ΓA(θR) =
[
(1− γA)θRm(θR)
r + δ + θRm(θR)
]
. (3.49)
Wages are set as a mark-up over net unemployment income. The mark-up is denoted
by Γl(θR), with l = A, T . As the wage rate for regular workers is larger than the net
income of being unemployed, it is easy to see that the mark-up is only positive if the
search effectiveness parameters γT and γA are smaller than unity. Parameters γT and γA
being equal to unity means that the search effectiveness of temporary workers coincides
with that of unemployed workers. In this case, the wage rates of both types of temporary
workers simplify to the net unemployment income, i.e. wT = wA = z. It seems plausible
to assume that the search effectiveness of unassigned and assigned temporary workers is
larger than the search effectiveness of an unemployed worker. In this case, the resulting
wage rates are smaller than the net income of being unemployed. At first sight, this sounds
counterintuitive. However, it reveals the idea that unassigned and assigned temporary
agency workers temporarily accept a lower wage, since they hope to find a regular job with
larger probability compared to looking for regular employment while being unemployed.
This is in line with the idea that temporary agency work is a stepping stone into regular
employment.
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3.5 Steady-State Equilibrium
The key endogenous variables θi, wi, x, Li and U for i = T,A,R are determined by the flow
equations (3.5) - (3.7) and (3.9), the labor demand equations (3.28), (3.35) and (3.36), the
equations for workers wage rates (3.48), (3.49) and (3.42), and the fee that firms have to
pay for using temporary agency employment in the production, eq. (3.47). Furthermore,
in equilibrium the resource constraint, that aggregate demand and aggregate production
coincide, has to hold. Hence,
Y ≡
∫ n
0
Yj
(
Pj
P
)
dj (3.50)
is fulfilled. Due to symmetry of the firms in equilibrium, the firm’s price coincides with
the aggregate price level, hence, pj = 1 and eq. (3.50) simplifies to Y = nYj. This
automatically implies that I = Yj.
3.6 Calibration
To describe the equilibrium of the model and to show the effects of the legal deregulation,
the model is calibrated using values that result in an overall unemployment rate that is
similar to what is observed for industrialized countries. The matching function that is
used in the following is of Cobb-Douglas type and formally represented by
M = ζ · V 1−αi · Sαi . (3.51)
Parameter α indexes the matching elasticity and ζ is a scale parameter denoting the
efficiency of the matching process. Following Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001), the matching
elasticity is set to α = 0.5. The scale parameter of the matching function is ζ = 0.3
(M. U. Krause & Uhlig, 2012).
As described in the outline of the model, unions are modeled to embody the full wage-
setting power in the determination of regular workers’ wages. In contrast to that, it is
assumed that in firm-agency bargaining over the firm’s fee for using temporary agency
employment, agencies have a rather low bargaining power, set to β = 0.2. This is mainly
based on two reasons. First, contrary to unions who embody specific human capital and
clearly differ from each other, firms may be rather indifferent between the agencies to
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bargain with since the workers that are represented by temporary work agencies perform
more or less simple tasks. Second, the agencies’ relatively low bargaining power reflects
the existing imbalance in the size of firms using temporary agency employment and its
supplier. Even if limiting the size of the agency in the present model to one worker is
rather restrictive, empirical studies support this imbalance in the size of the bargaining
parties. For instance, while the workforce of almost all German firms using temporary
agency employment comprises more than 50 employees (Crimmann et al., 2009), 82%
of the temporary employment agencies have less than 20 employees (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit, 2016a).
Reflecting the idea of temporary agency work being a stepping stone to regular em-
ployment, it is assumed that the search effectiveness of temporary agency workers is
larger compared to that of unemployed workers. Furthermore, the search effectiveness of
assigned temporary agency workers even exceeds that of unassigned temporary agency
workers. Even if assigned temporary agency workers are not under contract of a firm,
they already work for regular firms and therefore have a higher chance to find regular
employment compared to unassigned temporary workers. This idea is captured by the
parameterization of γA = 1.2 and γT = 1.15.
For simplicity reasons it is assumed that any type of job is destroyed with exogenous
rate δ = χ = 0.02 (M. U. Krause & Uhlig, 2012).10 The net income of being unemployed
is assumed to be related to the wage rate of regular workers with a standard value of the
replacement ratio of 60%. The interest rate is r = 0.05, goods demand elasticity is given by
η = 2.5, resulting in κ = 0.6, and the production function parameter is ρ = 0.9. Parameter
σ, assuring convexity of the cost function of assigned temporary agency employment and
reflecting firm-level costs of voluntary restrictions of temporary agency employment, is
chosen to be σ = 1.2. This ensures that the cost function is not too convex.11 The
10Haller & Jahn (2014) show that labor turnover is five times higher in temporary agency jobs than
in regular employment. In the present model, this labor turnover is described by the combination of a
higher rate of exogenous job destruction and successful on-the-job search of agency workers. However,
as a higher value for the rate of job destruction does not qualitatively change the results of Sections 3.6
and 3.7, it is for simplicity reasons assumed that δ and χ coincide.
11If the costs are too convex, there is no interior solution and the firms only use regular employment in
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size of the labor force, N , and the scale parameter of the production function, τ , are
normalized to unity. For simplicity reasons it is assumed that the costs of posting a job
at a regular firm and a temporary employment agency coincide and are equal to h = h˜ =
0.058. Parameter ε can be considered as regulatory costs of temporary agency employment
compared to regulatory costs of regular employment, which are normalized to unity. For
the calibration in this section, regulatory costs of temporary agency employment are
assumed to be slightly higher than for regular workers, i.e. ε = 1.1. This reflects still
existing legal regulations, such as the maximum period of assignment or the equal pay
obligation for regular and temporary workers. In Section 3.7, ε varies, taking values in the
domain 0.5 to 1.4. The reason for ε varying in a rather wide range is as follows: regulatory
costs of temporary agency employment may be smaller than for regular employment
(ε < 1), because there is either no or rather a weak employment protection. On the other
hand, they may be higher (ε > 1), e.g. due to the synchronization ban and re-employment
ban. Table 3.1 provides the full list of parameter values used in the calibration.
Table 3.1: Parameter Values for Germany
Parameter Description Value
α Matching elasticity 0.5
β Bargaining power of the agency 0.2
γA Search effectiveness of assigned temporary workers 1.2
γT Search effectiveness of unassigned temporary workers 1.15
δ, χ Job destruction rate 0.02
ε Regulatory costs of temporary workers 0.5-1.4
ζ Matching efficiency 0.3
η Goods demand elasticity 2.5
ρ Production function parameter 0.9
σ Non-institutional, firm-level costs of using temporary workers 1.2
τ Efficiency of the production technology 1
h, h˜ Costs of posting a vacancy 0.058
N Size of the labor force 1
r Interest rate 0.05
z Net income of being unemployed 0.6 · wR
The parameter values chosen fit well with the employment structure observable in
Germany. Temporary employment in almost all OECD countries is around 2% (CIETT,
the production. This is theoretically possible, but not realistic as the average rate of temporary agency
employment in industrialized countries is about 2%.
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2013). The observed overall unemployment rate in Germany is about 6.5% in 2016
(Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2016b). The model predicts an unemployment rate of 6.7%, al-
most coinciding with the value observed for Germany. Temporary employment (assigned
and unassigned temporary work) equals 2.7%, while the rate of regular employment is
90.6%.
3.7 Decrease in Regulatory Costs For Using Tempo-
rary Agency Workers
As indicated in Section 3.1, in recent decades there have been continuous deregulation
efforts regarding temporary agency employment aiming at more flexible European labor
markets. This section takes a closer look at the effects of such a deregulation, which
is modeled as a reduction in regulatory costs ε. Calibrating the model using the values
stated in Section 3.6 and a varying degree of ε ∈ [0.5, 1.4], the effects of a legal deregulation
on the workers’ wage rates and the firm’s fee for using temporary agency employment,
depicted in Figure 3.2, can be summarized in the following conjectures:
Conjecture 1. Workers’ wage rates decrease in increasing deregulation, while the firm’s
fee for using temporary agency employment increases in the degree of deregulation.
Furthermore, Figure 3.3 depicts the steady-state employment rates for the different
values of ε and can be summarized as follows:
Conjecture 2. The legal deregulation of temporary agency employment leads to a mono-
tonic reduction in unemployment as it lowers firm’s production costs and, thus, induces
a higher overall labor demand. At the same time, it increases regular employment and,
hence, the degree of employment covered by labor union bargaining. Unassigned temporary
employment also increases monotonically. However, there is a hump-shaped relationship
between regulatory costs and temporary agency employment used in the firm’s production.
The firm’s decision of using regular or temporary agency employment in the production
is based on the marginal costs of the respective worker. Due to the substitutability of
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both types of workers, marginal costs of regular and temporary workers have to coincide in
equilibrium and, furthermore, have to be balanced with marginal revenue. The optimality
conditions of the firm’s intertemporal optimization problem, eq. (3.35) for regular workers
and eq. (3.36) for temporary agency workers, can be rearranged such that the left-hand-
sides (LHS) equal the firm’s marginal revenue. The RHS denotes the marginal costs of
the respective type of worker:
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ = wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
, (3.52)
ρκτκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκ−1I1−κ = σεxLσ−1j,A + [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
. (3.53)
The marginal costs of both groups of workers consist of two parts each. The first term of
the respective marginal cost function reflects the unit costs of an additional worker, while
the second term represents the costs of posting a vacancy that are taken into account in
the intertemporal maximization problem.
Recall that the wage rate for regular workers, the fee, and the employment rates are
determined in two stages. In the first stage, labor unions set the wage rate wR and, at the
same time, agencies and firms bargain over the fee x. In the second stage, firms respond
by choosing the optimal employment levels of the respective type of worker based on
the determined wage rate and the fee. While unions take the employment responses for
regular and temporary agency employment into account, the one-worker agency neglects
the effects of its own behavior on the employment level of assigned temporary workers.
A reduction in regulatory costs leads ceteris paribus to a decrease in the unit costs of
temporary agency workers which, in principle, increases the firm’s demand for this type of
workers. The resulting increase in assigned temporary agency employment LA decreases
the firm’s marginal revenue. Due to the substitutability of regular and temporary agency
workers unions have to reduce their wage claims, as a reaction to the legal deregulation,
to prevent a substitution of regular employment by temporary agency workers. This
can also be seen from eq. (3.42). The resulting reduction in labor union’s wage claims
maintains the attractiveness of using regular employment compared to temporary agency
employment. Furthermore, the decrease in unit costs increases the firm’s labor demand
for regular workers. The increase in regular employment cushions the firm’s increasing
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demand for temporary agency employment initialized by the shock in ε. To state it differ-
ently, legal deregulation leads to an overall increase in firms’ labor demand, which is not
fully served by temporary agency employment, but (partly) substituted by an increase
in regular employment. Figure 3.2a shows that wR decreases monotonically, but with
decreasing rate. Furthermore, Figure 3.3a shows that LR increases monotonically, but
(a) wage rate of regular workers (b) fee for using temp. workers
(c) wage rate of assigned temp. workers (d) wage rate of unassigned temp. workers
Figure 3.2: Reaction of Fee and Wages to a Change in Regulatory Costs of Temporary
Agency Employment
with decreasing rate. The concavity of regular employment stems from the convex costs
of temporary agency employment. The higher the rate of assigned temporary agency em-
ployment, the larger its impact on the marginal costs of temporary agency workers. As
the union considers the employment effects for both types of labor input in the wage de-
termination, it anticipates that the less regulated and, ceteris paribus, the higher assigned
temporary agency employment, the higher its impact on the marginal costs of assigned
CHAPTER 3. DEREGULATION OF TEMPORARY AGENCY EMPLOYMENT 70
temporary agency workers. Thus, the substitution of regular employment by temporary
agency workers declines in LA as its impact on the marginal costs of temporary agency
employment increases. The resulting changes in the wage claims and the employment
rate of regular workers are, therefore, weaker.
As stated above, the reduction in regulatory costs directly affects the marginal costs
of temporary agency workers, LHS of eq. (3.53), and ceteris paribus increases the labor
demand for this production factor. Although, as can be seen directly from eq. (3.47), the
decrease in regulatory costs encourages the agencies to increase the fee x and, by this,
the agencies’ profit. This increase cushions the reduction in marginal costs as it opposes
the effect initialized by the shock in regulatory costs. As agencies and firms bargain
individually and agencies are small (one worker), the agency does not take into account
that the firm responses by adjusting the amount of temporary agency work due to changes
in the fee x. Even if the employment response of temporary agency employment may still
be positive overall, the increase in the fee x dampens the firm’s increasing labor demand
for this employment type induced by legal deregulation.
Furthermore, as the agency considers the firm’s demand for regular employment in
the determination of the fee x, it anticipates that the lower the legal regulation, the
lower the firm’s adjustment of regular employment to changes in regulatory costs. The
agency assumes that with decreasing ε its scope to adjust x upwards increases. Thus,
the fee x increases convexly in decreasing legal regulation of temporary agency work.
This is depicted in Figure 3.2b. However, the agency does not take into account that
the less regulated temporary agency work and, ceteris paribus, the higher the demand
for temporary agency workers, the higher its impact on the convex unit costs of this
production factor, see RHS of eq. (3.53). These two reasons, the increase in x and LA’s
increasing impact on marginal costs, finally lead to the marginal costs of temporary agency
employment being higher than the firm’s marginal revenue and, furthermore, the marginal
costs of regular employment. Thus, firms react to the agencies behavior with a reduction
in temporary agency employment in order to balance marginal revenue and marginal costs,
eq. (3.53). Overall, the aforementioned mechanisms lead to the hump-shaped relationship
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(a) regular employment (b) assigned temp. employment
(c) unemployment (d) unassigned temp. employment
Figure 3.3: Employment Reaction to a Change in Regulatory Costs of Temporary Agency
Employment
of temporary agency employment and regulatory costs, as shown in Figure 3.3b.12
Using the argumentation above, the steady-state changes of the wage rates of tempo-
rary agency workers can be explained. The wage rates of temporary workers, given in
eqs. (3.48) and (3.49), positively depend on the wage rate of regular workers. The higher
the wage rate of regular workers, the higher the mark-up on unemployment income and,
thus, the higher the wage rate of temporary agency workers. Hence, the behavior of
the wages qualitatively coincide with that of regular workers’ wages. This is depicted in
12Next to the effects on unit costs, the agency’s and union’s behavior also affects the second part of
the marginal costs, the vacancy costs that are taken into account in the intertemporal maximization
problem. For simplicity reasons, these effects are not considered in more detail in the argumentation
provided above.
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Figures 3.2c and 3.2d.
Figure 3.3c gives the steady-state unemployment rate for varying values of ε. Even
if the composition of the firm’s increased labor demand is a priori unclear, it is obvious
that legal deregulation leads to an overall increase in total employment as it decreases
the costs of regular and temporary workers. Thus, based on the depicted development
of the employment rates of regular and assigned temporary workers, legal deregulation of
temporary employment leads to a monotonic decrease in overall unemployment.
Figure 3.3d shows that unassigned temporary agency employment monotonically in-
creases in legal deregulation. Having in mind that there is a hump-shaped relationship
of assigned temporary employment and regulatory costs, this may be counterintuitive at
first sight. The reason is that legal deregulation leads to an increase in the fee x, which
increases the expected profit of the agency, eq. (3.27). More agencies enter the market
leading to an increase in employment of unassigned temporary workers. Thus, legal dereg-
ulation of temporary agency employment drives agencies to hoard idle labor waiting for
an assignment in a client firm.
Finally, Figure 3.4 takes a closer look at the firm’s profit and the union’s utility due
to changing regulatory costs. Legal deregulation of temporary agency employment leads
(a) firm’s profit (b) utility of the labor union
Figure 3.4: Evolution of Firm’s Profit and Union’s Utility due to a Change in Regulatory
Costs of Temporary Agency Employment
to a more profitable production alternative for firms and dampens union’s wage claims.
Furthermore, it decreases the costs of using temporary agency employment in the pro-
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duction. Thus, it is intuitive that the firm’s profit monotonically increases in the degree
of legal deregulation, as depicted in Figure 3.4a. Even if regular employment increases
monotonically in legal deregulation, the wage rate for regular workers and, hence, the
rent of a single worker, decreases. The increase in regular employment does not balance
the loss in individual workers’ rent. Thus, the utility of the labor union decreases in legal
deregulation, see Figure 3.4b. Even if the rate of regular employment and, as a conse-
quence, the degree of union coverage in the economy increases, unions suffer by declining
wages caused by temporary agency employment.
3.8 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter develops a theoretical model to analyze the general equilibrium effects of
the legal deregulation of temporary agency employment on negotiated wages and the
employment structure in a unionized economy. Large firms produce differentiated goods
using labor as the only production factor. Workers can either be hired directly by the firm
(regular workers) or by temporary employment agencies that lend the workers to client
firms for the production process. Both types of work are perfect substitutes. Regular
workers are represented by firm-level labor unions, which are assumed to be monopoly
unions. Temporary employment agencies are small (one worker) and bargain individually
with the firm over the fee that the agency receives from the firm for borrowing a worker.
In response to the determined fee and the claimed wage, the firm chooses the respective
employment levels used in its production.
While there already exist contributions on labor unions and temporary employment
agencies in the literature, this model is the first that combines temporary agency employ-
ment and the wage-setting behavior of labor unions in a frictional labor market to discuss
the agency’s impact on regular employment and the overall employment structure.
The most striking result is that the model predicts that legal deregulation of temporary
agency employment does not lead to a steady increase in this employment type implying
that there is no substitution of regular employment. Instead, there exists a hump-shaped
relationship between temporary agency employment and its degree of legal deregulation.
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Whereas deregulation out of a high degree of regulation leads to an increase in temporary
agency employment, its rate decreases the more extensive legal deregulation is. Thus,
deregulation efforts of the temporary agency employment sector that occurred in most
European countries in recent decades, do not inevitable lead to a strengthening of this
sector, but may even lead to a declining rate of temporary agency employment in the
economy. At the same time, the rate of regular employment increases monotonically and
overall employment benefits from the deregulation.
The reason for the hump-shaped pattern of temporary agency employment and the
steady increase in regular employment is the cost structure of temporary agency employ-
ment. There are often voluntary, non-institutional firm-level agreements restricting the
degree of temporary agency employment used in the production. Thus, the costs of tem-
porary agency employment increase convexly. The higher the rate of temporary agency
employment induced by legal deregulation, the higher the impact of the non-institutional
firm-level agreements on marginal costs. Because agencies are rather small compared to
the large firms they bargain with, they do not consider the consequences of the convex
cost structure in their negotiations. Combined with the fact that a more attractive tem-
porary agency employment forces the labor unions to reduce their wage claims for regular
employed workers to prevent employment losses and maintain the competitiveness with
temporary agency employment, temporary agency employment may even decrease in the
degree of legal deregulation, while regular employment increases monotonically. Never-
theless, even if legal deregulation does not lead to a decline in the coverage of collectively
bargained wages in the economy, it leads to a reduction in workers’ wage rates and a
reduction in labor union’s utility.
These findings reject the main argument of opponents of temporary agency employment
that its legal deregulation leads to a substitution of regular employment and to a higher
share of precarious employment. Hence, the policy makers’ idea that legal deregulation of
temporary agency employment increases the flexibility of the European labor markets and
brings people to work who may not find regular employment, seems to be verified. Thus,
legal deregulation of temporary agency employment aiming at an increasing employment
level may be continued.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Steady State Employment
Using the steady-state conditions for each labor market state, the respective job-searchers
and the condition that U+LT+LA+LR = 1, the respective equations from the perspective
of the firm can be rewritten to obtain the different employment rates across states
LT =
θTm(θT ) · (1− LR) + [χ− θTm(θT )] · LA
δ + θTm(θT ) + θAm(θA) + γT θRm(θR)
, (3.54)
LA =
θAm(θA)LT
χ+ γAθRm(θR)
, (3.55)
LR =
[1− LT (1− γT )− LA(1− γA)] · θRm(θR)
δ + θRm(θR)
. (3.56)
The numerators denote the flows into and out of the respective labor market states.
Division by the respective denominator weights the employment rates by the average
retention period of a job in the respective state.
3.A.2 Concavity of the Firm’s Instantaneous Profit
Function
Using eqs. (3.12) and (3.13), the instantaneous profit of the firm, eq. (3.14), can be written
as
pij = τ
κ(Lj,R + Lj,A)
ρκI1−κ − wj,R Lj,R − εxLσj,A − h (Vj,A + Vj,R), (3.57)
with κ = (η − 1)/η. The lower κ, the higher the firm’s monopoly power in the goods
market. The second order conditions are
∂2pi
∂L2j,R
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0, (3.58)
∂2pi
∂L2j,A
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A < 0, (3.59)
∂2pi
∂Lj,R∂Lj,A
= ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0. (3.60)
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While the necessary condition for a profit maximum is that the first-order conditions are
equal to zero, the sufficient condition for a profit maximum is
∂2pi
∂L2j,R
∂2pi
∂L2j,A
−
(
∂2pi
∂Lj,R∂Lj,A
)2
> 0. (3.61)
This can be seen to hold for κ ∈ (0, 1) and σ > 1:
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · [−σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A ] > 0. (3.62)
3.A.3 Corner Solutions in Firm’s Production
The decision of the firm, which type of labor input to use in the production, directly
depends on the marginal costs of each labor input. If the costs of an additional temporary
worker undercut (exceed) the marginal costs of a regular worker, the firm will only produce
with temporary workers (regular workers). Evaluating eqs. (3.35) and (3.36) at LA > 0
and LR = 0, it turns out that the firm will produce by solely using temporary workers in
the entire production, if
τκLρκj,RI
1−κ = σxεLσ−1A + [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
< wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
.
On the contrary, evaluating eqs. (3.35) and (3.36) at LR > 0 and LA = 0, it follows that
the final good will be produced by solely using regular employment, if
τκLρκj,RI
1−κ = wR + (r + δ)
h
m(θR)
< [r + χ+ γAθRm(θR)]
h
m(θA)
.
Choosing the cost function of temporary employment to be convex (but not too convex)
ensures to rule out the first case, since temporary employment becomes too expensive
at a certain level of production. On the other hand, a convex cost function implies that
temporary workers are relatively cheap at a low level of production, making the second
case less likely. Thus, the probability to obtain an interior solution crucially depends on
the convexity of the cost function of temporary agency employment.
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3.A.4 Derivatives of Firm’s Labor Demand
Using eqs. (3.35) and (3.36), respectively, it turns out that the labor demand decreases
with respect to its own costs, i.e. formally
dLj,R
dwR
=
1
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ < 0, (3.63)
and
dLj,A
dx
=
σLσ−1j,A
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ − σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A
< 0. (3.64)
Taking eqs. (3.63) and (3.64) into account, it can be shown that the labor demand of
regular (temporary) workers increases in the fee x (wage of regular workers)
dLj,R
dx
= −dLj,A
dx
> 0, (3.65)
dLj,A
dwR
=
ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ · dLj,RdwR
σ(σ − 1)εxLσ−2j,A − ρκ(ρκ− 1)τκ(Lj,R + Lj,A)ρκ−2I1−κ
> 0. (3.66)
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Chapter 4
Technological Unemployment
Revisited: Automation in a Search
and Matching Framework∗
4.1 Introduction
Reports in the news show on a daily basis that robots are outcompeting humans on more
and more tasks (see, for example, The Economist, 2014, 2017; Davison, 2017). This
holds true even for tasks that were seen as unautomatable just a few years ago. While
industrial robots are substituting for assembly line workers in the automotive industry
since decades, recent years are characterized by advances in driverless cars and trucks,
diagnosing diseases, producing customized parts and medical implants, writing novels,
and even doing science (National Science Foundation, 2009; Schmidt & Lipson, 2009;
Barrie, 2014; Abeliansky et al., 2015; Ford, 2015).
Ever since the publication of the working paper version of Frey & Osborne (2013, 2017),
who claim that 47% of the jobs in the United States are highly susceptible to comput-
erization over the coming two decades, policymakers, economists, and the general public
have been concerned about mass unemployment in the age of automation. However, these
∗This chapter is the result of joint work with Klaus Prettner and has appeared as Cords & Prettner
(2018).
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high numbers are criticized for various reasons. For example, Arntz et al. (2016) argue
that specific tasks get automated but not whole jobs. They incorporate this insight into
the method used by Frey & Osborne (2013, 2017) and calculate that only 9% of all jobs
in the United States can be automated in the near future when assuming such a task-
based perspective. In addition, there are compensating mechanisms in actually existing
economies such as i) decreasing prices of the goods that are produced in an automated
manner such that spending on goods and services that are produced by humans might
increase, or ii) an increase in the production of robots and 3D printers that might require
additional human labor. On top of these arguments, Bloom et al. (2018) take into account
that building robots is costly and takes time. Thus, not all jobs that could be substi-
tuted by robots from a technical perspective will indeed vanish soon. Instead, economic
considerations need to be taken into account because often it will not pay off for firms to
substitute cheap labor by expensive robots. Bloom et al. (2018) calculate that the pre-
dicted evolution of the stock of industrial robots according to the International Federation
of Robotics (2017) together with the estimates of Acemoglu & Restrepo (2017) that one
industrial robot substitutes for around six workers, implies the loss of approximately 60
million jobs worldwide until 2030.1 While these numbers are nowhere near the 47% of all
jobs mentioned by Frey & Osborne (2013, 2017), they are nevertheless large and give rise
to some concern. Thus, it is important to analyze the pathways by which robots have
the potential to lead to technological unemployment within the modern literature on the
determinants of endogenous unemployment levels.
Most recently, He´mous & Olsen (2016) and Acemoglu & Restrepo (2018) pioneered
the analysis of the effects of automation on economic growth and inequality within the
R&D-based growth literature. In He´mous & Olsen (2016), final goods are produced using
1Dauth et al. (2017) apply the analysis of Acemoglu & Restrepo (2017) to Germany and find that
there, one robot only substitutes for two manufacturing workers. Dauth et al. (2017) trace this difference
between the United States and Germany back to the flexibility of German labor unions in setting the
bargained wage. If we use the numbers of Dauth et al. (2017) as a baseline for the calculations, we would
get a lower number of jobs that will be lost due to automation until 2030 (approximately 20 million
worldwide). In addition, these calculations do not take into account that jobs will be created in the
manufacturing sector in general equilibrium.
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a variety of intermediate goods, while in Acemoglu & Restrepo (2018), final goods are
produced using a variety of tasks. In both papers the intermediate varieties/tasks are
either produced by labor or by labor-replacing machines. R&D-driven innovation leads
to new varieties/tasks that always come into existence as un-automated and, thus, have
to be produced by human labor. Firms then decide whether to make investments to
automate the production of their intermediate variety/task. Along the balanced growth
path, there is always a constant range of goods/tasks that are produced by low-skilled
workers. As a consequence, technological unemployment is less of a concern in the long
run. The wages of low-skilled workers rise due to innovation because a higher rate of
creation of intermediate goods/tasks raises the range of these goods/tasks that are pro-
duced by low-skilled labor. Even more productive automation could lead to higher wages
for low-skilled workers because it encourages more innovation. In both contributions,
technological unemployment is not at the focus.
As far as the theoretical underpinnings of changing unemployment in the age of au-
tomation are concerned, Prettner & Strulik (2017) explore some potential channels. They
propose an R&D driven growth model in which new technologies are labor-replacing
robots that substitute for low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers are either engineers in
the final goods sector or scientists in the R&D sector. Low-skilled workers are employed
at assembly lines in the final goods sector. As a consequence, the wages of low-skilled
workers stagnate in the face of automation, whereas the wages of high-skilled workers
rise. In their model, voluntary equilibrium unemployment will result if there exists a
social safety net that is financed out of a wage tax on low-skilled and high-skilled workers.
The reason is that the outside option for low-skilled workers becomes more attractive over
time because the wages of low-skilled workers stagnate, while the social security benefits
rise due to the contributions of high-skilled workers.
In an extension of the model, Prettner & Strulik (2017) show that even involuntary
equilibrium unemployment is possible in such a setting. The argument is rooted in the fair
wage theory based on Akerlof & Jellen (1990): individuals compare their own wages with
those of their peers and perceive their wage as unfair if it lies below a weighted average
of their own market clearing wage and the wage of their reference group on the labor
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market. If workers perceive their wage as unfair, they do not entail full effort at work.
The wages of high-skilled workers, which constitute the reference group for low-skilled
workers, are higher than the wages of low-skilled workers. Thus, the wages of low-skilled
workers that are perceived as fair have to be higher than their market clearing wages
to induce full effort of low-skilled workers. At this wage rate, more low-skilled workers
seek jobs than firms are willing to provide. Thus, there is involuntary unemployment of
low-skilled workers in equilibrium.
The discussions so far show that equilibrium unemployment in the age of automation
can take the form of voluntary unemployment and involuntary unemployment based on
fair wage considerations. This chapter contributes to this debate by introducing automa-
tion into the modern search and matching theory of frictional unemployment based on
Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000). Assuming that low-skilled work-
ers are easier to substitute than high-skilled workers, which is the empirically relevant
case up to now, the model predicts that automation leads to higher equilibrium wages of
high-skilled workers and to a tighter high-skilled labor market. The reverse holds true for
low-skilled workers. As a consequence, unemployment of low-skilled workers rises, while
unemployment of high-skilled workers falls.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the related literature on
automation and search and matching models. Section 4.3 contains the description of
the model. Section 4.4 derives the analytical results, while Section 4.5 concludes, draws
potential lessons for policy makers, and discusses promising future research avenues.
4.2 Related Literature
This chapter builds upon the literature on automation and the search and matching
theory of the labor market. As far as automation is concerned, Steigum (2011) and
Prettner (2018) augment the standard neoclassical growth models of Solow (1956), Cass
(1965), and Koopmans (1965) by a production factor that is a perfect substitute for
labor, while it is accumulated similar to physical capital. They show that this automation
capital has the potential to lift an economy out of the traditional stagnation steady state
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even in the absence of technological progress. The reason is that automation capital
makes the production factor labor accumulable such that the Cobb-Douglas production
technology is transformed endogenously into an AK production technology. Thus, the
possibility for long-run economic growth emerges in the neoclassical growth model, which
has considerable consequences for welfare in the long run.
While the long-run implications of capital accumulation for economic growth are strik-
ingly similar in the models of Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) on the one
hand, and in the overlapping generations model of Diamond (1965) on the other hand,
their implications on the growth effects of automation are the opposite of each other.
Sachs & Kotlikoff (2012), Benzell et al. (2015), and Sachs et al. (2015) show numerically
that long-run stagnation emerges in an overlapping generations model with automation.
Gasteiger & Prettner (2017) provide an analytical explanation for this finding. Since in-
dividuals save exclusively out of wage income in the overlapping generations model and
automation reduces wages, there is a vicious circle that prevents the economy from tak-
ing off. In the standard neoclassical growth framework of Solow (1956), Cass (1965),
and Koopmans (1965), by contrast, individuals save out of wage income and out of cap-
ital income. Thus, a similar vicious circle is not present in these types of models with
automation such that long-run growth is feasible.
Irrespective of whether automation is analyzed in the neoclassical growth models of
Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and Koopmans (1965) or in the overlapping generations model
of Diamond (1965), the distributional effects of automation are similar. Since automation
substitutes for workers but the income of robots flows to capital owners, the capital
income share of the economy rises, which is consistent with the stylized facts over the last
decades (Elsby et al., 2013; Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014). The fact that wealth is more
concentrated than income implies that the automation-induced rise in the capital income
share contributes to a rise in overall income inequality (cf. Piketty, 2014; Krusell & Smith,
2015). At the same time, low-skilled workers are still more susceptible to automation than
high-skilled workers such that automation leads to a rising skill premium and thereby
raises wage inequality (He´mous & Olsen, 2016; Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2018; Prettner &
Strulik, 2017; Lankisch et al., 2017).
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While there seems to be a consensus that automation will lead to higher inequality, the
effects on unemployment are still subject to considerable debates. To gain deeper insights
from a theoretical perspective on the endogenous evolution of involuntary unemployment,
it is necessary to consider the search and matching model a` la Mortensen & Pissarides
(1994) and Pissarides (2000). In this type of models, unemployment emerges due to search
frictions in the labor market. Assuming such a search and matching based perspective
allows to derive the effects of an increase in the stock of robots on the employment
structure via its impact on job creation and the job search behavior of workers that
responds endogenously. This chapter is the first that studies the effects of automation on
skill-specific involuntary frictional unemployment.
The contributions of Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013, 2014), Fadinger & Mayr (2014),
and Battisti et al. (2017) are related to this chapter because they use a similar method-
ological framework. While Fadinger & Mayr (2014) endogenize the state of technology
and study the effects of a change in skill endowments, the other articles analyze the im-
pact of skill-specific immigration. All of these articles share important elements with this
chapter, such as the existence of two separate labor markets, one for high-skilled workers
and one for low-skilled workers, and a similar production structure according to which
the final good is produced based on a CES production function, while the intermediate
goods are produced by high-skilled and low-skilled labor based on a linear technology.
The decisive difference to these contributions lies at the level where the exogenous shock
takes place. While low-skilled immigration substitutes for low-skilled natives in the pro-
duction of the low-skilled intensive intermediate good in Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013,
2014) and Battisti et al. (2017), automation capital appears in the production function
of the final good and substitutes for the low-skilled intensive intermediate good in this
chapter. Taking taxi drivers as an example, low-skilled immigrants may substitute for
low-skilled natives as drivers. However, self-driving cars (automation capital) will be able
to replace the occupation group of taxi drivers altogether in the not too distant future.
This aspect cannot be analyzed without the presence of the new production factor of
automation capital.
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4.3 The Model
Consider an economy in which workers have two different skill levels i = {L,H}, where
L denotes low-skilled individuals and H denotes high-skilled individuals. The skills are
distributed exogenously on a two-point distribution: the fraction λ of the population is
low skilled, while the remaining fraction 1−λ is high skilled. Normalizing the population
size to unity implies that the population shares of a particular skill level are equal to the
numbers of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, respectively. Time evolves continuously
and workers can be in either of two states: employed or unemployed. Workers live indefi-
nitely, are risk neutral, discount the future at the constant rate r > 0, and cannot choose
to switch their skill level, i.e., education is exogenous and fixed.
4.3.1 Production Technology
Three goods are produced in the economy. A final consumption good Y and two in-
termediate goods YH and YL that are used in the production of the final good. Each
high-skilled worker produces one unit of the intermediate good YH and each low-skilled
worker produces one unit of the intermediate good YL. Due to this structure, there is no
need to distinguish between the employment level of a given skill type i and the output
of the corresponding intermediate good i, thus, YH ≡ H and YL ≡ L. From now on, the
intermediate goods that are produced by low-skilled workers are referred to as low-skilled
intensive, while the intermediate goods produced by high-skilled workers are high-skilled
intensive.
Apart from high-skilled and low-skilled labor, there are two other production factors:
traditional physical capital in the form of machines, assembly lines, and factory buildings,
which is denoted byK, and automation capital in the form of industrial robots, self-driving
cars, 3D printers, etc. which is denoted by P for “programmable labor.” Automation
capital is a perfect substitute for low-skilled workers and an imperfect substitute for high-
skilled workers (cf. Lankisch et al., 2017). The CES production function of the final good
is given by
Y = AKα[γ(L+ P )σ + (1− γ)Hσ] 1−ασ , (4.1)
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where α denotes the elasticity of output with respect to traditional capital, γ ∈ (0, 1)
refers to the production weight of low-skilled intermediates and of programmable labor,
σ ∈ (−∞, 1] determines the substitutability between both types of workers, and A is an
efficiency parameter. From now on, the focus of this chapter is on the empirically relevant
case σ ∈ (0, 1), in which low-skilled and high-skilled workers are gross substitutes (Autor,
2002; Acemoglu, 2009).
All of the three goods are sold in competitive markets and the price of the final good is
used as the nume´raire, implying that the prices of the two intermediate goods pH and pL
are equal to their marginal products. Hence, it holds that pH = ∂Y/∂H and pL = ∂Y/∂L.
Furthermore, firms can buy and sell traditional capital on a competitive capital market
without delay. Thus, it holds that pK = ∂Y/∂K = r+δ, where δ denotes the depreciation
rate of traditional capital. Differentiating eq. (4.1) and using pK = ∂Y/∂K = r + δ, the
prices of the two intermediate goods are given by2
pL = (1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−σ
σ
, (4.2)
pH = (1− α)(1− γ)A 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−σσ
. (4.3)
If the rate of return on automation capital would be lower than the rate of return on
traditional capital, rational investors would only invest in traditional capital, and vice
versa. For an interior equilibrium to exist, it needs to be the case that both types of
investments deliver the same rate of return. Thus, it holds that pK = pP = r + δ, with
pP being the price of automation capital.
It can be seen immediately that – for the empirically relevant range of σ – an increase
in the number of high-skilled workers increases the price of the goods produced by low-
skilled workers and reduces the price of the goods produced by high-skilled workers. In
case of an increase in the number of low-skilled workers, the reverse is true. It is shown
later how an increase in P affects the prices of the high-skilled and low-skilled intensive
good.
2Appendix 4.A.1 provides detailed calculations.
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4.3.2 Labor Market
There are two separate labor markets, one for high-skilled labor and one for low-skilled
labor. High-skilled workers direct their job search only to the high-skill intensive sector,
while low-skilled workers direct their search only to the low-skill intensive sector (see, for
example, Belan et al., 2010; Chassamboulli & Palivos, 2013, 2014; Hagedorn et al., 2016;
Battisti et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017). The matching function of firm i can be formally
described by
Mi = M(Vi, Ui), (4.4)
where Mi denotes the instantaneous flow of hires, Vi refers to the number of vacancies that
are posted, Ui is the number of job-searchers, which equals the number of unemployed
workers, and the function M(·, ·) exhibits constant returns to scale, is increasing in both
arguments, at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada conditions. The arrival
rate of any worker per vacancy is M(Vi, Ui)/Vi ≡ m(θi), where θi ≡ Vi/Ui measures the
labor market tightness in terms of the number of vacancies per unemployed person in
the economy. From these expressions it follows immediately that the arrival rate of any
vacancy per unemployed worker is M(Vi, Ui)/Ui ≡ θim(θi). As a consequence, the arrival
rate for firms decreases in θi, whereas the arrival rate for workers increases in θi.
4.3.3 Firms
In line with the literature, the firms that produce in the intermediate goods sector are
small and each firm offers only one job (see, for example, Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994;
Albrecht & Vroman, 2002; Dolado et al., 2009; Gautier et al., 2010).3 The number of
firms is determined endogenously in equilibrium. Firms i = {H,L} can either post a
high-skill intensive vacancy, which is only suited for high-skilled workers, or a low-skill
intensive vacancy, which is only suited for low-skilled workers. The value functions of
the firms differ according to whether the firm has filled the vacancy or not. If the firm
has filled the vacancy, it produces the corresponding good i = {H,L} and sells it on the
3Pissarides (2000) shows that the outcome of the single-worker model is equivalent to a model with
large firms that face adjustment costs of employment.
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market for the price pi. The firm pays the wage wi to its workers and with a probability
(1− si) the vacancy is still filled in the next period, such that si is the exogenous rate of
job destruction. With this structure it is obvious that the value function of a firm with a
filled vacancy is given by
rΠFi = pi − wi + si(ΠVi − ΠFi ). (4.5)
By contrast, a firm that does not fill the vacancy has no labor costs and no revenues
but has to pay costs for a vacancy (e.g., job advertisement cost), which are denoted by
hi. With the probability m(θi) the firm manages to fill the vacancy such that its value
function is given by
rΠVi = −hi +m(θi)(ΠFi − ΠVi ). (4.6)
4.3.4 Workers
The behavior of workers can be analyzed in a similar vein as the behavior of firms. Workers
who are employed receive the wage wi and become unemployed in the next instant with
the probability si. Thus, the value function of an employed worker is given by
rΨEi = wi + si(Ψ
U
i −ΨEi ). (4.7)
An unemployed person receives a flow benefit zi while being unemployed. This flow benefit
includes the opportunity costs of employment such as unemployment benefits, leisure, and
the potential income generated by home production. With the probability of finding a
job being equal to θim(θi), the value function of an unemployed person is given by
rΨUi = zi + θim(θi)(Ψ
E
i −ΨUi ). (4.8)
4.4 Solution of the Model
This section solves the model, describes the steady-state solution, and provides the com-
parative statics analysis with respect to the effects of the accumulation of automation
capital on unemployment and wages of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, respectively.
CHAPTER 4. AUTOMATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT 92
4.4.1 Wage Determination
Since the workers strictly prefer being employed to being unemployed and the firms strictly
prefer a filled vacancy to the situation of an unfilled vacancy, there is a surplus to be gained
from a successful match. This chapter follows the literature and assumes that the firm and
the worker bargain over the distribution of the surplus from the match in a cooperative
bargaining process (see, for example, Mortensen & Pissarides, 1994, 1999; Pissarides,
2000; Gautier, 2002). Once a worker of type i and a firm with the same skill requirements
meet each other, they solve a generalized Nash bargaining problem given by
max
wi
{
ΨEi −ΨUi
}β
·
{
ΠFi − ΠVi
}1−β
, (4.9)
where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the worker. Maximizing the Nash
product yields the equilibrium expression for the wage rate as given by
wi = zi + (pi − zi) · Γ(θi), (4.10)
with
Γ(θi) = β
r + si + θim(θi)
r + si + θim(θi)β
.
Thus, the wage is set as a mark-up over the income enjoyed while being unemployed. The
mark-up itself consists of two parts. The first part is the profit that a firm earns if it
fills a vacancy with an employee who only earns the outside option zi. This is the largest
possible overall profit a firm could make. Second, the term Γ(θi) provides the effective
bargaining power of the workers as described by Cahuc et al. (2014). This term refers to
those part of the largest possible overall profit that a firm can make by filling a vacancy
that the workers are able to appropriate by negotiation. As is intuitive, this bargaining
power rises with the bargaining weight of the workers (β) and with the labor market
tightness (θi), whereas it decreases with the job destruction rate (si). Appendix 4.A.2
provides the detailed calculations regarding the derivation of the wage rate.
4.4.2 Labor Demand and Employment
Firms enter the market and open their vacancies as long as the expected profit of posting
a vacancy is positive. Free market entry drives the expected profit of a vacancy down to
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zero such that
ΠVi = 0 (4.11)
holds at the long-run equilibrium. Further, the present value function of a filled job,
eq. (4.5), is used and combined with the equilibrium wage level wi to obtain the following
labor demand:
hi
m(θi)
= (1− β) (pi − zi)
r + si + θim(θi)β
. (4.12)
Thus, the average costs of a vacancy equal the expected profit of a filled job.
At a steady-state equilibrium, the flows in and out of unemployment have to be equal,
i.e., U˙i = 0. Using that the number of low-skilled workers in the economy is given by
λ = UL + L, with UL being the number of unemployed low-skilled workers, while the
number of high-skilled workers is given by 1 − λ = UH + H, with UH being the number
of unemployed high-skilled workers, the steady-state unemployment rates ui are given by
UL
λ
= uL =
sL
sL + θLm(θL)
(4.13)
and
UH
1− λ = uH =
sH
sH + θHm(θH)
. (4.14)
Analogously, the employment levels are
L = λ
θLm(θL)
sL + θLm(θL)
(4.15)
and
H = (1− λ) θHm(θH)
sH + θHm(θH)
. (4.16)
4.4.3 Effects of the Accumulation of Automation Capital
Before the central results are derived and discussed, the steady-state equilibrium of the
economy will be defined.
Definition 1. A steady-state equilibrium of the developed search and matching model
with automation and skill heterogeneity is characterized by a stationary economy in which
the key endogenous variables
{
θi, pi, pk, wi, H, L,K, ui
}
are determined by the following
equations:
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(i) the flow eqs. (4.13) - (4.16),
(ii) the prices of the two intermediates as given by eqs. (4.2) and (4.3) and of capital as
given by pk = r + δ = αY/K,
(iii) the wage rates as given by eq. (4.10),
(iv) labor demand for each skill level as given by eq. (4.12).
Next, the central results of the developed model will be stated in the following three
propositions. Proposition 4.1 describes the effects of automation capital on labor market
tightness in the low-skilled labor market and in the high-skilled labor market, respectively.
Proposition 4.1. The accumulation of automation capital P decreases the labor market
tightness in the low-skilled labor market and increases the labor-market tightness in the
high-skilled labor market.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.3 for the formal proof.
To provide an intuition for this result, it is considered that an increase in the stock of
robots P reduces the price of goods produced by low-skilled workers and raises the price
of the goods produced by high-skilled workers. This gives rise to the following lemma.
Lemma 4. An increase in the stock of robots P reduces the price of goods produced by
low-skilled workers and raises the price of the goods produced by high-skilled workers.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.4 for the formal proof.
An increase in the number of robots leads to a substitution of the goods that are
produced with low-skilled labor by robots in final goods production. Thus, the price of the
goods produced by low-skilled workers decreases, which leads to lower profits of the firms
that produce low-skilled intensive goods. This in turn reduces the number of firms that
produce low-skilled intensive goods at the steady-state equilibrium and therefore reduces
the overall flow of low-skilled vacancies for a given number of low-skilled workers. Thus,
labor market tightness decreases for low-skilled workers. By contrast, the demand of the
final goods sector for intermediate goods produced by high-skilled workers increases, which
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raises the price of high-skilled intensive goods and hence the profits of firms producing
these goods. The reason is that H and P are imperfect substitutes, implying that the price
of the high-skilled intermediate good depends positively on the amount of automation and
negatively on the amount of high-skilled labor. At the steady-state equilibrium, there will
then be firm entry into the high-skilled intensive goods production such that the flow of
vacancies for a given number of high-skilled workers increases. This, in turn, raises the
tightness of the high-skilled labor market.
Proposition 4.2 describes the effects of automation capital on the unemployment rates
of both types of skills.
Proposition 4.2. The accumulation of automation capital P increases the unemployment
rate of low-skilled workers and decreases the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.5 for the formal proof.
This result is a consequence of the results obtained in Proposition 4.1. Labor market
tightness increases for high-skilled workers as automation progresses, while labor market
tightness decreases for low-skilled workers. As a consequence, the job finding probability of
high-skilled workers increases, while that of low-skilled workers decreases, which, in turn,
lowers the unemployment rate of low-skilled workers and increases the unemployment rate
of high-skilled workers.
Proposition 4.3 describes the effects of automation capital on the wage rates of both
types of workers.
Proposition 4.3. The accumulation of automation capital P decreases the wage rate of
low-skilled workers and increases the wage rate of high-skilled workers.
Proof. See Appendix 4.A.6 for the formal proof.
This finding is a consequence of the previously obtained results. It has been shown
already that the marginal product of the low-skilled intensive good in final goods pro-
duction decreases once that automation is accounted for, while the marginal product of
the high-skilled intensive good in final goods production increases. The increase in the
price of the goods produced by high-skilled workers leads to a higher match surplus for
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firms in the high-skilled intensive sector, which induces vacancy posting and raises labor
market tightness in that sector. The so induced increase in the job-finding probability of
high-skilled workers improves their outside option and strengthens their bargaining posi-
tion, which in turn raises their wage rate. For low-skilled workers, the opposite results
emerge. This channel is known from the immigration literature, where a similar produc-
tion function of the final good implies that low-skilled immigrants are perfect substitutes
for low-skilled natives and imperfect substitutes for high-skilled native workers (see, for
example, Chassamboulli & Palivos, 2013, 2014; Chassamboulli & Peri, 2015; Liu et al.,
2017).
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter uses automation capital as an additional production factor and embeds it
in the standard search and matching model augmented by skill heterogeneity, imperfect
substitutability between high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers, different search costs
and job destruction rates across skill levels. Automation capital is considered to be a
perfect substitute for low-skilled labor and an imperfect substitute for high-skilled labor.
Using this structure, it is possible to analyze how an increase in the stock of robots effects
wage inequality and involuntary unemployment across skill levels. The model predicts
that the accumulation of automation capital decreases the labor market tightness in the
low-skilled labor market and increases the labor-market tightness in the high-skilled labor
market. This leads to a rising unemployment rate of low-skilled workers and a falling
unemployment rate of high-skilled workers. In addition, automation leads to falling wages
of low-skilled workers and rising wages of high-skilled workers.
Previous contributions have clarified that higher unemployment due to automation
could come in the form of i) higher voluntary unemployment if the wages of low-skilled
workers stagnate in the wake of automation, while welfare benefits rise with the average
wage, and ii) in the form of higher involuntary unemployment if low-skilled workers per-
ceive their wage as unfair and react by exerting less effort. Then firms would need to raise
the wages for low-skilled workers above their marginal productivity to induce low-skilled
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workers to exert full effort. In this situation, equilibrium unemployment would result.
The contribution of this chapter clarifies that also higher frictional unemployment might
be a result of automation.
From a policy perspective, the issue of higher frictional unemployment could be ad-
dressed by i) raising the efficiency of the search process, ii) making sure to raise the
fraction of individuals who are skilled by investing in higher education and retraining
programs, and iii) potentially one could think about public employment programs for
low-skilled workers who are negatively affected by automation and for whom retraining
programs do not work appropriately. Such a program might put long-term unemployed
into publicly paid jobs at the community level that would not be profitable for private
firms like cleaning parks, spending time with the elderly, etc. These programs might be
a good alternative for the long-term unemployed who are cut off of the labor market,
because the net costs are just the top-up on the unemployment benefits and there might
be positive side effects apart from the benefit of the work done for the community. These
positive side effects might come in the form of higher levels of self-esteem of the persons
enrolled in such schemes, staying better integrated in the society via the connections in
the community and at the workplace, and of not losing certain basic skills.
The model that is developed in this chapter abstracts from endogenous education de-
cisions such that individuals cannot switch from being low skilled to being high skilled
subject to investment costs as in Prettner & Strulik (2017). Introducing such an en-
dogenous education decision could yield additional insights into the long-run adjustment
dynamics to rising technological unemployment. In addition, it might be interesting to
introduce a service sector in which low-skilled workers could also find work and might not
yet be threatened to get replaced by automation capital to a similar extent as in man-
ufacturing (Autor & Dorn, 2013). Another promising avenue for further research would
be to augment the search and matching model by fair wage considerations to analyze two
distinct sources of involuntary unemployment within the model (cf. Prettner & Strulik,
2017; Kuang & Wang, 2017).
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Prices of the Intermediate Goods
Differentiating the production function, eq. (4.1), with respect to the number of high-
skilled workers, with respect to the number of low-skilled workers, and with respect to
traditional capital yields
∂Y
∂H
= pH = Y (1− α)(1− γ)Hσ−1
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
, (4.17)
∂Y
∂L
= pL = Y (1− α)γ(L+ P )σ−1
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
, (4.18)
∂Y
∂K
= pK = αAK
α−1
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
] 1−α
σ
. (4.19)
Solving eq. (4.19) for K and using pK = r + δ provides us with
K =
( αA
r + δ
) 1
1−α
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
] 1
σ
. (4.20)
Next, eqs. (4.17) and (4.18) are divided by pK = αY/K, which can be derived by collecting
terms in eq. (4.19). This yields
pH
pK
=
1− α
α
(1− γ)Hσ−1K
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
, (4.21)
pL
pK
=
1− α
α
γ(L+ P )σ−1K
[
(1− γ)Hσ + γ(L+ P )σ
]−1
. (4.22)
Substituting eq. (4.20) in eqs. (4.21) and (4.22), using pK = r + δ, and rearranging leads
to the prices of the two intermediate goods as given by eqs. (4.2) and (4.3):
pL = (1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−σ
σ
,
pH = (1− α)(1− γ)A 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−σσ
.
4.A.2 Wage Determination
Once a worker and a firm with the same skill requirements meet, they bargain over the
wage rate. They solve the generalized Nash-bargaining problem given by
max
wi
{
ΨEi −ΨUi
}β
·
{
ΠFi − ΠVi
}1−β
. (4.23)
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Maximization of the Nash product delivers the sharing rule
β[ΠFi − ΠVi ] = (1− β)[ΨEi −ΨUi ]. (4.24)
Using the present value functions, eqs. (4.5) and (4.7), together with the free entry con-
dition ΠVi = 0, the rents of firms and workers can be derived as
ΨEi −ΨUi =
wi − rΨUi
r + si
and ΠFi − ΠVi =
pi − wi
r + si
. (4.25)
Substituting eq. (4.25) in eq. (4.24) and rearranging leads to
wi = βpi + (1− β)rΨUi . (4.26)
The wages are the weighted sum of the worker’s productivity and the value of unemploy-
ment. The weights are given by the bargaining power of the respective participant in
the negotiations. Next, ΨEi − ΨUi has to be substituted in the present value function for
unemployed workers, eq. (4.8). For the substitution, the sharing rule (4.24) is used. This
yields
ΨEi −ΨUi = β · S, (4.27)
with S = (ΨEi −ΨUi )+(ΠFi −ΠVi ) being the surplus of a match of the respective bargaining
parties. Using eq. (4.25), it turns out that
ΨEi −ΨUi = β
(pi − rΨUi
r + si
)
. (4.28)
Substituting eq. (4.28) in eq. (4.8), the expected value of being unemployed is
rΨUi =
zi(r + si) + piθim(θi)β
r + si + θim(θi)β
. (4.29)
Finally, inserting eq. (4.29) into eq. (4.26) and rearranging leads to the wage rate given
in eq. (4.10):
wi = zi + (pi − zi) · Γ(θi),
with
Γ(θi) = β
r + si + θim(θi)
r + si + θim(θi)β
.
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4.A.3 Proof of Proposition 4.1
To see how the wages, employment levels, etc. of workers change due to the accumulation
of automation capital, it is necessary to derive how the labor market tightness in each
labor market is affected by an increase in P . To do so, the total differential of eq. (4.12)
is calculated for each labor market, which thereby proves Proposition 4.1. Afterwards,
Propositions 4.2 and 4.3 are proved. However, before the change in wages in Section 4.A.6
can be derived, it is first necessary to derive the change in pL and pH as given by eqs. (4.2)
and (4.3) and as stated in Lemma 4. Section 4.A.4 contains the corresponding proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. In the low-skilled labor market total differentiation delivers
hL
m(θL)β
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
− [r + sL + βθLm(θL)]m′(θL)
m(θL)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
C>0
dθL
dP
=
[
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
− H
L+ P
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− β)(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−2σ
σ
Hσ−1
(L+ P )σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B>0
.
(4.30)
Rearranging yields [
C +B
H
L+ P
dL
dθL
]
dθL
dP
= B
[
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
− H
L+ P
]
. (4.31)
Analogously, the total differential in the high-skilled labor market is given by
hH
m(θH)β
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
− [r + sH + βθHm(θH)]m′(θH)
m(θH)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
D>0
dθH
dP
=
[
− L+ P
H
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
+
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− β)(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−2σσ
(L+ P )σ−1
Hσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B1>0
.
(4.32)
CHAPTER 4. AUTOMATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT 101
Rearranging yields
dθH
dP
=
B1
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
[
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
]
. (4.33)
Substituting eq. (4.33) in eq. (4.31) and simplifying yields
dθL
dP
= − BD
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
H
L+ P
< 0. (4.34)
In the next step, eq. (4.34) is substituted in eq. (4.33) to obtain
dθH
dP
=
B1C
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
> 0. (4.35)
Eqs. (4.34) and (4.35) prove Proposition 4.1.
4.A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4. Total differentiation of the price of the low-skill intensive intermediate
good delivers
dpL
dP
=
[
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
− H
L+ P
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ)
(
H
L+ P
)σ
+ γ
] 1−2σ
σ
Hσ−1
(L+ P )σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B2>0
.
(4.36)
Inserting eqs. (4.34) and (4.35) and simplifying yields
dpL
dP
= − B2CD
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
H
L+ P
< 0. (4.37)
The procedure for the price of the high-skill intensive intermediate good is similar. Total
differentiation yields
dpH
dP
=
[
− L+ P
H
dH
dθH
dθH
dP
+
(
dL
dθL
dθL
dP
+ 1
)]
×
(1− α)γA 11−α
(
α
r + δ
) α
1−α
(1− σ)(1− γ)
[
(1− γ) + γ
(
L+ P
H
)σ] 1−2σσ
(L+ P )σ−1
Hσ︸ ︷︷ ︸
B3>0
.
(4.38)
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Substituting in eqs. (4.34) and (4.35) and simplifying provides
dpH
dP
=
B3CD
C
(
D +B1
L+P
H
dH
dθH
)
+BD H
L+P
dL
dθL
> 0. (4.39)
Eqs. (4.37) and (4.39) prove Lemma 4.
4.A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Using the change in labor-market tightness in each labor mar-
ket, the change in the respective employment levels and unemployment rates, as given by
eqs. (4.13) - (4.16), can be easily derived as follows:
dL
dP
= λ
sL
[sL + θLm(θL)]2
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
dθL
dP︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0 (4.40)
duL
dP
= − sL
[sL + θLm(θL)]2
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
dθL
dP
> 0 (4.41)
dH
dP
= (1− λ) sH
[sH + θHm(θH)]2
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
dθH
dP︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0 (4.42)
duH
dP
= − sH
[sH + θHm(θH)]2
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
dθH
dP
< 0. (4.43)
Eqs. (4.41) and (4.43) prove Proposition 4.2.
4.A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Finally, it is possible to derive the change in the wage rates.
The total differential of the wage rate, as given by eq. (4.10), in each labor market is
dwL
dP
= Γ(θL)
dpL
dP︸︷︷︸
<0
+(pL − zL) (1− β)(r + sL)
[r + sL + βθLm(θL)]2
∂θLm(θL)
∂θL
dθL
dP︸︷︷︸
<0
< 0, (4.44)
dwH
dP
= Γ(θH)
dpH
dP︸︷︷︸
>0
+(pH − zH) (1− β)(r + sH)
[r + sH + βθHm(θH)]2
∂θHm(θH)
∂θH
dθH
dP︸︷︷︸
>0
> 0. (4.45)
This proves Proposition 4.3.
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Chapter 5
Endogenous Technology, Matching,
and Overqualification: Does
Low-Skilled Immigration Affect the
Technological Alignment of the Host
Country?∗
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, the number of refugees has severely increased in Germany and other
European countries. Especially countries, such as Iraq and Syria, where human rights
are violated and war is omnipresent, face a huge outflux of refugees. For example, in
Germany the number of asylum applications increased about 267% from 2014 to 2016
(Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2017). Facing this enormous increase, there is an ongoing
public and political debate within and across European countries about how this situation
changes the European Union and its member states, and how it should be dealt with.
Politicians and scientists agree that the key factor for a successful integration of these
∗A previous version of this chapter has appeared as Cords (2017).
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refugees is their participation in the labor market. However, such a substantial shock in
labor supply may strongly change the respective countries’ labor markets.
This chapter analyzes the effects of low-skilled immigration on the host country in a
theoretical model. In particular, the model investigates how the technological alignment
of the economy is altered. It is assumed that immigration is low skilled, since it is known
that most refugees from the aforementioned countries are indeed low skilled (Bru¨cker
et al., 2015a, 2015b).1 Even if there are, up to now, no completely reliable numbers
concerning the qualification of refugee immigrants, it can be concluded that about two
out of three refugees have visited at maximum secondary school. Further, about two-
thirds have not completed vocational training (compared to 14% of German citizens with
no immigration background). Even if refugee immigrants are high skilled, it remains
open if their skills are comparable to those of high-skilled natives in Europe. The reason
is that the educational system is very different between countries, such as Germany and
countries from the middle east. Hanushek & Woessmann (2015) compare the educational
performance of pupils across 81 countries. They find that the average performance of
15 year old pupils from Syria is 140 PISA-points worse than that of German pupils of
the same age. This amounts in about the knowledge pupils acquire in four to five school
years.
To analyze the effects of immigration, a search and matching model a` la Mortensen &
Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000) is applied. Thus, unemployment is present due
to the existence of frictions in the labor market. In comparison to the standard matching
model, there is more than one type of worker. Since it is distinguished between high and
low skills, natives and immigrants, and it is allowed for low-skilled immigration, the model
incorporates three groups of workers. The distribution of skills across workers is assumed
to be exogenous. Firms post either high- or low-tech vacancies, however, they cannot
distinguish ex ante whether they meet a native or an immigrant. While the skill distribu-
1Keep in mind that refugees differ from economic immigrants in several aspects, such that refugees
have on average less education and proficiency in foreign language, are initially less healthy, face initially
worse labor market expectations, etc. (see Chin & Cortes, 2015). Throughout this chapter, the notions
refugee immigration and low-skilled immigration are used interchangeably.
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tion of workers is exogenously given, the skill requirements of firms adjust endogenously.
Thus, the chapter is able to address the question how low-skilled immigration affects the
firms’ technology choice and, hence, the technological orientation of the host country as
a whole. Furthermore, it analyzes if policies that improve the access of immigrants to the
labor market counteract or even strengthen the effects that are induced by an increase in
immigration. To do so, the model builds on Albrecht & Vroman (2002), who investigate
the technology choice of firms under worker heterogeneity in the absence of immigration.
The main result of the model is that firms react to the increase in low-skilled immigra-
tion by using the basic technology more intensively. Thus, the composition of jobs in the
economy changes. Many firms shift their production to the less-advanced technology and
produce simple, less-advanced goods. It is further shown that low-skilled immigration is
beneficial for low-skilled natives, while high-skilled workers are hurt in terms of wages, but
gain in terms of employment. At first sight, this may seem implausible, since low-skilled
immigrants are competing with low-skilled natives for jobs. However, firms react to the
increase in low-skilled immigration by producing with the less-advanced technology more
intensively. Hence, the pervasive fear of low-skilled workers to get displaced by immi-
grants is unfounded at least in this type of model. As a second result, it can be shown
that policies that target at a reduction in immigrants’ costs of searching for a job, to
improve immigrants’ access to the labor market, work in the opposite direction. Firms
have an incentive to produce with the more advanced technology. Thus, the host country
is shaped by a high-tech production industry. Hence, it may be a favorable economic
policy to improve the access of immigrants to the labor market. However, such policies
hurt low-skilled natives both in terms of wages and employment, while high-skilled natives
gain in terms of wages, but lose in terms of employment. A drawback of such policies is
that the wage inequality among native skill groups increases.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 gives a brief discussion of
related literature. Section 5.3 describes the outline of the model and its components
in more detail, before the equilibrium is derived in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 provides
analytical results, i.e. analyzes the changes in the technology choices of firms, the wage-
setting and employment structure triggered by an increase in low-skilled immigration and
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by a decrease in search costs of immigrants. Section 5.6 calibrates the model to German
data and measures quantitatively the effects of these two scenarios. Finally, Section 5.7
summarizes the results and concludes.
5.2 Related Literature
The model, that will be developed in the following, combines several strands of literature.
Most of the theoretical literature in labor economics studies the effects of immigration
within a standard neoclassical growth model (for an overview, see Ben-Gad, 2004, 2008;
Moy & Yip, 2006; Palivos & Yip, 2010). However, a basic assumption of this type of
model is that there is perfect competition in the labor market and, thus, there is no
involuntary unemployment. Up to now, there exist only a few studies that analyze the
impact of immigration in a search and matching model a` la Mortensen & Pissarides (1994)
and Pissarides (2000). Ortega (2000), Liu (2010), Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013, 2014)
and Battisti et al. (2017) provide first contributions to analyze the labor market effects
of immigration. Their focus is on the effects of skill specific immigration on the wage
level, employment and its structure in the host country. However, it is not taken into
account that firms may adjust their production technology. The implementation of such
an endogenous technology choice is necessary, since skill-specific immigration leads to a
change in the relative supply of labor. As a consequence, the incentives of firms to invest
in specific technologies may change. This results in an endogenous, skill-biased technical
change. Further, it is not considered that there is a skill mismatch in the labor market.
Theoretical work on endogenous technology choices is rather limited. Acemoglu (1999)
studies the effects of skill-biased technical change. In his model, the job-filling and job-
finding rate are exogenously given, which yields to the conclusion that all jobs are identical
in the economy if the productivity difference between low- and high-skilled workers is
small and/or if the proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy is low enough.
Mortensen & Pissarides (1999) also use a model with an exogenous skill distribution of
workers and heterogeneity on both sides of the market to show that the effects of a skill-
biased technical change depend on the different systems of unemployment insurance and
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employment protection in Europe and the US. However, they assume that workers are
able to direct their search, which leads to perfect matching of workers and jobs with the
appropriate skill requirement.2 This chapter uses and extends the framework developed
by Albrecht & Vroman (2002), who investigate how a change in the productivity of a high-
skilled job changes the technology choices of firms in a closed economy. In their model,
there are two type of workers, low- and high-skilled, that are searching for a job. Jobs
differ in their skill requirement. Jobs that use the basic technology can either be performed
by low- or high-skilled workers, while a job that uses the more advanced technology can
only be occupied by a high-skilled worker.3 Davidson et al. (2008) extend this framework
to two countries that differ in the technologies firms produce with. In comparison to
this chapter, they look at the effects of offshoring and distinguish between short- and
long-run effects of offshoring. While low- and high-skilled workers are hurt in the short
run, the long-run effects of offshoring high-tech jobs in a specific industry improves the
position of low-skilled workers in the same industry. Dolado et al. (2009) use the model of
Albrecht & Vroman (2002) and enrich it by on-the-job search. Baudy (2017) goes beyond
Albrecht & Vroman (2002) and introduces temporary agency employment by assuming
that the output a regular worker produces is higher than the output a temporary worker
produces using a less advanced technology. He shows that a deregulation of temporary
agency employment affects the technological orientation of the economy through a more
intensive use of the less advanced technology.
Liu et al. (2017) are the first that study immigration in a search and matching model
that takes the labor market sorting of Albrecht & Vroman (2002) into account. How-
ever, they focus on the imperfect transferability of foreign human capital and neglect the
endogenous technology choice of firms. This chapter is the first theoretical work that
combines immigration, educational mismatch among natives and endogenous, skill spe-
2Another contribution is provided by McKenna (1996). In comparison to the other papers, he endog-
enizes the educational decision of workers in a two-sector matching model.
3For example, Gautier (2002) justifies this labor market sorting by using the example of a hamburger-
flipping job, which can be performed by everyone, while only very few skilled workers can be occupied at
NASA as an engineer.
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cific technology choices all together in a search and matching framework. Thus, it is
possible to reveal how immigration and a reduction in the barriers for integration and
participation in the labor market of immigrants affects the technological orientation of
the host country.
5.3 Outline of the Model
5.3.1 Basic Assumptions
All workers are assumed to live forever, to be risk neutral and to discount the future at
a constant rate r > 0. Further, the model is in continuous time. As in the standard
matching literature, workers can be in either of two states: employed or unemployed.
Workers differ in their country of origin, with i = {N, I}, where N stands for native and
I for immigrant. The measure of natives is normalized to 1. Immigrants are low skilled,
implying that their measure is IL = I. Furthermore, natives have different skill levels,
with j = {L,H}, where L denotes low-skilled individuals and H denotes high-skilled
individuals. The skills are distributed exogenously on a two-point distribution: fraction
p is low-skilled, while the remaining fraction 1− p is high-skilled.
Considering the jobs that firms offer, they can either be filled or vacant. There are two
type of jobs, which differ in their skill requirement. If any job is filled, it gets destroyed
with the exogenous job destruction rate δ.4 Before a firm enters the market and posts a
vacancy, it has to make a decision concerning its technology choice. The firms’ production
technology is described as follows: each firm that decides to adopt the basic technology
produces yL units of output if a job is filled, independent of the type of worker the job is
filled with.5 Thus, low- and high-skilled workers are perfect substitutes for low-tech firms.
4Assuming the job destruction rate to be equal across jobs does not change the qualitative results
and, further, simplifies the analytical derivations. Albrecht & Vroman (2002), Davidson et al. (2008) and
Dolado et al. (2009) apply the same assumption.
5It is also possible to assume that high-skilled workers produce µyL units of output. However, Gautier
(2002) points out that there is no reason to assume µ to be unequal than unity. Further, Bla´zquez &
Jansen (2008) and Dolado et al. (2009) also assume µ to be equal to unity.
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Firms that use the advanced technology can only produce with high-skilled workers.6 If
a job is filled, high-skilled workers produce yH units of output, with yH > yL.
7 Adopting
the labor market sorting of Albrecht & Vroman (2002), there are two types of equilibria:
ex-post segmentation (EPS) and cross-skill matching (CSM). In EPS, low-skilled workers
work in low-tech jobs and high-skilled workers only work in high-tech jobs, since these
workers refuse to be occupied in a low-tech job. On the other hand, in CSM, high-skilled
workers sort themselves also into low-tech jobs. The type of segmentation that emerges
depends mainly on the labor market expectations of high-skilled workers and the wage
they could earn in a low-tech job. If the wage paid for them in a low-tech job is quite low
and they expect to find a high-tech job relatively fast, they will sort themselves only in
high-tech jobs. Thus, the resulting equilibrium is an EPS. On the other hand, if the wage
that could be earned in a low-tech job is high enough and they do not expect to find a
high-tech job very fast, the resulting equilibrium is an CSM. Further, the probability that
a CSM exists is higher, the smaller the gap between the productivity in a high-tech and
low-tech job, and the smaller the share of high-skilled natives. In this chapter, the focus
is on a CSM, meaning that high-skilled workers take any job that is offered to them.8
Thus, high-skilled workers prefer to be employed in a low-tech job rather than staying
unemployed. There are mainly two reasons: first, in a richer model with more than two
skill groups, overqualification is a more prominent issue. Second, using data from the
6This chapter abstracts from studying the case where low-skilled workers can be employed in a high-
tech job. Underqualification does not seem to play a big role in a country such as Germany, for which the
model is calibrated below. McGowan & Andrews (2015) calculate the skill and qualification mismatch
based on the OECD Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC). They find that under-skilling only amounts to less
than 4 % in Germany in the year 2012, while over-skilling is around 23 %.
7Using this simple production structure keeps the model tractable and makes it possible to derive
clear analytical results. This would not be the case if a production structure like in Chapter 4 would be
considered, where a final good is produced using two intermediates, which are imperfectly substitutable.
In this case, the larger supply of low-skilled labor, due to an exogenous increase in immigration, would
decrease the price of the low-tech good and increase the price of the high-tech good. This channel, which
is investigated in Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013, 2014), would counteract the effect that arises due to
the technology adaption of firms.
8It will be shown later that the conditions for a CSM are fulfilled.
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EU-LFS for high-skilled German natives that are aged 15-64, it can be shown that 9.8 %
are overqualified.9
Unemployed workers and vacancies meet each other randomly, so that the matching
function can formally be described by
M = M(v, u). (5.1)
Search is undirected, meaning that vacancies can not direct their search to a specific type
of worker. Thus, there is a single labor market featuring low- and high-skilled workers
and low-tech and high-tech firms. The matching function exhibits constant returns to
scale, is increasing in both arguments, at least twice differentiable, and satisfies the Inada
conditions. M denotes the instantaneous flow of hires. The number of vacancies posted
are denoted by v, while the number of job-searchers equals the unemployment rate u.
Further, the fraction of vacancies that require a low-skill level is given by φ, while γ
denotes the fraction of unemployed workers that are low skilled.10 The arrival rate of
any worker per vacancy is M(v, u)/v ≡ m(θ), while the arrival rate of any vacancy per
unemployed worker is M(v, u)/u ≡ θm(θ). The arrival rate for firms decreases in θ, while
the latter one increases in θ. Variable θ ≡ v/u reflects the overall labor market tightness.
As not all combinations of firms and workers fulfill their mutual requirements, the arrival
rates can be further specified. For instance, the effective arrival rate of vacancies for
unemployed low-skilled workers is φθm(θ). Further, the effective arrival rate of workers
for a high-tech vacancy is (1− γ)m(θ).
The assumption of undirected search is often used in economic literature if workers
differ in their skills (see, e.g., Albrecht & Vroman, 2002; Wong, 2003; Dolado et al., 2009;
Chassamboulli, 2011; Agnese & Hromcova´, 2016). The reasons are manifold. First, it is
often observed that the difficulty of firms is not to trace potential applicants, but rather
the process of screening applications for the ideal candidate. For example, van Ours &
Ridder (1993) confirm this, since they find that the duration of vacancies mainly consist of
9As already mentioned above, McGowan & Andrews (2015) show that over-skilling even amounts to
approximately 23 %.
10This type of modelling follows Albrecht & Vroman (2002).
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a selection period, while attracting potential candidates takes only a relatively small time.
Another argument in favor of undirected search in models with heterogeneity on both sides
of the market is provided by Acemoglu (1999). He states that the skill level is imperfectly
correlated with observable characteristics, such as age and years of education. It will be
seen later in the description of the model that workers in this chapter do not only differ
in terms of skill and productivity, but also in terms of their outside option (for example,
due to a different entitlement towards unemployment benefits or higher search costs of
immigrants). This even reinforces Acemoglu’s argument. Lastly, Pries (2008) adds that
even if the firm should be able to reveal the productivity or the opportunity costs of a
worker once they meet, what is important for an argument in favor of directed search is
whether the productivity or the opportunity costs of a worker can be precisely identified
prior to an interview, which is indeed doubtful. For the second degree of heterogeneity,
namely if the worker is a native or an immigrant, the model follows Chassamboulli &
Palivos (2014) and Battisti et al. (2017), where firms cannot distinguish immigrants and
natives ex ante (when posting vacancies), but ex post (when bargaining about wages).
This feature explains the wage gap between immigrants and natives of the same skill
group that arises due to a weaker bargaining position of immigrants.
From the workers point of view it can be argued that a high-tech firm can not prevent to
receive applications from low-skilled immigrants. Even if the skills of immigrants may not
be comparable to the skills of high-skilled natives, and foreign professional qualifications
are often not recognized by authorities, immigrants with a self-perceived high-skill level
will also apply for a high-tech job.11 In a similar vein, it can be argued that also natives
often apply for job offers that do not really fit their specific experience and skill level
as many job advertisements are rather difficult to understand, or it may be difficult for
the workers to identify which types of skills are required in particular. This behavior is
acknowledged by firms, who know that there is seldom a job applicant that fulfills every
criteria of the job advertisement.12
11A refugee that worked as a doctor in his home country, for example, wants to get hired as a doctor
as well in Germany and will not directly apply for a position as a nurse.
12This argument is even more vigorous in reality, where workers are not classified into two skill levels,
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The way of representing the meeting technology is decisively different between the
frameworks of Albrecht & Vroman (2002) on the one hand, and Neugart & Storrie (2006)
as well as Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013, 2014) on the other hand. Albrecht & Vroman
(2002) define an overall labor market tightness and distinguish, e.g., the effective arrival
rate of vacancies for workers by multiplying the overall labor market tightness with the
fraction of high- or low-tech vacancies. Neugart & Storrie (2006) as well as Chassamboulli
& Palivos (2013, 2014) construct a specific labor market tightness for each submarket,
the former for temporary agency and regular vacancies while the latter do it for high- and
low-skill intensive jobs.13
5.3.2 Firms
Firms are small and offer only one job. Before entering the market, they ex-ante decide
which type of technology to use in their production. Once a low-tech job is filled, the
firm’s expected profit is
rΠFNL = yL − wNL + δ(ΠVL − ΠFNL), (5.2)
rΠFIL = yL − wIL + δ(ΠVL − ΠFIL), (5.3)
rΠFOH = yL − wOH + δ(ΠVL − ΠFOH). (5.4)
Low-tech vacancies can either be filled with a low-skilled native (NL), with an immigrant
(IL) or with a high-skilled worker (OH). The expected profits of a low-tech job that is
filled by a low-skilled worker (native or immigrant, respectively), are given in eq. (5.2)
and (5.3). The worker produces yL units of output, which is the same for low-skilled
natives and low-skilled immigrants, while the firm has to pay a wage rate wNL or wIL,
but feature a continuum of skills. It may be useful to consider the case of an potential applicant that
perfectly fulfills every requirement of a certain job advertisement. The only thing that is demanded in the
job advertisement and that the applicant does not exhibit is, for example, foreign experience. However,
this does not keep the potential applicant away from submitting the application.
13While this chapter uses the approach of Albrecht & Vroman (2002), Chapter 3 uses the approach of
Neugart & Storrie (2006), and Chapter 4 follows Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013, 2014).
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respectively.14 Further, the last term on the right-hand-side (RHS) denotes the loss the
firm experiences if the job is destroyed, weighted by its probability of occurrence δ. Equa-
tion (5.4) represents the case where a low-tech vacancy is filled with a high-skilled worker.
Even if the high-skilled worker is overqualified for this type of job, the output produced
is the same as for a low-skilled worker, yL. However, the firm pays a different wage wOH ,
which represents the wage a high-skilled, overqualified worker obtains. Again, the last
term on the RHS denotes the loss that occurs for the firm if the job is hit by a shock and
gets destroyed. The present value of a filled high-tech job is given by
rΠFH = yH − wH + δ(ΠVH − ΠFH). (5.5)
Since high-tech jobs can only be performed by high-skilled individuals, the output pro-
duced is yH and the wage the worker receives is wH . Again, the last term denotes the loss
if the position gets vacant.15
The firm’s expected profit of posting a low-tech vacancy is
rΠVL = −cL +m(θ)
[
γ
[
ε(ΠFIL −ΠVL ) + (1− ε)(ΠFNL −ΠVL )
]
+ (1− γ)(ΠFOH −ΠVL )
]
, (5.6)
where cL denotes the costs of a low-tech vacancy and ε is the fraction of low-skilled
unemployed that are immigrants. Considering the present value for a low-tech vacant
job, it is known that low-tech jobs can be occupied by low-skilled natives, low-skilled
immigrants or high-skilled workers. Thus, the gain a firm obtains if a job gets filled is
a weighted sum of the potential gains multiplied by the effective arrival rates and, thus,
depends on the type of worker the vacancy is filled with. In case that a low-tech vacancy
gets filled with an immigrant, the firm gains ΠFIL − ΠVL , while the effective arrival rate
is the product of the overall vacancy arrival rate m(θ) and the probability to meet an
immigrant γε. If the vacancy gets filled with a low-skilled native, the effective arrival rate
is m(θ)γ(1− ε) and the related gain of the firm is ΠFNL −ΠVL . Lastly, if the firm meets a
high-skilled worker, the vacancy is filled with rate m(θ)(1− γ), while the related gain of
the firm is given by ΠFOH − ΠVL .
14Even if immigrants and low-skilled natives produce the same output, their wages are different. Sec-
tion 5.4.1 shows that the reason is the difference in the costs of searching for a job.
15Since high-skilled individuals are necessarily natives by assumption, the index N is omitted.
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The firm’s expected profit of posting a high-tech vacancy is
rΠVH = −cH +m(θ)(1− γ)(ΠFH − ΠVH), (5.7)
with cH denoting the costs of a high-tech vacancy. The last term on the RHS denotes
the gain ΠFH − ΠVH a high-tech firm obtains if a vacant job gets filled. The gain is only
weighted by the effective arrival rate of workers for a high-tech vacancy m(θ)(1− γ). The
reason is that only high-skilled workers can perform a job with high-skill requirements.
5.3.3 Workers
The behavior of workers can be stated similar to the firms’ value functions. The expected
value of employment for low-skilled workers is given by
rΨENL = wNL + δ(Ψ
U
NL −ΨENL), (5.8)
rΨEIL = wIL + δ(Ψ
U
IL −ΨEIL). (5.9)
The wage rates wNL and wIL, respectively, denote the instantaneous wage income in a
low-tech job. The second term on the RHS reflects the loss from becoming unemployed,
weighted by its probability of occurrence δ.
The expected value of employment for high-skilled workers is given by
rΨEOH = wOH + δ(Ψ
U
H −ΨEOH), (5.10)
rΨEH = wH + δ(Ψ
U
H −ΨEH). (5.11)
Per instantaneous time interval, a high-skilled worker that is employed in a low-tech
firm receives wage rate wOH . A high-skilled worker that is employed in a high-tech firm
obtains wage rate wH per instantaneous time interval. Again, the second term on the RHS
reflects the loss from becoming unemployed, weighted by its probability of occurrence δ,
respectively.
Finally, the present value functions of being unemployed are
rΨUNL = zL + θm(θ)φ(Ψ
E
NL −ΨUNL), (5.12)
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rΨUIL = zL − hI + θm(θ)φ(ΨEIL −ΨUIL), (5.13)
rΨUH = zH + θm(θ)
[
(1− φ)(ΨEH −ΨUH) + φ(ΨEOH −ΨUH)
]
, (5.14)
for low-skilled natives, immigrants and high-skilled natives, respectively. While being
unemployed workers receive a flow income zj, which includes the opportunity costs of
employment such as unemployment benefits, leisure and the payoff from home produc-
tion. Further, the search costs of immigrants are denoted by hI . It is more difficult for
immigrants to find a job, compared to natives, due to existing language barriers, the lack
or non-existence of a social network, non-recognition of foreign professional qualifications,
social stigma against immigrants and so forth. As natives do not face these problems,
there are no search costs for native job seekers (the same assumption is also applied in
Ortega, 2000; Battisti et al., 2017; Chassamboulli & Palivos, 2014; Liu et al., 2017). The
last term on the RHS describes the expected gain from possible changes in the labor
market state. For low-skilled workers of either origin the gain is weighted by the effective
arrival rate of low-tech vacancies θm(θ)φ. Considering eq. (5.14), the potential gain of
changing the labor market state is a weighted sum, since high-skilled workers can either be
hired by a low-tech, or a high-tech firm. The weights are depicted by the effective arrival
rate of low-tech vacancies θm(θ)φ, and the effective arrival rate of high-tech vacancies
θm(θ)(1− φ), respectively.
5.4 Solution of the Model
5.4.1 Wage Determination
Once a low-skilled native and a low-tech firm meet each other, they solve a generalized
Nash bargaining problem given by
max
wNL
{
ΨENL −ΨUNL
}β
·
{
ΠFNL − ΠVL
}1−β
, (5.15)
where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the bargaining power of the worker. Maximizing the Nash
product gives
wNL = zL + (yL − zL) · ΓL(θ), (5.16)
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with ΓL(θ) = β
r+δ+θm(θ)φ
r+δ+θm(θ)βφ
. Thus, the wage for low-skilled natives is set as a mark-up
over the income enjoyed while being unemployed. The mark-up ΓL(θ) gives the effective
bargaining power of low-skilled natives, see Cahuc et al. (2014).
The wage rate for high-skilled workers that are employed in a high-tech firm is deter-
mined in a similar way. The wage is given by
wH = zH + (yH − zH) · ΓH(θ)− (1− β)θm(θ)βφ(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
, (5.17)
with ΓH(θ) = β
r+δ+θm(θ)
r+δ+θm(θ)β
denoting the effective bargaining power of all high-skilled na-
tives. In comparison to the wage rate for low-skilled natives, the effective bargaining
power does not depend on the fraction of vacancies that require a particular skill type
as high-skilled workers are able to work in both type of jobs. Further, the wage rate is
lowered by the last term on the RHS due to the possibility of a mismatch.
The wage rate for immigrants can be stated as follows
wIL = zL − hI + [yL − (zL − hI)] · ΓL(θ). (5.18)
Again, the wage for low-skilled immigrants is set as a mark-up over net unemployment
income zL−hI . As low-skilled natives have a better outside option than immigrants, due
to immigrants’ positive search costs, low-tech firms have to pay low-skilled natives higher
wages. Thus, low-tech firms prefer to hire immigrants.
The wage rate for high-skilled workers that work in low-tech firms is also determined
by individual bargaining. Finally, the wage turns out to be
wOH = zH + (yL − zH) · ΓH(θ) + (1− β)θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
. (5.19)
The wage is set as a mark-up over the income a high-skilled worker enjoys while being
unemployed. It should be further noted wOH > wNL as high-skilled workers have a better
outside option than low-skilled natives. Thus, low-tech firms prefer to hire low-skilled
workers rather than high-skilled workers. Appendix 5.A.1 provides detailed calculations
about the derivation of the wage rates.
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5.4.2 Labor Demand and Equilibrium
Firms that use the basic technology and the more advanced technology enter the market
and open their vacancies as long as the expected profit of posting a vacancy is positive.
Free market entry drives the expected profit of a vacancy down to zero, i.e.
ΠVH = Π
V
L = 0. (5.20)
Further, the present value functions of a filled job, eqs. (5.2) - (5.5), are used and combined
with the equilibrium wage levels wNL, wIL, wOH , and wH . Thus, the labor demand for
high-skill employment is
cH(r + δ)
m(θ)
= (1− β)(1− γ)(yH − zH)(r + δ) + φθm(θ)β(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
, (5.21)
while the labor demand for low-skill employment is given by
cL(r + δ)
m(θ)
=
γ(r + δ)(1− β)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
[
ε[yL − (zL − hI)] + (1− ε)(yL − zL)
]
+ (1− β) (1− γ)(r + δ)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
[
(yL − zH)− θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL)
]
.
(5.22)
Appendix 5.A.2 provides detailed calculations, of how the two labor demand conditions
can be derived.
In equilibrium, the flows in and out of unemployment have to be equal, i.e. u˙ = 0.
Thus, the steady-state flow for low-skilled immigrants is given by
φθm(θ)γεu = δ
[
I
1 + I
− γuε
]
. (5.23)
Immigrants meet low-tech vacancies at rate φθm(θ) per instantaneous time interval. Mul-
tiplying this rate with the rate of unemployed immigrants γεu represents the instantaneous
inflow of immigrants into jobs that demand low skills. At the same time, employment
of immigrants I
1+I
− γuε is destroyed at rate δ.16 The equilibrium in- and outflow of
low-skilled natives can be summarized as
φθm(θ)γ(1− ε)u = δ
[
p
1 + I
− γu(1− ε)
]
. (5.24)
16Recall, that the number of immigrants has to be normalized by the total number of workers, which
is given by 1 + I.
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Unemployed low-skilled natives γ(1 − ε)u find employment at a low-tech firm with rate
φθm(θ). At the same time, employment of low-skilled natives p
1+I
−γu(1−ε) is destroyed
with rate δ.
Similar to low-skilled workers, the flow into and out of unemployment for high-skilled
workers at a low-tech firm is given by
φθm(θ)(1− γ)u = δ
[
1− p
1 + I
− (1− γ)u)
]
σ, (5.25)
with σ being the fraction of high-skilled workers that are overqualified, i.e. the fraction
of high-skilled workers that are employed in low-tech jobs. Unemployed, high-skilled
natives (1− γ)u find employment at a low-tech firm with rate φθm(θ). At the same time,
employment of high-skilled natives that are employed at a low-tech firm [1−p
1+I
−(1−γ)u)]σ
is destroyed with rate δ. The equilibrium in- and outflow of high-skilled natives at a
high-tech firm can be summarized as
(1− φ)θm(θ)(1− γ)u = δ
[
1− p
1 + I
− (1− γ)u)
]
(1− σ). (5.26)
Unemployed, high-skilled natives (1− γ)u find employment at a high-tech firm with rate
(1 − φ)θm(θ). At the same time, employment of high-skilled natives that are employed
at a high-tech firm [1−p
1+I
− (1− γ)u)](1− σ) is destroyed with rate δ.
The flow eqs. (5.23) - (5.26) can be used to solve for the two endogenous variables u
and φ, which yields17
u =
δ(1− p)
(1− γ)(1 + I)[δ + θm(θ)] , (5.27)
φ =
(p+ I)(1− γ)(θm(θ) + δ)− γ(1− p)δ
θm(θ)γ(1− p) . (5.28)
It can easily be shown that the ceteris paribus changes of φ are18
∂φ
∂θ
> 0 and
∂φ
∂γ
< 0.
17Appendix 5.A.3 shows that the fraction of high-skilled workers that are employed in low-tech jobs
(σ) and the fraction of vacancies that require low-skill levels (φ) coincide.
18 ∂φ
∂θ > 0 for γ >
p+I
1+I . This is fulfilled in CSM, as low-skilled workers compete with high-skilled workers
for low-tech jobs. Hence, the job finding rate of high-skilled workers is greater than the one of low-skilled
workers.
CHAPTER 5. IMMIGRATION AND ENDOGENOUS TECHNOLOGY CHOICE 124
In order to derive the unemployment rates for each group of workers, it is taken into
account that uIL ≡ γεuI (1 + I), uNL ≡ γ(1−ε)up (1 + I), and uH ≡ (1−γ)u1−p (1 + I). Solving the
respective worker flows, the unemployment rates are given by19
uIL =
UIL
I
= uNL =
UNL
p
=
δ
δ + φθm(θ)
and uH =
UH
1− p =
δ
δ + θm(θ)
. (5.29)
Using the unemployment rates for low-skilled natives and immigrants, it can be easily
verified that ε ≡ UIL
UIL+UNL
reduces to ε = I
p+I
.
The interest of this chapter is on an equilibrium where all types of workers are employed
and cross-skill matching is present, i.e. high-skilled natives work in both type of jobs. In
order that such an equilibrium exist the following conditions have to hold: yL > zL, which
automatically implies that yL > zL− hI . Further, it has to hold that yh > zH and for the
existence of CSM
(yL − zH)(r + δ) > θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL). (5.30)
Appendix 5.A.4 provides detailed explanations.
Finally, the four endogenous variables u, θ, γ and φ can be determined using the labor
demand conditions, eqs. (5.21) and (5.22), and the expressions for the unemployment rate
and the fraction of vacancies that require a low-skill level, eqs. (5.27) and (5.28).
5.5 General Equilibrium Analysis
5.5.1 The Effects of Low-skilled Immigration
The model presented above is rather sophisticated and incorporates different mechanisms
through which native workers are affected by an influx of immigration. In order to derive
some analytical results, before the model will be calibrated, a few assumptions are made.
To analyze the effects of an inflow of immigration, modeled by an increase in I, it is
considered that the costs of a vacancy are identical across jobs (cH = cL). It is further
assumed that the costs of searching for a job for natives and low-skilled immigrants are
19The unemployment rates of low-skilled natives and immigrants coincide, as they have the same
effective arrival rate and the same job destruction rate. The levels of employment (EH , ENL and EIL)
can be derived in a similar manner.
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identical, i.e. hI = 0. This implies that the wages of low-skilled natives and immigrants
are identical, meaning that the only difference between those two types of workers lies
in their country of origin.20 Considering job creation of low-skilled jobs, eq. (5.22), it is
evident that the fraction of unemployed low-skilled workers that are immigrants (ε) drops
out. Thus, immigration does not directly affect natives through the job creation channel
anymore, since the expected profit of a low-tech job does not depend on the composition
of low-skilled workers.
Proposition 1 Assuming that the costs of a vacancy are identical across jobs (cH = cL),
and that the costs of searching for a job are the same for all low-skilled workers (hI = 0),
it can be shown that an influx of low-skilled immigrants I
(i) Encourages firms to invest in the basic technology φ;
(ii) Increases the wage rate wNL and decreases the unemployment rate uNL of low-skilled
natives;
(iii) Decreases the wage rates wH and wOH , and the unemployment rate uH of high-skilled
natives.
Proof. See Appendix 5.A.5 for the formal proof.
The mechanisms behind the result in (i) are the following. An increase in immigration
raises the relative supply of the low-skilled production factor. Thus, the effective arrival
rate of those workers increases, which in turn raises the expected profit out of a low-tech
job. Hence, firms decide ex-ante to invest more in the basic technology.
The findings in (ii) follow from the result in (i). On the one hand, the increase in the
fraction of low-tech vacancies increases the effective arrival rate for low-skilled natives,
since the entry of low-skill firms also raises labor market tightness. This relative demand
effect is known from Albrecht & Vroman (2002), who exogenously increase the proportion
of low-skilled workers, and Dolado et al. (2009), who analyze the case of skill upgrading.
20This case is, thus, slightly different from the case of an exogenous increase of low-skilled natives,
since this shock would increase the proportion of low-skilled natives in an economy. This is not the case
for an exogenous increase of low-skilled immigrants.
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On the other hand, there is a countervailing effect since low-skilled natives face a higher
competition due to the new arrivals. However, this effect is weaker than the corresponding
effects in Albrecht & Vroman (2002) and Dolado et al. (2009), since the relative supply of
low-skilled natives does not increase, but even decreases due to immigration. As the first
effect dominates the latter one, the unemployment rate of low-skilled natives decreases.
A smaller unemployment rate raises the scope of bargaining for low-skilled natives. Thus,
their wage rate increases.
The intuition for (iii) is as follows. Due to the increase in the fraction of low-tech
vacancies, the value of unemployment for high-skilled workers decreases. The reason
is that the gain for high-skilled workers is larger if they are employed in a high-tech
firm, compared to a low-tech firm, see eq. (5.14). On the other hand, the availability of
more low-tech vacancies increases the overall job offer arrival rate. As the former effect
dominates, all high-skilled workers reduce their wage claims. This leads to a concomitant
decrease in high-skilled natives’ unemployment rate.
These findings support the results of the directed technological change literature, see
Acemoglu (1998, 2002).21 An increase in the supply of the low-skilled production factor
triggers entry in the sector that uses this factor intensive in production, which in turn
increases the relative efficiency of that factor via a market-size effect and decreases the
relative price of that factor. When the supply of low-skilled workers increases, the market
for the basic technology expands. Thus, more effort will be devoted to invest in the basic
technology (market-size effect). In contrast, when the relative price of the simple good
decreases, the technology used in its production demands a lower price, which decreases
the incentive to upgrade the basic technology (price effect). If the goods are gross or
perfect substitutes in consumption, the market-size effect dominates the price effect.
5.5.2 The Effects of a Change in Search Costs of Immigrants
In order to improve the integration of immigrants in the society, an easier access to the
labor market serves as a precondition. Therefore, it is often an aim of politicians to reduce
21Fadinger & Mayr (2014) extend this result to matching frictions in skill-specific labor markets.
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the costs of searching for a job of immigrants, e.g. through language courses, a more
improved advice in a job center and so on. Further, the longer immigrants live in the host
country, the better they learn the language and the more they assimilate into the society.
Hence, both the specific targeted policies of politicians and the willingness of immigrants
to become part of the society reduce the barriers for integration and participation in the
labor market, i.e. immigrants’ search costs hI decline.
Proposition 2 Assuming that the costs of a vacancy are identical across jobs (cH = cL),
a decrease in the search costs of immigrants hI
(i) Discourages firms to invest in the basic technology φ;
(ii) Decreases the wage rate wNL and increases the unemployment rate uNL of low-skilled
natives;
(iii) Increases the wage rates wH and wOH , and the unemployment rate uH of high-skilled
natives.
Proof. Appendix 5.A.6 provides the formal proof.
The mechanisms behind the result in (i) are described below. The difference in search
costs among low-skilled natives and immigrants ensures that the expected profit of a low-
tech job depends on the composition of low-skilled workers. A decrease in search costs
of immigrants leads to an increase in the flow income of unemployment for immigrants
zL − hI . This increase in turn decreases the expected profit of a low-tech firm. The
reason is that the higher outside option of low-skilled immigrants translates into a smaller
surplus the firm obtains from matching with an immigrant, as immigrants claim higher
wages. Since the expected profit of a low-tech job declines, less firms will decide to use
the basic technology and, thus, φ declines.
The findings in (ii) follow from (i). The decline in the fraction of low-tech vacancies
directly decreases the effective arrival rate for low-skilled natives. Thus, less low-skilled
natives exit the unemployment pool. A higher unemployment rate reduces the scope of
bargaining for low-skilled natives. Thus, the wage rate of low-skilled natives decreases.
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The result in (iii) can be explained in the following way. The decrease in the fraction of
low-tech vacancies translates into a higher value of unemployment for high-skilled natives.
Therefore, all high-skilled workers increase their wage claims, since it is less painful for
high-skilled natives to be unemployed. The rise in their wage rates also increases their
unemployment rate, as the firms’ wage costs for high-skilled workers are higher.
5.6 Quantitative Results
This section calibrates the model to German data, to show how immigration quantitatively
affects the technological alignment of the economy and the labor market outcomes of
different types of workers. Further, the calibration is used to assess how it changes the
total steady-state surplus of the economy. For the welfare analysis it is assumed that all
firms are owned by natives who obtain all the profits. Thus, overall welfare of natives is
W = Y + zHUH + zLUNL − vφcL − v(1− φ)cH − wIL
[
I − UIL
]
, (5.31)
where Y = (1− σ)EHyH +
[
ENL + EIL + σEH
]
yL denotes the aggregate level of output.
In spirit of Chassamboulli & Palivos (2013, 2014), an alternative measure of net income
to natives that does not include the income enjoyed by unemployed natives is provided
W1 = W − zHUH − zLUNL. (5.32)
The calibration uses the following Cobb-Douglas matching function
M = ξ · uαv1−α, (5.33)
where ξ denotes the efficiency of the matching process and α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the match-
ing elasticity. The model is fully characterized by 14 parameters. Table 5.1 lists eight
parameters that are taken from available empirical literature. First, the elasticity of the
matching function α is set to 0.5, which is in the range of estimates reported in Petrongolo
& Pissarides (2001). Second, following most of the literature, including Petrongolo & Pis-
sarides (2001), the bargaining power β is set to 0.5, so that the Hosios condition (α = β)
is fulfilled (Hosios, 1990). Next, the matching efficiency parameter ξ and the produc-
tivity in a low-tech job yL are normalized to unity. Following Hobijn & S¸ahin (2009),
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Table 5.1: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value Source
α Matching elasticity 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
β Bargaining power 0.5 Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)
ξ Matching efficiency parameter 1 Normalized
yL Production in a low-tech job 1 Normalized
r Quarterly real interest rate 0.012 Chassamboulli & Palivos (2014)
δ Quarterly job destruction rate 0.0318 Hobijn & S¸ahin (2009)
p Share of low-skilled natives 0.74 Battisti et al. (2017)
I Ratio of low-skilled immigrants 0.1215 Battisti et al. (2017)
the quarterly job destruction rate δ for Germany is calculated to be 0.0318, while the
quarterly real interest rate r is estimated to be 0.012 (Chassamboulli & Palivos, 2014).
Finally, Battisti et al. (2017) estimate the share of low-skilled natives p to be 0.74, while
the normalized number of low-skilled immigrants I can then be calculated to be 0.1215.22
The remaining six parameters of the model are chosen such that the model reflects seven
calibration targets obtained from German data, see Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Matched Targets
Target Source Value
Return to skill for native workers EU-SILC 1.45
Native-immigrant wage premium EU-SILC 1.10
Replacement ratios, both skill groups Battisti et al. (2017) 0.44
Vacancy to unemployment ratio EU-LFS, Eurostat 0.35
Fraction of vacancies that require low skills IAB Job Vacancy Survey 0.81
Fraction of unemployed that are low skilled EU-LFS 0.56
Notes: All targets are constructed for Germany. All values that are obtained by the EU-LFS and EU-
SILC databases refer to working age population, aged 15-64 or 18-64 (depending on the availability
of the data). Further, they are averaged over the period 2005-2015. The vacancy data from the
IAB Job Vacancy Survey ranges between years 2010-2015. The skill groups are calculated using
educational attainments of the ISCED-11 classification system. Individuals are low skilled up to
secondary school certificate, i.e. up to level 4 of the ISCED scale. Those individuals between levels
5 and 8 of the ISCED scale are high skilled.
22The ratio of low-skilled immigrants is obtained by dividing their raw number by the native labor
force.
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Table 5.3 shows the six parameters that are obtained by exactly reproducing the num-
ber of moments with the model for Germany.23
Table 5.3: Calibrated Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
cH Costs of a high-tech vacancy 2.88
cL Costs of a low-tech vacancy 1.30
yH Production in a high-tech job 1.67
hI Search costs of low-skilled, unemployed immigrants 0.61
zL Flow income of low-skilled, unemployed workers 0.40
zH Flow income of high-skilled, unemployed workers 0.59
Notes: Calibrated from moments of the data for Germany.
5.6.1 Increase in Low-skilled Immigration
This section analyzes the effects of low-skilled immigration by increasing the share of
immigrants in the labor force by one percentage point, i.e. it increase from 12.15% to
13.15%. Table 5.4 provides the results for the full version of the model, with hI > 0
and cH > cL. In comparison to the simplified version that was investigated analytically,
immigration also has a direct effect via job creation, see eq. (5.22), since it is cheaper
for firms to hire immigrants due to their higher search costs. An increase in immigration
leads to an increase in the expected profit of a low-tech firm, which results in an enhanced
vacancy posting of low-tech jobs. Thus, in the full model, the relative demand effect is even
strengthened by the effect that is active through job creation.24 This leads to a decreasing
unemployment rate of low-skilled natives, while their scope of bargaining increases.
Considering high-skilled natives, the availability of more low-tech vacancies increases
their overall job offer arrival rate. On the other hand, there is a negative effect on the
23In both simulation exercises that are conducted below, the conditions for CSM are fulfilled.
24Dolado et al. (2009) show that there are opposing effects in the case of skill-upgrading and that it is
a priori unclear how the unemployment rate of high-skilled workers reacts. They use a similar argument
and explain that it is more likely that the demand effect outweighs the supply effect in case of on-the-job
search.
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Table 5.4: The Effects of an Increase in Low-skilled
Immigration (Changes in Percentage Points)
(1)
Variable hI > 0
cH > cL
Overall
θ 0.96
γ -0.02
φ 1.34
u -0.10
Low-skilled Natives
wNL 0.08
uNL -0.11
Low-skilled Immigrants
wIL 0.16
uIL -0.11
High-skilled Natives
wH -0.37
wOH -0.37
uH -0.05
Welfare and Output
W -0.08
W1 -0.04
Y 0.84
outside option of high-skilled workers since their expected labor income decreases due to
the increase in the fraction of low-tech jobs. As the latter effect is dominant, their value
of unemployment decreases. Thus, high-skilled natives reduce their wage claims, while
their unemployment rate decreases. In contrast to Liu et al. (2017), the mismatch ratio
among high-skilled natives increases due to the shift towards the basic technology.
Further, the analysis of the basic model in Section 5.5.1 together with Table 5.4 reveal
that almost all effects coincide for both specifications of the model, whereas the only
qualitative difference is that γ decreases. The driving force for the decrease in the fraction
of unemployed that are low skilled is the larger decrease in the unemployment rate of low-
skilled workers due to enhanced low-tech vacancy posting.
Finally, it is worth noting that these effects are exactly the opposite one expects in a
model with perfect competition and no search frictions. In the present model, low-skilled
natives gain due to higher search costs (implying lower net unemployment benefits) of
low-skilled immigrants, while high-skilled natives lose due to the possibility of cross skill
matching and the endogenous response of firms. Low-skilled immigration encourage firms
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to invest more in the basic technology. Thus, the technological orientation of the economy
shifts away from more advanced, innovative products to less advanced, simpler products.25
The shift in the production towards cheaper, simpler products goes along with a decrease
in welfare. Aggregate production increases despite the adoption of the basic technology.
5.6.2 Decrease in Search Costs of Immigrants
This section quantifies the effects of a decrease in the search costs of low-skilled immi-
grants. It is assumed that they decrease by one percentage point. Table 5.5 illustrates
the results for the full model. The qualitative results are exactly the same as for the
Table 5.5: The Effects of a Decrease in Search Costs of
Low-skilled Immigrants (Changes in Percentage Points)
Variable Change
Overall
θ -1.19
γ 0.16
φ -0.96
u 0.10
Low-skilled Natives
wNL -0.08
uNL 0.11
Low-skilled Immigrants
wIL 0.45
uIL 0.11
High-skilled Natives
wH 0.25
wOH 0.25
uH 0.06
Welfare and Output
W 0.04
W1 0.00
Y 0.05
simplified version of the model analyzed in Section 5.5.2. A decrease in the search costs
of low-skilled immigrants raises their expected utility of being unemployed. Since im-
migrants are better off while being unemployed, wage pressure increases and, thereby,
25This result is in line with the findings reported in empirical studies suggesting that the production
technology responds endogenously to immigration induced changes in the relative supply of labor. A
few recent studies are Lewis (2003) and Doms & Lewis (2006) for the US, Gonza´lez & Ortega (2011) for
Spain, and Dustmann & Glitz (2015) for Germany.
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unemployment goes up. Both, the decrease in the search costs and the increase in the
wage rate lower the expected profit from a filled low-tech job. Hence, firms invest ex-ante
less in the basic technology, implying a decrease in overall labor market tightness and the
fraction of low-tech vacancies. As a consequence, the effective arrival rate for low-skilled
natives declines. Hence, their unemployment rate goes up, forcing low-skilled natives to
dampen their wage claims. Considering high-skilled natives, their value of unemploy-
ment increases due to the decline in the fraction of low-tech vacancies. Thus, high-skilled
natives increase their wage claims leading to higher unemployment. In addition, their
mismatch ratio goes down due to the adoption of the more advanced technology.
Overall, it is evident that policies, which simplify the participation of immigrants in
the labor market, are suitable to cushion or even reverse the unfavorable shift towards
a low-tech economy. However, they lead to an increase in the wage gap among natives.
As expected, the shift towards the production of high-tech goods increases aggregate
production and benefits the overall welfare of natives.
5.7 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter develops a theoretical model to study the effects of low-skilled immigration
on wages, the employment structure and especially the technology choice of firms in a
host country with labor market frictions. Firms have to decide ex ante which technology
to use for production. They can either choose a basic or a more advanced technology.
Native workers are either low or high skilled, whereas immigrants are assumed to be low
skilled. While the skill distribution of workers is exogenous, the technology choice of the
firms are determined endogenously. It is also taken into account that overqualification
exists among high-skilled natives. Thus, a high-tech firm only hires high-skilled workers,
while a low-tech firm employs either a low- or a high-skilled worker.
While there already exist contributions that study one or more issues of immigration,
overqualification and endogenous technology choices, this chapter is the first that combines
all of those issues in a frictional labor market to analyze the impact of immigration on
wages, the employment structure and especially the technology choices of firms.
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The main result of the model is that firms react to an increase in low-skilled immigration
and shift their production towards the basic technology and produce simple, less-advanced
goods. Thus, the composition of jobs in the host country changes. A further, remarkable
result is that low-skilled immigration is beneficial for low-skilled natives, while high-skilled
workers are hurt in terms of wages, but gain in terms of employment. At first sight, this
may seem implausible, since low-skilled immigrants are competing with low-skilled natives
for jobs. However, firms react to the increase in low-skilled immigration by producing with
the less-advanced technology more intensively. Hence, the omnipresent fear of low-skilled
workers to get substituted by immigrants is unfounded at least in this model setting.
As a second result, it can be shown that policies that improve immigrants’ access to
the labor market, work in the opposite direction. Firms use the advanced technology
more intensively, which leads to the creation of a high-tech production industry in the
host country. From this point of view it may be a suitable economic policy to pursue a
better integration of immigrants to the labor market. On the contrary, such policies hurt
low-skilled natives both in terms of wages and employment, while high-skilled natives gain
in terms of wages, but lose in terms of employment. Thus, a disadvantage of such policies
is that the change towards high-tech production goes along with an increase in the wage
inequality among native skill groups.
The focus of this chapter is on the effects of low-skilled immigration on the technolog-
ical alignment of the host country. Therefore, a few simplifying assumptions are made,
while other interesting questions arising from the model are left for further research. For
example, it would be interesting not only to allow for an endogenous skill response of firms,
but also to endogenize the educational decision of workers. The effect on the technological
alignment of the economy would crucially depend on the degree of mismatch, since more
individuals may decide to stick to a basic education level if the mismatch of high-skilled
workers is quite pronounced in the economy. It would be interesting to examine how
the short-run effects (fixed education level) differ from the long-run effects (endogenous
education choice) as a lot of workers may decide to pursue the basic education due to the
unfavorable shift towards a low-tech economy and the drop in high-skilled workers’ wages
and employment that is induced by an increase in low-skilled immigration.
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5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Wage Determination
Once a high-skilled worker and a high-tech firm meet, they bargain over the wage rate.26
They solve the generalized Nash-bargaining problem given by
max
wH
{
ΨEH −ΨUH
}β
·
{
ΠFH − ΠVH
}1−β
. (5.34)
Maximization of the Nash product delivers the sharing rule
β[ΠFH − ΠVH ] = (1− β)[ΨEH −ΨUH ]. (5.35)
Using the present value functions, eqs. (5.5) and (5.11), together with the free entry
condition ΠVH = 0, the rents of firms and workers can be substituted by
ΨEH −ΨUH =
wH − rΨUH
r + δ
and ΠFH − ΠVH =
yH − wH
r + δ
. (5.36)
Rearrangement leads to
wH = βyH + (1− β)rΨUH . (5.37)
The wage for high-skilled workers is the weighted sum of the worker’s productivity and the
value of unemployment. The weights are given by the bargaining power of the respective
participant in the negotiations. In a next step, rΨUH has to be replaced. Thus, Ψ
E
H −ΨUH
as well as ΨEOH −ΨUH have to be substituted in the present value function for unemployed
high-skilled workers, eq. (5.14). To substitute for the rent of a high-skilled worker that is
employed in a high-tech firm, the sharing rule, eq. (5.35), gives
ΨEH −ΨUH = β · S, (5.38)
with S = (ΨEH−ΨUH)+(ΠFH−ΠVH) being the surplus of a match of the respective bargaining
parties. Using eq. (5.36), it turns out that
ΨEH −ΨUH = β
(yH − rΨUH
r + δ
)
. (5.39)
26The formal derivations of the wage rates for low-skilled natives, overqualified natives and immigrants
are similar to that of high-skilled natives. Thus, their derivations are not provided in more detail.
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Considering the rent of a high-skilled worker that is employed in a low-tech job ΨEOH−ΨUH ,
the respective sharing rule suggests that the rent of an overqualified worker is
ΨEOH −ΨUH = β
(yL − rΨUH
r + δ
)
. (5.40)
Substituting eqs. (5.39) and (5.40) in eq. (5.14), the expected value of being unemployed
for a high-skilled worker is
rΨUH =
zH(r + δ) + θm(θ)β
[
(1− φ)yH + φyL
]
r + δ + θm(θ)β
. (5.41)
Finally, insertion of eq. (5.41) in eq. (5.37) and some rearrangement leads to the wage
rate given in eq. (5.17):
wH = zH + (yH − zH) · ΓH(θ)− (1− β)θm(θ)βφ(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
,
with ΓH(θ) = β
r+δ+θm(θ)
r+δ+θm(θ)β
.
5.A.2 Derivation of Equilibrium Labor Demand
Using the firm’s value functions (5.5) and (5.7) and the free-entry condition ΠVH = 0, job
creation of high-tech jobs can be stated as
cH
m(θ)(1− γ) =
yH − wH
r + δ
. (5.42)
Thus, it has to hold that the expected costs of creating a high-tech vacancy equals the
expected profit of a filled high-tech job, discounted by the effective discount rate r + δ.
Substituting wH by its expression as given by eq. (5.17), equilibrium labor demand for
high-tech jobs is
cH(r + δ)
m(θ)
= (1− β)(1− γ)(yH − zH)(r + δ) + φθm(θ)β(yH − yL)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
.
Using the firm’s value functions (5.2) - (5.4), (5.6) and the free-entry condition ΠVL = 0,
job creation of low-tech jobs can be stated as
cL
m(θ)
= γ
[
ε
yL − wIL
r + δ
+ (1− ε)yL − wNL
r + δ
]
+ (1− γ)yL − wOH
r + δ
. (5.43)
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Hence, the expected costs of creating a low-tech vacancy equals the expected profit of a
filled, discounted low-tech job. The expected profit of a filled low-tech job is a weighted
sum and depends on the type of worker the vacancy is filled with. The weights are
represented by the probability of meeting the respective type of worker. Inserting wIL,
wNL and wOH as given by eqs. (5.16), (5.18) and (5.19), equilibrium labor demand for
low-tech jobs is
cL(r + δ)
m(θ)
=
γ(r + δ)(1− β)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
[
ε[yL − (zL − hI)] + (1− ε)(yL − zL)
]
+ (1− β) (1− γ)(r + δ)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
[
(yL − zH)− θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL)
]
.
5.A.3 Derivation of σ
Solving the flow for overqualified high-skilled workers that end up in low-tech jobs,
eq. (5.25), for σ gives
σ =
φθm(θ)(1− γ)u
δ
[
1− p− (1− γ)u] . (5.44)
The unemployment rate u can be replaced by using eq. (5.27). After some rearrangement,
it turns out that the fraction of high-skilled workers that are employed in low-tech jobs
equals the fraction of low-tech vacancies, i.e. σ = φ. The intuition for this result is as
follows: every worker, independent of the respective skill level, accepts the first low-tech
job offer. Further, a firm that uses the basic technology hires the very first applicant
that arrives. Thus, the fraction of high-skilled workers that are overqualified and work
in low-tech jobs is determined by the probability that the vacancy they are facing is a
low-tech one.
5.A.4 Conditions for the Existence of CSM
A match between a firm and a worker of either skill type is formed if the respective surplus
of the match is positive. In order that each type of worker is hired, it is enough to show
that the respective profit of the firm is positive.27 Using eq. (5.5), the profit of a high-tech
27The sharing rule for high-skilled workers, for example, can be rewritten to obtain
ΠFH =
1− β
β
[ΨEH −ΨUH ].
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firm that hires a high-skilled native is
ΠFH =
yH − wH
r + δ
. (5.45)
Insertion of eq. (5.17) to substitute wH and simplification gives
ΠFH =
1− β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
(yH − zH), (5.46)
which is positive if yH > zH . Similarly, Π
F
NL > 0 if yL > zL and Π
F
IL > 0 if yL > zL − hI .
Thus, a match between a low-tech firm and a low-skilled native will be successful, since
its profit is positive. Even if an immigrant will accept a lower wage, implying that the
firms’ profit will be higher, the firm does not to wait for an immigrant. Finally, cross-skill
matching exists if ΠFOH > 0. This is the case if
(yL − zH)(r + δ) > θm(θ)β(1− φ)(yH − yL).
This assumption guarantees that
ΠFOH =
1− β
β
[ΨEOH −ΨUH ] > 0 = ΠVL . (5.47)
Thus, a low-tech firm as well as a high-skilled native prefer to form a match rather than
stay vacant or unemployed, respectively.
5.A.5 Comparative Statics for a Change in I
As discussed in Section 5.5.1, it is assumed that cH = cL = c and hI = 0. This leads the
LHS of eqs. (5.21) and (5.22) to be identical. Equalizing eqs. (5.21) and (5.22) and some
rearrangement gives
γ(r + δ)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
(yL − zL) = (1− γ)(yH − yL). (5.48)
To derive the changes in φ, γ, θ and u, eqs. (5.21), (5.27), (5.28) and (5.48) are used.
Taking the total derivative of eq. (5.28) and solving for dφ/dI gives
dφ
dI
=
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
D2 − dγdIC1 +D1
θm(θ)γ(1− p) , (5.49)
Thus, a positive profit of a firm automatically implies that the workers’ rent is positive as well, since
β ∈ (0, 1).
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where C1 ≡ (1 − p)
[
φθm(θ) + δ
]
+ (p + I)
[
δ + θm(θ)
]
, D1 ≡ (1 − γ)
[
δ + θm(θ)
]
and
D2 ≡ (p+ I)(1− γ)− φγ(1− p).28 Next, take the total derivative of eq. (5.21), rearrange
and collect terms to obtain
A1
dγ
dI
=(1− γ)θm(θ)β(yH − yL)dφ
dI
+
dθ
dI
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β)
− dθ
dI
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)β
[
c(r + δ)− (1− β)m(θ)(1− γ)φ(yH − yL)
]
m(θ)2(1− β) ,
(5.50)
with A1 ≡ (yH − zH)(r + δ) + φθm(θ)β(yH − yL). The total derivative of eq. (5.48) is
given by
dγ
dI
[
D3+(yH−yL)
[
r+δ+φθm(θ)β
]]
= (1−γ)(yH−yL)β
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
, (5.51)
where D3 ≡ (r+δ)(yL−zL). Substitution of dφ/dI by eq. (5.49) and some rearrangement
leads to
dγ
dI
=
C3
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ C4
A2
, (5.52)
with C3 ≡ (yH − yL)β (1−γ)2(p+I)γ(1−p) , C4 ≡ (yH − yL)β (1−γ)
2[δ+θm(θ)]
γ(1−p) , and A2 ≡ D3 + (yH −
yL)
[
r+δ+φθm(θ)β
]
+(1−γ)(yH−yL)β C1γ(1−p) . Using eq. (5.52), dγ/dI can be substituted
in eq. (5.49) and, thus,
dφ
dI
=
1
θm(θ)γ(1− p)
{
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
[
D2 − C1C3
A2
]
+D1 − C1C4
A2
}
. (5.53)
Finally, eqs. (5.52) and (5.53) are inserted into eq. (5.50) to derive a single equation that
only depends on the change in overall labor market tightness θ. After some computational
steps it turns out that
dθ
dI
= −C4(r + δ)(zH − zL)
A2B
, (5.54)
with
B ≡c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
A1 + (1− γ)β(yH − yL) C1
γ(1− p)
]
− ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
β
[
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) −
(1− γ)2(p+ I)(yH − yL)
γ(1− p)
]
.
28It will be shown later that D2 is positive.
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It can be easily seen that the numerator in eq. (5.54) is positive. Thus, the change in
overall labor market tightness depends on the sign of B in the denominator, since A2 is
positive as well. It is easy to verify that the first two terms in B are negative. Hence,
if the last term in corner brackets is positive, B is clearly negative. Thus, the whole
denominator of eq. (5.54) would be negative implying a positive relationship between
overall labor market tightness and low-skilled immigration. The term is positive if it
holds that
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) −
(1− γ)2(p+ I)(yH − yL)
γ(1− p) > 0. (5.55)
Replacing the first fraction by eq. (5.21) gives
(yH − zH)(r + δ)
r + δ + θm(θ)β
+ (yH − yL)
[
φθm(θ)β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
− (1− γ)(p+ I)
γ(1− p)
]
> 0. (5.56)
It is a reasonable assumption to assume that the unemployment benefits of high-skilled
workers are smaller than the value of production in a low-skilled job. This assumption
can be used to simplify eq. (5.56). Thus, if this condition is fulfilled for zH = yL, it has
to hold for zH < yL as well. Since yH − yL is positive, it is enough to show that
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
− (1− γ)(p+ I)
γ(1− p) > 0. (5.57)
Now, two cases can be distinguished in order to show that eq. (5.57) is positive: in the
first extreme case that φ = 1, the first fraction equals unity. Thus, it is enough to show
that the second fraction is smaller than unity. This is the case if γ > p+I
1+I
. This condition
is fulfilled, since low-skilled workers compete with high-skilled workers for low-tech jobs.
Thus, the job finding rate of high-skilled workers is greater than the one of low-skilled
workers, since high-skilled workers can be employed in both types of jobs. In the second
extreme case, it is assumed that φ = 0. This implies that the first term reduces to
r+δ
r+δ+θm(θ)β
> 0. As there is a negative relationship between φ and γ, the latter is very
large. Thus, (1−γ)(p+I)
γ(1−p) → 0. Since eq. (5.57) is fulfilled for both extreme cases, it is also
valid for all possible combinations in between. Therefore, B is indeed negative and it
follows that
dθ
dI
> 0. (5.58)
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In order to derive the change in γ, dθ/dI has to be inserted in eq. (5.52). Expanding
the second fraction to the same denominator and some rearrangement leads to
dγ
dI
=
C4
A2B
[
B − C3
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
(r + δ)(zH − zL)
]
> 0. (5.59)
To examine how the fraction of low-tech vacancies changes due to an increase in im-
migration, eq. (5.59) has to be inserted in eq. (5.49). Simplification yields
dφ
dI
=
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
D2 +
D1
A2
(yH − yL)[r + δ + φθm(θ)β] + D1D3B1A2B − C1C3C4A22B (r + δ)(yL − zH)
θm(θ)γ(1− p) ,
(5.60)
with
B1 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
A1 − ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
β
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) − C3
]
.
It is easy to verify that B1 is negative as it is just a component of B. Thus,
dφ
dI
is only
positive if D2 ≡ (1− γ)(p+ I)− φγ(1− p) is positive. Inserting the equilibrium value for
φ, it turns out that D2 ≡ δ γ(1−p)−(p+I)(1−γ)θm(θ) . It can easily be shown that D2 is positive for
γ > p+I
1+I
, which is fulfilled. This implies that
dφ
dI
> 0. (5.61)
The changes in the unemployment rates of the different types of workers can be analyzed
forming the total differential of eq. (5.29)
duNL
dI
= − uNL
δ + φθm(θ)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
< 0, (5.62)
duIL
dI
= − uIL
δ + φθm(θ)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
< 0, (5.63)
duH
dI
= − uH
δ + θm(θ)
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
< 0. (5.64)
It is easy to see that the unemployment rates of the three type of workers decrease due to
an increase in immigration since overall labor market tightness and the fraction of low-tech
vacancies both increase in immigration. Total differentiation of the overall unemployment
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rate u does not deliver a clear sign. However, it holds that du
dI
= duNL
dI
+ duIL
dI
+ duH
dI
. Since
the unemployment rate of each type of worker on the RHS decreases, it has to hold that
du
dI
< 0. (5.65)
Finally, the changes in the four wage rates have to be determined. Taking the total
differential of eqs. (5.17) and (5.19), the wage rates of high-skilled workers are identical
and given by
dwH
dI
= β
(1− β)
[
r+δ
r+δ+θm(θ)β
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
[
yH − zH − φ(yH − yL)
]
− θm(θ)(yH − yL)dφdI
]
r + δ + θm(θ)β
.
(5.66)
Since the sign is not clear, the change in labor market tightness, eq. (5.54), and the change
in the fraction of vacancies that are opened for low-skilled workers, eq. (5.60), have to be
inserted. Rearrangement yields to
dwH
dI
= β
1− β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
[
− yH − yL
γ(1− p)
D1D3
A2B
B3 − r + δ
r + δ + θm(θ)β
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
φ(yH − yL)dθ
dI
− yH − yL
γ(1− p)
(
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
D2 +
D1
A2
(yH − yL)[r + δ + φθm(θ)β]− C1C3C4
A22B
(r + δ)(yL − zH)
)
+
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
C4
A2B
(r + δ)
{
r + δ
r + δ + θm(θ)β
(yH − zH)(yL − zH)
+ (yL − zL)(yH − yL)
(
φθm(θ)β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
− (1− γ)(p+ I)
γ(1− p)
)}]
,
(5.67)
with
B3 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3A1
A2
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
< 0.
In eq. (5.67), all terms are negative despite the one in curly brackets. If the term in
curly brackets is positive, the whole expression gets negative, which implies that the wage
of high-skilled and overqualified workers decreases due to immigration. Considering the
term in curly brackets, it has been verified before that r+δ+φθm(θ)β
r+δ+θm(θ)β
− (1−γ)(p+I)
γ(1−p) > 0. Hence,
the term in curly brackets is positive if (yH − zH)(yL − zH) ≥ (yH − yL)(yL − zL), which
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can be shown to be true for plausible parameter values and, thus,
dwH
dI
< 0 and
dwOH
dI
< 0. (5.68)
What is left is to analyze how the wage rates of low-skilled workers change in immigra-
tion. Taking the total derivative of eqs. (5.16) and (5.18), the change in the wage rates
for low-skilled natives and immigrants can be expressed as follows:
dwNL
dI
= β
(r + δ)(1− β)[
r + δ + θm(θ)βφ
]2 (yL − zL)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI︸︷︷︸
>0
+θm(θ)
dφ
dI︸︷︷︸
>0
]
> 0, (5.69)
dwIL
dI
= β
(r + δ)(1− β)[
r + δ + θm(θ)βφ
]2 (yL − zIL)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dI
]
> 0. (5.70)
5.A.6 Comparative Statics for a Change in hI
As discussed in Section 5.5.2, it is taken into account that cH = cL = c. This leads the
LHS of eqs. (5.21) and (5.22) to be identical. Equalizing eqs. (5.21) and (5.22) and some
rearrangement gives
γ(r + δ)
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
[
ε[yL − (zL − hI)] + (1− ε)(yL − zL)
]
= (1− γ)(yH − yL). (5.71)
To derive the changes in φ, γ and θ, eqs. (5.21), (5.28) and (5.71) are used. Total
differentiation of eq. (5.28) and some rearrangement gives
dφ
dhI
=
1
θm(θ)γ(1− p)
[
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
D2 − dγ
dhI
C1
]
. (5.72)
The total derivative of eq. (5.21) is similar to the previous case and given by
A1
dγ
dhI
=(1− γ)θm(θ)β(yH − yL) dφ
dhI
+
dθ
dhI
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]
∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β)
− dθ
dhI
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)β
[
c(r + δ)− (1− β)m(θ)(1− γ)φ(yH − yL)
]
m(θ)2(1− β) .
(5.73)
In a next step, the total differential of eq. (5.71) is computed, which gives
εγ(r + δ) = (1− γ)(yH − yL)β
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dhI
]
− dγ
dhI
[
D4 + (yH − yL)
[
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
]]
,
(5.74)
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with D4 ≡ (r+ δ)
[
ε[yL− (zL−hI)] + (1− ε)(yL− zL)
]
. Substituting dφ/dhI by eq. (5.72)
and rearrangement gives
dγ
dhI
=
C3
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
− εγ(r + δ)
A3
, (5.75)
with A3 ≡ D4 + (yH − yL)
[
r + δ + φθm(θ)β
]
+ (1 − γ)(yH − yL)β C1γ(1−p) . Furthermore,
replacement of dγ/dhI , eq. (5.75), in eq. (5.72) leads to
dφ
dhI
=
1
θm(θ)γ(1− p)
{
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
[
D2 − C1C3
A3
]
+
C1
A3
εγ(r + δ)
}
. (5.76)
Using eqs. (5.75) and (5.76) in eq. (5.73) it is possible to derive a single equation that
only depends on the change in overall labor market tightness:
dθ
dhI
= −εγ(r + δ)
A3B4
[
A1 + (1− γ)(yH − yL)β C1
γ(1− p)
]
> 0, (5.77)
with
B4 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
C3
A3
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
A1 + (1− γ)β(yH − yL) C1
γ(1− p)
]
− ∂θm(θ)
∂θ
β
[
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) −
(1− γ)2(p+ I)(yH − yL)
γ(1− p)
]
< 0.
In order to see how the fraction of unemployed that are low skilled change in search costs
of low-skilled immigrants, eq. (5.77) has to be inserted in eq. (5.75). This gives
dγ
dhI
= − B5
A3B4
εγ(r + δ) < 0, (5.78)
with
B5 ≡
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
[
β
c(r + δ)
m(θ)(1− β) − C3
]
< 0.
As dθ
dhI
> 0 and dγ
dhI
< 0, using eq. (5.72) it is easy to verify that
dφ
dhI
> 0. (5.79)
Total differentiation of the overall unemployment rate and the unemployment rates of
each type of worker gives their changes as
du
dhI
=
u
(1− γ)(1 + I)[δ + θm(θ)]
[[
δ + θm(θ)
] dγ
dhI
− (1− γ)∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
]
< 0, (5.80)
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duNL
dhI
= − uNL
δ + φθm(θ)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dhI
]
< 0, (5.81)
duH
dhI
= − uH
δ + θm(θ)
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
< 0, (5.82)
duIL
dhI
= − uIL
δ + φθm(θ)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
+ θm(θ)
dφ
dhI
]
< 0. (5.83)
Next, to analyze the change in the wage rates of high-skilled workers, the total differentials
are build. These are identical and are, thus, given by
dwH
dhI
= β
(1− β)
[
r+δ
r+δ+θm(θ)β
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI
[
yH − zH − φ(yH − yL)
]
− θm(θ)(yH − yL) dφdhI
]
r + δ + θm(θ)β
.
(5.84)
Substitution of eq. (5.76) and eq. (5.77) leads to
dwH
dhI
= −β 1− β
r + δ + θm(θ)β
εγ(r + δ)
A3B4
[
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
D5D6
1− γ
+
yH − yL
γ(1− p)C1
(
c(r + δ)
[
r + δ + θm(θ)β
]∂m(θ)
∂θ
m(θ)2(1− β) −
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
βD6
)]
,
(5.85)
with D5 ≡ A1 + (1 − γ)β(yH − yL) C1γ(1−p) and D6 ≡ c(r+δ)m(θ)(1−β) − (1−γ)
2(p+I)(yH−yL)
γ(1−p) . Thus,
the wage rates for high-skilled workers decrease as long as the term in big corner brackets
is negative. This condition holds, so that
dwH
dhI
< 0 and
dwOH
dhI
< 0. (5.86)
Finally, the change in the wage rate for low-skilled natives is given by
dwNL
dhI
= β
(r + δ)(1− β)[
r + δ + θm(θ)βφ
]2 (yL − zL)
[
φ
∂θm(θ)
∂θ
dθ
dhI︸︷︷︸
>0
+θm(θ)
dφ
dhI︸︷︷︸
>0
]
> 0. (5.87)
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
Well-functioning labor markets are undoubtedly a prerequisite not only for individuals,
who mostly spend a large time of there life on the labor market and whose well being
depend on there performance and thereby there wage payments, but also for governments
and societies as economic growth and social harmony among citizens vitally build upon a
strong participation of individuals in the labor market and a rather fair income distribu-
tion. Especially previous years have shown that labor markets come under pressure, since
several modern phenomena may change their functioning. This thesis picks up some of
these phenomena and contributes to the literature by developing four theoretical models
to consider the effects on several labor market outcomes. To be more precise, it analyzes
how the coordination of labor unions depends on the degree of product differentiation and
how the unions’ decision to merge or to stay separated affect the wage and employment
rates of workers. Further, it examines how the ongoing deregulation of temporary agency
employment affects labor market outcomes such as the rate of regularly employed work-
ers and the employment structure of the economy. In addition, the question is addressed
if low-skilled workers will be substituted by automation. Finally, the thesis discusses
how the technological alignment of an economy changes due to an exogenous inflow of
low-skilled immigrants.
Chapter 2 studies the issue of multi-unionism, which is a special feature of labor union
representation and reflects a situation where two or more labor unions represent union
members at the firm level. To do so, it uses a partial equilibrium model and examines
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how the decision of labor unions to merge or to stay independent depends on the degree
of product differentiation. The model features two labor unions and a single firm that
produces two final goods. Each good requires labor input only from one corresponding
union. The two products are either substitutable in consumption (tariff competition)
or they are complementary in consumption (tariff plurality). To identify the merger
incentives of the labor unions, the outcomes of joint bargaining are compared to those
under separate bargaining. Separate bargaining can either take place simultaneously or
sequentially. Labor unions have to decide ex-ante whether they want to merge or not. The
scope of bargaining is about wages, while the firms decide about the level of employment.
The model predicts that labor unions have strict incentives to merge if the products
are substitutable in consumption, while they want to bargain individually with the firm
for complementary products. Further, it can be shown that workers benefit from the
unions’ decision in terms of their wage rate. Only for complementary products, workers
of the union that bargains lastly under sequential bargaining would be better of under
simultaneous bargaining.
Chapter 3 analyzes the continuous deregulation efforts concerning temporary agency
employment that took place in almost all European countries in recent decades. It uses
a general equilibrium matching model to investigate the effects of a deregulation of tem-
porary agency employment on wage setting and the employment structure in a unionized
economy. The models main advantage, compared to a partial equilibrium model, is that
it goes beyond studying the optimal behavior of individual market participants, such as
temporary work agencies, and makes it possible to reveal how such a policy changes the
employment structure and the magnitude of precarious employment. Chapter 3 develops
a search and matching model with large firms that produce differentiated goods using
regularly employed workers and, in addition, temporary agency workers that may search
on-the-job for regular employment. The model further comprises firm-level labor unions
in order to see how the position of labor unions in the economy is affected through a legal
deregulation. It can be shown that the legal deregulation of temporary agency employ-
ment increases overall employment, deteriorates labor unions’ position in the economy,
as it becomes cheaper to use temporary agency employment, and decreases the wage reg-
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ular workers receive. In addition, the model identifies that even if the rate of regular
employment increases in legal deregulation, labor unions suffer from declining wages since
this negative effect outweighs the positive one, through an increase in the rate of regular
employment, in labor unions’ utility. A last and surprising result of the model is, that
it predicts a hump-shaped relationship between the degree of legal deregulation of tem-
porary agency employment and its employment rate used in production. An important
driver behind this finding are voluntary, non-institutional firm-level agreements that re-
strict the use of temporary agency employment in the production. Due to the convex cost
structure, the impact of such agreements is higher, the more deregulated and, therefore,
the more attractive it is ceteris paribus for firms to use temporary agency workers in their
production. These non-institutional agreements are normally on the agenda of employee
representations of firms, especially of those firms that operate in the manufacturing sector.
Hence, the model delivers a theoretical foundation for the real world phenomena that in
almost all industrialized countries the rate of temporary agency employment stays rela-
tively stable at a low level. As a consequence thereof, it contradicts the main argument of
opponents of temporary agency work, that the deregulation of it necessarily creates more
precarious employment in an economy.
Chapter 4 examines a relatively new research field by analyzing the effects of automa-
tion. While the rather small amount of previous studies mainly focused on the effects of
economic growth and wage inequality within the R&D growth literature, less attention
has been paid to potential changes of the unemployment structure in the era of automa-
tion. Therefore, Chapter 4 connects automation with the search and matching theory
to reveal if the accumulation of automation capital creates technological unemployment.
The model comprises one-worker firms that either operate in a low-skill intensive or high-
skill intensive intermediate sector and employ low- or high-skilled workers, with a fixed
skill distribution, respectively. Next to the two intermediate goods, traditional capital
in the form of machines, assembly lines etc., and automation capital in the form of in-
dustrial robots, 3D printer etc. are used in the production of a final good. Automation
capital serves as a perfect substitute for low-skilled labor and an imperfect substitute for
high-skilled labor in the production of the final good. Using this framework, it can be
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 153
shown that the accumulation of automation capital leads to the creation of technological
unemployment. While high-skilled workers benefit from a rising employment rate, low-
skilled workers suffer and get replaced by automation capital. As a second result, the
model predicts that automation decreases the wage of low-skilled workers and increases
the wage of high-skilled workers. The results are also of interest from the policy point of
view, since progressive automation even widens the wage inequality across skill groups,
which is already present and rising in the last couple of decades in many OECD coun-
tries. Proper investments in higher education and retraining programs may even be more
important than ever in the era of automation, to prevent that more and more low-skilled
workers will be cut off the labor market.
Chapter 5 deals with the international movement of people into a destination coun-
try, since immigration is undoubtedly an essential aspect in today’s globalized world. In
particular, it focuses on the technological orientation of the host country and studies the
effects of low-skilled immigration on the technology choices of firms. To do so, it uses a
search and matching model that incorporates two type of firms that either use a basic
technology to produce with or a more advanced technology. Firms have to decide ex-
ante with which technology they want to produce. Workers match with these vacancies
randomly and consist out of three groups: low- and high-skilled natives and low-skilled
immigrants. While the skill distribution of workers is exogenous, firms may endogenously
adjust their skill requirements. Another feature of the model is that it captures educa-
tional mismatch, since high-skilled natives may be overqualified and find employment at
a low-tech firm. The model suggests that an increase in low-skilled immigration causes
firms to change their behavior and to shift their production towards the basic technology.
In addition, another surprising result is that low-skilled natives benefit from the influx of
low-skilled immigrants due to the change in the technological orientation of the economy,
while the wage rate of high-skilled natives decreases, whereas their employment rate goes
up. Next to the effects of low-skilled immigration, the model analyzes how policies that
improve immigrants’ access to the labor market function. The model suggest exactly the
opposite: firms use the advanced technology more intensively, whereas low-skilled natives
are hurt and high-skilled natives gain in terms of wages, but lose in terms of employment.
